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Abstract		Opioid	abuse	has	reached	epidemic	status	 in	the	United	States,	and	opioids	are	the	leading	cause	of	drug-related	deaths	in	Australia	and	worldwide.	One	factor	that	 has	 not	 received	 attention	 in	 the	 addiction	 literature	 is	 intolerance	 of	uncertainty	 (IU).	 IU	 is	 personality	 trait	 characterised	 by	 exaggerated	 negative	beliefs	about	uncertainty	and	its	consequences.	This	thesis	investigates	the	links	between	IU	and	impulsive	decision-making	in	the	context	of	opioid-dependency.	Four	 experimental	 studies	 examined	 impulsive	 decision-making	 from	multiple	perspectives,	and	assessed	for	the	first	time	how	impulsivity	interacts	with	IU	in	opioid-dependent	 individuals.	 Across	 all	 four	 studies,	 opioid-dependent	 adults	reported	markedly	higher	levels	of	IU	compared	to	a	healthy	control	group.	This	consistent	 result	 provides	 strong	 evidence	 that	 IU	 is	 a	 personality	 trait	 that	 is	related	to	drug	addiction,	whether	it	may	be	a	pre-morbid	risk	factor,	a	result	of	chronic	 drug	 use	 or	 a	 co-occurring	 phenomenon	 based	 on	 shared	 neural	correlates.	A	common	thread	between	studies	was	that	IU	and	impulsivity	were	meaningfully	related	in	opioid-dependent	individuals,	but	not	in	control	groups.	Specifically,	 IU	 was	 correlated	 with	 self-reported	 impulsive	 personality	 traits,	poor	 attentional	 control,	 risk	 taking	 for	monetary	 losses	 and	 risk-aversion	 for	health	 improvements.	 No	meaningful	 correlations	were	 found	 between	 IU	 and	impulsivity	 in	control	participants.	 	These	findings	have	important	 implications	for	 addiction	 prevention	 and	 therapy.	 It	 is	 commonly	 accepted	 that	pharmaceutical	opioids	are	a	driving	factor	for	the	upsurge	in	heroin	abuse,	and	IU	 may	 be	 helpful	 to	 screen	 for	 at-risk	 individuals.	 Furthermore,	 addiction	
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treatment	could	benefit	by	addressing	IU	in	order	to	improve	faulty	beliefs	about	and	reactions	to	uncertainty.	
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Chapter	1:	Introduction	
1.1	Opioid	addiction	The	use	of	opium	can	be	dated	as	far	back	as	3000	B.C.,	and	it	left	behind	a	wake	 of	 opium	 addicts	 as	 it	 spread	 across	 the	 Middle	 East,	 Europe	 and	 Asia,	before	arriving	in	the	United	States	in	the	late	19th	century	(Escohotado,	1999).		The	powerful	hedonic	effects	of	opioids	have	made	them	appealing	recreational	drugs	 throughout	 the	 ages.	 The	 opioid	 experience	 involves	 a	 “rush”	 of	 initial	euphoria,	 a	 prolonged	 feeling	 of	 well-being,	 and	 a	 state	 of	 detachment	 from	reality	that	can	involve	sleepiness	or	unconsciousness	(Koob	&	Le	Moal,	2006).	Morphine	was	originally	prescribed	in	the	United	States	as	a	pharmaceutical	for	a	 broad	 range	 of	 ailments,	 and	 heroin	was	 later	 developed	 as	 a	 non-addictive	alternative	 that	was	marketed	 towards	mothers	 as	 a	 cough-suppressant.	 Non-medicinal	 opioids	 were	 criminalised	 in	 1914	 in	 response	 to	 the	 escalation	 of	recreational	 use	 and	 abuse	 among	 the	 general	 population	 (Acker,	 2002).	 In	recent	years,	opioids	have	been	increasingly	prescribed	as	analgesics	for	severe	short	term	and	chronic	pain	such	as	codeine,	hydrocodone,	morphine,	oxycodone	and	 fentanyl	 (Pergolizzi,	 LeQuang,	 Berger,	 &	 Raffa,	 2017).	 Opioids,	 in	 all	formulations,	 are	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 most	 dangerous	 types	 of	 psychoactive	substances	due	to	their	depressant	effect	on	the	central	nervous	system	and	high	risk	for	physical	dependency	(Darke,	Kaye,	&	Duflou,	2006).		Opioid	 abuse	 and	 related	 deaths	 have	 been	 rising	 worldwide	 at	 an	alarming	rate,	particularly	 in	 the	United	States.	 In	 the	 last	15	years,	heroin	use	has	increased	in	the	United	States	by	150%	and	heroin	overdose	deaths	by	400%	(Jones,	Logan,	Gladden,	&	Bohm,	2015).	Additionally,	there	were	33,000	opioid-
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related	 overdose	 deaths	 in	 2015	 compared	 to	 7,000	 in	 1999.	 Opioids	 are	 also	responsible	for	a	large	proportion	of	drug-related	deaths	in	Australia.		Heroin	is	the	 second	 most	 used	 illicit	 drug	 in	 Australia,	 and	 opioid-related	 fatalities	outnumber	 those	 from	 all	 other	 illicit	 drugs	 (Peacock,	 Lusk,	 &	 Bruno,	 2016).	While	heroin	use	has	remained	fairly	stable	in	Australia	for	the	last	twenty	years,	accidental	opioid	related	deaths	have	been	on	the	upturn,	with	a	160%	increase	in	 pharmaceutical	 opioid	 related	 deaths	 from	 2001	 –	 2012	 (Roxburgh	 et	 al.,	2017).		Opioid	abuse,	particularly	heroin,	has	spread	to	demographic	groups	that	are	 historically	 low-risk	 for	 heroin	 abuse,	 such	 as	 women	 and	 high-income	earners	(Jones	et	al.,	2015).	The	demographic	changes	 in	heroin	users	between	1999	 and	 2013	 in	 the	 United	 States	 is	 depicted	 in	 Figure	 1.1	 The	 dramatic	upsurge	 in	 heroin	 addiction	 has	 been	 largely	 attributed	 to	 the	 proliferation	 of	prescribed	opioid	pain	medication	(Bohnert	et	al.,	2011;	 Jones,	2013),	although	the	 path	 to	 opioid	 addiction	 is	 not	 clear-cut.	 The	 change	 in	 the	 demographic	profile	 of	 heroin	 users	may	 reflect	 a	 transition	 to	 cheaper	 and	 often	 easier	 to	procure	 heroin	 (Drug	 Enforcement	 Administration,	 2015;	 Jones,	 2013),	 as	obtaining	 illicit	 pharmaceutical	 opioids	 can	 entail	 doctor	 shopping,	 forging	prescriptions,	or	stealing	from	friends	and	family	(Degenhardt	et	al.,	2007).	It	is	possible	 that	 the	 new	 cohorts	 of	 heroin	 users	 simply	 did	 not	 have	 previous	exposure	to	opioids,	compared	to	those	with	drugs	readily	available	within	their	community,	 peers	 or	 family	 (Durrant	 &	 Thakker,	 2003;	 Hawkins,	 Catalano,	 &	Arthur,	 2002).	 The	 demographic	 shift	 shows	 us	 that	 addiction	 vulnerability	transcends	 the	 typical	 social	 and	 cultural	 risk	 factors,	 such	 as	 parental	permissiveness,	 lack	 of	 supportive	 social	 systems	 for	 educational	 success,	
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unemployment	 and	 low	 socioeconomic	 status	 (see	 Spooner	 &	 Hetherington,	2004	 for	 a	 review).	 Indeed,	 the	 first	 documented	 morphine	 addicts	 were	comprised	of	people	from	all	walks	of	life,	including	doctors	and	the	clergy,	and	the	majority	belonged	to	the	middle	class	(Escohotado,	1999).	Furthermore,	the	stereotypical	 profile	 of	 a	 “junkie”,	 as	 argued	 by	 Acker	 (2002)	 is	 not	 a	manifestation	of	a	morally	defunct	character	or	innate	criminality,	but	instead	is	a	 consequence	of	 the	vice	 subculture	 created	by	 the	 criminalisation	of	opioids.	There	 are	 clearly	 nuanced	 individual	 differences	 that	 contribute	 the	development	 of	 an	 addiction	 that	 need	 to	 be	 better	 understood	 if	 we	 hope	 to	curb	the	opioid	epidemic.		
	*	Significant	trend	(p	<	.05)		Figure	 1.1.	 Demographic	 changes	 in	 heroin	 use	 in	 the	 United	 States	 between	2002-2004	and	2011-2013.	
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Regardless	of	one’s	 trajectory	 to	opioid	addiction,	 the	negative	physical,	psychological	 and	 social	 costs	 are	 the	 same.	 A	 large	 study	 of	 heroin-related	consequences	 revealed	 that	 89%	 of	 current	 heroin	 users	 reported	 financial	problems,	78%	reported	family	problems,	78%	had	driven	under	the	influence	of	heroin,	 41%	 lost	 a	 job	 because	 of	 heroin	 use,	 38%	 experienced	 legal	ramifications,	 29%	 had	 a	 history	 of	 overdose,	 and	 27%	 had	 attended	 an	emergency	 room	 because	 of	 heroin	 (Moses,	 Woodcock,	 Lister,	 Lundahl,	 &	Greenwald,	2018).	Addiction	to	all	drug	types	is	characterised	by	a	pathological	pattern	 of	 behaviours	 involving	 loss	 of	 control	 over	 the	 amount	 of	 drugs	 used	and	 the	 amount	 of	 time	 spent	 using,	 obtaining	 or	 recovering	 from	 drugs	(American	 Psychiatric	 Association.,	 2013).	 Consequent	 social	 detriments	 often	ensue,	 in	which	one	 fails	 to	 fulfil	 obligations	 at	work,	 school	 or	 at	 home,	 or	 to	attend	 important	social	events.	Opioids	are	particularly	problematic	because	of	their	 depressant	 effect	 on	 the	 central	 nervous	 system	 that	 results	 in	 sedation,	drowsiness	and	mental	clouding	(Inturrisi,	2002).	Furthermore,	people	often	use	opioids	with	 the	primary	aim	of	disengaging	with	 the	world	 (Kreek,	Laforge,	&	Butelman,	2002).	The	physical	health	 consequences	of	opioid	abuse	are	also	very	 serious,	particularly	 when	 opioids	 are	 administered	 intravenously.	 	 Intravenous	 drug	users	 are	 at	 a	 high	 risk	 of	 contracting	 HIV,	 with	 studies	 reporting	 40%	 HIV	infection	 in	 methadone-treatment	 patients	 (Schoenbaum	 et	 al.,	 1989),	 and	 an	estimated	 55%	 attributable	 risk	 of	 HIV	 due	 to	 intravenous	 use	 (Chitwood,	Comerford,	 &	 Sanchez,	 2003).	 Furthermore,	 Hepatitis	 C	 and	 B	 are	 extremely	common	in	intravenous	drug	users,	with	one	study	observing	a	76%	prevalence	of	hepatitis	C	and	67%	prevalence	of	hepatitis	B	(Garfein,	Vlahov,	Galai,	Doherty,	
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&	Nelson,	1996).	Opioid	abuse	also	carries	a	great	risk	of	overdose,	compared	to	all	 other	 illicit	 substances	 (Susnjara,	 2015),	 primarily	 due	 to	 respiratory	depression	(Inturrisi,	2002).	The	primary	cause	of	death	among	heroin	users	is	overdose,	and	both	fatal	and	non-fatal	overdose	is	highly	common	in	intravenous	users	 (Sporer,	 1999;	Warner‐Smith,	Darke,	 Lynskey,	&	Hall,	 2001).	 Suicide	 is	also	a	major	problem,	as	opioid-dependent	individuals	are	14	times	more	likely	to	die	 from	suicide	compared	to	the	general	population,	and	between	17%	and	47%	of	 heroin	 users	 and	 abusers	 have	 a	 history	 of	 attempted	 suicide	 (Wilcox,	Conner,	 &	 Caine,	 2004).	 On	 a	 societal	 level,	 the	 economic	 cost	 of	 the	 opioid	epidemic	 was	 estimated	 to	 be	 $51.2	 billion	 US	 dollars	 in	 2015,	 due	 to	 lost	productivity	and	the	costs	of	incarceration,	crimes	committed	by	users,	addiction	treatment	 and	 treatment	 for	 addiction-related	 complications	 such	 as	 HIV,	hepatitis,	tuberculosis,	overdose	and	Neonatal	Abstinence	Syndrome	(Jiang,	Lee,	Lee,	&	Pickard,	2017).	Finally,	 opioid	 addiction	 is	 notoriously	 hard	 to	 overcome	 for	 both	abstinence-orientated	and	opioid-maintained	drug	therapy.	For	example,	Smyth,	Barry,	 Keenan,	 and	 Ducray	 (2010)	 found	 that	 91%	 of	 patients	 experienced	 a	relapse	 after	 six-week	 in-patient	 abstinence	 therapy;	 59%	 of	 which	 occurred	within	one	week	of	discharge.		Relapse	rates	after	buprenorphine	treatment	have	shown	 to	 be	 around	 56%	 to	 as	 high	 as	 90%	 (Bentzley,	 Barth,	 Back,	 &	 Book,	2015).	 The	 National	 Treatment	 Outcome	 Research	 Study,	 conducted	 on	 23	opioid	 rehabilitation	 programmes	 in	 England,	 observed	 a	 31%	 relapse	 rate	within	30	days	of	 completing	abstinence-focussed	residential	drug	dependence	programmes	 (Gossop,	 Stewart,	 Browne,	&	Marsden,	 2002).	 Interestingly,	 there	were	 no	 differences	 in	 relapse	 rates	 according	 to	 length	 of	 treatment,	 socio-
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demographic	 characteristics,	 drug-using	 friends	 or	 partners,	 or	psychological/physical	health	problems.	The	extent	of	pre-treatment	heroin	use	or	 length	 of	 addiction	 also	 did	 not	 predict	 relapse.	 Similar	 findings	 were	observed	across	21	methadone	clinics,	in	that	demographic	variables	(age,	race,	education	 level	 or	 marital	 status)	 did	 not	 predict	 treatment	 efficacy	 (Joe,	Simpson,	&	Sells,	1994).	 It	 is	clear	 that	 there	are	other	vulnerability	 factors	 for	drug	 relapse	 that	 cannot	 be	 accounted	 for	 purely	 by	 drug	 exposure,	socioeconomic	status	or	other	demographic	variables.			
1.2	Drug	exposure	perspectives	on	addiction	Drug	 addiction	 is	 conceptualised	 as	 a	 progressive	 dysregulation	 of	multiple	 brain	 circuits	 that	 results	 from	neuroadaptive	 changes	 in	 response	 to	chronic	drug	use	(Everitt	&	Robbins,	2005).	The	sensitization	of	the	mesolimbic	dopamine	 system	 has	 traditionally	 thought	 to	 be	 the	 primary	 mechanism	underlying	 transition	 from	 drug	 use	 to	 addiction	 (Hyman,	Malenka,	 &	Nestler,	2006).	 Addictive	 substances	 activate	 the	 dopaminergic	 reward	 system	responsible	 for	 the	 hedonic	 and	 reinforcing	 effect	 of	 drugs	 (Di	 Chiara	 &	Imperato,	 1988;	 Koob	 &	 Bloom,	 1988;	 Volkow,	 Fowler,	 &	 Wang,	 2003).	 The	incentive-sensitisation	 theory	 of	 drug	 addiction	 posits	 that	 repeated	 drug	exposure	creates	neural	adaptations	to	the	dopaminergic	system,	which	enables	drugs	to	be	more	effective	in	stimulating	dopamine	(Robinson	&	Berridge,	2001).		There	 is	 clear	 evidence	 that	 chronic	 drug	 use	 results	 in	 neural	 changes	 at	 the	molecular	and	cellular	 level	 (Nestler	&	Aghajanian,	1997).	Drugs	become	more	desirable,	 and	 “wanting”	 the	 drug	 develops	 into	 craving	 and	 compulsive	 drug	taking,	 which	 occurs	 relatively	 independent	 of	 desired	 or	 undesired	
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consequences	 (Robinson	 &	 Berridge,	 2001).	 Dopamine	 influences	 other	responses	 to	 rewards,	 such	 as	 signalling	 and	 consolidating	 memory	 (Volkow,	Fowler,	Wang,	Swanson,	&	Telang,	2004),	which	create	learned	associations	that	lead	to	later	cravings	and	further	drug	use	(Robinson	&	Berridge,	2003;	Volkow	et	al.,	2004).	This	allows	drug-related	cues,	such	as	syringes	or	paraphernalia,	to	act	 as	 reminders	 of	 the	 drug	 and	 elicit	 cravings.	 A	 critical	 component	 of	 the	dopaminergic	 system	 is	 the	 striatum,	 which	mediates	 the	 associative	 learning	after	repeated	drug	administration	(Di	Chiara,	1999)	that	 is	responsible	for	the	compulsive	use	of	drugs	observed	in	addiction	(Berridge	&	Robinson,	1998).	The	reinforcing	 effect	 of	 a	 drug	 is	 thought	 to	 become	 so	 great	 that	 it	 overshadows	natural	reinforcers,	thus	motivating	chronic	drug	use	(Volkow	et	al.,	2003)	at	the	expense	of	other	rewarding	activities.		Negative	reinforcement	models	have	also	been	proposed	 in	which	addiction	develops	 from	 learned	associations	with	 the	alleviations	of	the	physical	and	affective	symptoms	of	withdrawal,	as	well	as	with	stress	 relief	 (Baker,	 Piper,	McCarthy,	Majeskie,	 &	 Fiore,	 2004).	 In	 the	 negative	affect	 reinforcement	 model	 of	 addiction	 proposed	 by	 Baker	 et	 al.	 (2004),	 the	chronic	drug	user	eventually	becomes	sensitised	to	internal	and	external	signals	of	negative	affect,	which	prime	learned	associations	with	drug	taking.		Drug	 addiction	 has	 been	 attributed	 to	 dysfunction	 in	 areas	 of	 the	 brain	responsible	 for	 self-regulation	 and	 cognitive	 control	 such	 as	 the	 prefrontal	cortex	(PFC;	Bechara,	2005;	Goldstein	&	Volkow,	2002).	Damage	to	the	PFC	has	been	 associated	 with	 impaired	 decision-making	 in	 substance	 dependent	individuals	 (Bechara	 et	 al.,	 2001).	 Insensitivity	 to	 future	 consequences,	 as	demonstrated	by	chronic	drug	taking,	has	been	shown	to	also	relate	to	damage	to	 the	PFC	(Bechara,	Damasio,	Damasio,	&	Anderson,	1994).	Substance	abusers	
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exhibit	 impaired	 decision	 making	 similar	 to	 those	 with	 damage	 to	 the	 PFC	(Bechara	et	al.,	2001;	Rogers	et	al.,	1999).	The	orbito-frontal	cortex	(OFC)	is	an	essential	 component	 to	 associative	 learning,	 and	 may	 contribute	 to	 the	reinforcing	 effects	 of	 drugs	 (Winstanley,	 Olausson,	 Taylor,	 &	 Jentsch,	 2010).	Dysfunction	in	the	OFC	can	prevent	new	associated	learning	to	occur	for	future	non-drug	 rewards	 (Schoenbaum,	Roesch,	&	Stalnaker,	 2006).	Drugs	 also	 active	stress	pathways	that	adapt	in	response	to	regular	drug	administration	and	as	a	consequence	 of	 withdrawal,	 such	 as	 a	 hyper-sensitisation	 of	 hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal	axis	hormones	observed	in	opioid	and	cocaine	abusers	(Sinha,	2008).	As	a	result,	drug	abusers	may	be	less	able	to	control	their	stress	response	and	 turn	 to	 using	 drugs	 as	 a	 coping	 method.	 A	 combination	 of	 a	 heightened	reward	 value	 of	 drugs,	 sensitisation	 to	 drug	 rewards,	 associative	 learning,	 and	lack	of	behavioural	control	manifest	in	the	destructive	choices	observed	in	drug	addiction	(Jentsch	&	Taylor,	1999;	Lyvers	et	al.,	2014).	Over	time,	neural	changes	can	contribute	to	the	transition	to	loss	of	control	over	one’s	drug	use.	However,	the	pathway	from	drug	taking	to	drug	addiction	is	unclear	and	highly	complex,	as	some	regular	drug	users	never	develop	an	addiction.	Opioids	 produce	 powerful	 analgesic	 properties	 as	 well	 as	 intense	euphoria,	which	 result	 from	 the	 activation	of	 endogenous	mu-opioid	 receptors	that	 are	 involved	 in	 modulating	 stress,	 mood,	 and	 reinforcement	 of	 natural	rewards	 such	 as	 food	 and	 sex	 (Le	 Merrer,	 Becker,	 Befort,	 &	 Kieffer,	 2009).	Damage	 to	 opioid	 system	 is	 implicated	 in	 drug	 addiction	 in	 tandem	 with	disruptions	of	the	dopaminergic	system.	Chronic	opioid	use	leads	to	changes	in	the	excitability	of	mu-opioid	receptors,	resulting	in	the	need	for	greater	amounts	of	 the	drug	 to	 achieve	 the	desired	 effects	 (i.e.	 tolerance).	Dependency	 also	 can	
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result	from	suppression	of	noradrenaline,	a	neurotransmitter	that	regulates	the	physical	 expressions	 of	 opioid	 use,	 such	 as	 slowed	 breathing,	 drowsiness,	 and	low	 blood	 pressure.	 Noradrenaline	 production	 increases	 in	 response	 to	 the	depressant	 effects	 of	 opioid,	 and	 an	 excessive	 amount	 of	 noradrenaline	 is	released	 with	 the	 sudden	 cessation	 of	 opioid	 use	 (Kosten	 &	 George,	 2002).	Opioid	dependency	is	thought	to	also	cause	changes	in	brain	regions	associated	with	reward,	motivation,	stress,	learning	and	executive	function	(Le	Merrer	et	al.,	2009;	 Seip-Cammack,	 Reed,	 Zhang,	 Ho,	 &	 Kreek,	 2013).	 These	 neurobiological	changes	have	been	shown	 to	persist	after	abstinence	 (Dalley	et	al.,	2005;	Seip-Cammack	 et	 al.,	 2013),	 which	 may	 account	 for	 the	 high	 rates	 of	 relapse	associated	 with	 opioids.	 The	 persistence	 of	 neural	 dysfunction	 has	 been	implicated	 in	 overdose	 following	 a	 long	 period	 of	 abstinence.	 Tolerance	 to	 the	euphoric	effects	of	opioids	is	thought	to	develop	more	quickly	and	diminish	more	slowly	 than	 physiological	 tolerance	 (White	 &	 Irvine,	 1999).	 This	 discrepancy	may	lead	to	overdose	if	a	recently	abstinent	user	takes	a	larger	dose	to	achieve	a	hedonic	effect	that	the	body	can	no	longer	tolerate.		
1.3	Transition	from	drug	use	to	addiction	It	has	been	argued	that	experiencing	euphoria	universally	motivates	non-drug	recreational	activities,	such	as	playing	sports,	 listening	to	music,	watching	movies,	 or	 eating	 gourmet	 food	 (Siegel,	 2005).	 These	 activities	 alter	 brain	function	 much	 like	 drugs	 do;	 therefore,	 taking	 drugs	 is	 not	 necessarily	 an	aberrant	 behaviour	 as	 it	 aligns	with	 our	 innate	 desire	 to	 experience	 pleasure.	Furthermore,	drug	use	does	not	necessarily	lead	to	an	addiction,	as	data	from	a	survey	 of	 a	 large	 representative	 US	 sample	 shows.	 The	 National	 Comorbidity	
		
	 10	
Survey	revealed	that	only	15%	of	those	who	use	drugs	develop	a	substance	use	disorder	(SUD),	and	7.5%	of	analgesic	users	(e.g.	opioids)	reported	dependency	(Anthony,	Warner,	&	Kessler,	1994).	This	survey	also	revealed	that	among	those	who	use	drugs	sporadically,	only	some	of	them	go	on	to	start	using	regularly,	and	even	a	smaller	subset	develop	an	addiction.	Regarding	addiction	to	prescription	opioids,	 not	 every	 patient	 who	 legitimately	 takes	 opioid	 medication	 becomes	addicted.	An	estimated	3%	of	chronic	pain	patients	receiving	opioid	medication	management	develop	an	addiction	to	opioids	(Portenoy	et	al.,	2007),	and	around	20.4%	 exhibit	 aberrant	 drug-related	 behaviours	 that	 often	 precede	 addiction	(Fishbain,	Cole,	Lewis,	Rosomoff,	&	Rosomoff,	2008).	Animal	models	support	the	supposition	of	individual	differences	in	addition	vulnerability.	When	rodents	are	freely	 able	 to	 self-administer	 drugs,	 only	 some	 rats	 increase	 their	 drug	 intake	(Mantsch,	Yuferov,	Mathieu-Kia,	Ho,	&	Kreek,	2004;	Piazza,	Deminiere,	Le	Moal,	&	 Simon,	 1989)	 or	 consistently	 take	 high	 doses	 of	 the	 drug	 (Piazza,	 Deroche-Gamonent,	Rouge-Pont,	&	Le	Moal,	2000).		There	are	many	 individual	differences	predating	drug	addiction	that	are	theorised	 to	 contribute	 to	 drug	 abuse.	 Some	 differences	 include	 personality	traits	 that	 psychotropic	 properties	 of	 drugs	 correct	 or	 balance	 out,	 such	 as	neuroticism,	 depression	 or	 low-self	 esteem	 (Ausubel,	 1961).	 Deficits	 in	 one’s	ability	to	control	anxiety,	negative	affect	or	aggression	are	also	individual	factors	that	are	 implicated	in	consuming	drugs	(Khantzian,	1980).	Drug	abuse	has	also	been	 conceptualised	 as	 a	 ratio	 of	 deconstructive	 to	 constructive	 individual	factors	 relating	 to	 personality	 strength,	 motivations,	 risk	 taking	 and	 habit	formation	(Frederick,	1980).	Many	of	these	theories	predate	evidence	of	neural	alterations	 resulting	 from	 chronic	 drug	 exposure,	 but	 are	 still	 very	 relevant	 to	
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our	understanding	of	why	particular	individuals	lose	control	of	their	drug	intake.	Furthermore,	addiction	can	develop	to	many	other	hedonic	activities	such	as	sex,	food	 or	 gambling,	 which	 clearly	 indicates	 that	 there	 are	 non-drug	 exposure	factors	that	underlie	substance	abuse.		Piazza	 and	 Deroche-Gamonet	 (2013)	 proposed	 a	 general	 model	 of	 the	transition	 to	 drug	 addiction	 that	 involves	 three	 stages,	 through	 which	 only	individuals	 with	 particular	 psychobiological	 vulnerabilities	 progress.	 As	 one	moves	through	these	phases,	 the	amount	of	 time	spent	on	productive	and	non-drug	 related	 activities	 grows	 smaller	 as	 involvement	 with	 drug	 use	 increases.	The	first	phase	is	recreational/sporadic	use,	in	which	the	drug	activates	reward	pathways	 and	 taking	 the	 drug	 is	 purely	 a	 pleasurable	 activity.	 In	 the	intensified/sustained	phase,	the	motivation	for	drug	use	changes	from	pleasure	to	 desire,	 tolerance	 develops	 and	 the	 drug	 becomes	 needed	 for	 allostasis.	 The	third	stage	is	addiction	and	is	characterised	by	a	loss	of	control.	The	drug	is	also	intensely	mourned	and	withdrawal	can	occur,	which	results	in	devoting	a	great	deal	 time	 to	 obtaining	 and	 using	 the	 drug.	 The	 authors	 posit	 that	 progression	from	one	stage	to	the	next	is	facilitated	by	individual	neurobiological	differences	interacting	 with	 the	 degree	 of	 drug	 exposure.	 This	 three-phase	 model	 can	account	 for	 why	 only	 a	 small	 percentage	 of	 people	 escalate	 their	 recreational	drug	intake	and/or	lose	control	over	their	use.		However,	among	 those	who	do	become	addicted,	opioid	addiction	 tends	to	 persist	 over	 long	 periods	 of	 time.	 Hser,	 Hoffman,	 Grella,	 and	 Anglin	 (2001)	found	that	after	33	years,	the	rate	of	heroin	use	was	almost	identical	in	a	sample	of	 581	 patients	 receiving	 court-ordered	 addiction	 treatment	 (23.1%	 versus	20.7%).	Similarly,	Vaillant	(1973)	found	that	only	35-42%	of	heroin	addicts	were	
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abstinent	after	a	20-year	follow-up.	As	discussed	earlier	 in	the	current	chapter,	relapse	rates	are	also	very	high	for	opioid	addicts,	even	after	receiving	inpatient	therapy	or	opioid	maintenance	therapy.	Understanding	the	vulnerability	factors	for	addiction	is	vital	for	initiating	treatment	strategies	before	damage	can	occur	and	prevent	addiction	becoming	a	lifelong	affliction.	
1.4	Impulsivity	There	 is	 clear	 evidence	 that	 repeated	 drug	 exposure	 causes	 neural	 and	structural	 brain	 changes,	 but	 the	 role	 of	 individual	 differences	 in	 the	development	 of	 drug	 addiction	 is	 less	 understood.	 Contrary	 to	 drug	 exposure	theories,	 there	 is	 evidence	 that	 individual	 differences	 predating	 drug	 use	may	increase	 one’s	 vulnerability	 to	 addiction.	 One	 key	 trait	 is	 impulsivity;	 a	multi-factor	 construct	 that	 is	 broadly	 conceptualised	 as	 a	 tendency	 to	 act	 without	considerable	 forethought	 or	 inhibition	 (Bari	&	Robbins,	 2013;	Gullo,	 Loxton,	&	Dawe,	2014).	Spontaneity	and	risk	taking	are	natural	human	behaviours,	and	we	would	 not	 have	 scientific	 developments	 or	 the	 creative	 arts	 without	 some	aspects	of	impulsivity.		The	ability	to	make	quick,	error-free	decisions	is	also	an	advantageous	 quality	 in	 fast-paced	 work	 environments	 and	 in	 competitive	sports.	 However,	 impulsivity	 becomes	 dysfunctional	 when	 it	 results	 in	undesirable	consequences.	Impulsivity	 can	 be	 conceptualised	 as	 a	 form	 of	 maladaptive	 decision-making,	in	that	it	is	counterproductive	for	achieving	one’s	best	interests.	For	the	purpose	of	the	present	thesis,	the	term	impulsivity	will	be	operationally	defined	as	 a	 pattern	 of	 maladaptive	 decision-making.	 The	 literature	 largely	 supports	impulsivity	 as	 a	 relatively	 stable	 personality	 trait	 that	 correlates	 well	 with	
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psychopathologies	 such	 as	 SUD,	 problem	 gambling	 and	 violent	 criminal	offending	(see	Stanford	et	al.	2009	for	a	review).		Impulsivity	is	highly	relevant	to	drug	 addiction,	 as	 maladaptive	 decision-making	 is	 a	 principal	 feature	 of	 drug	addiction	 in	 that	 users	 choose	 to	 take	 drugs	 despite	 serious	 negative	consequences,	 and	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 pursing	 pro-social	 non-drug	 rewards	(American	Psychiatric	Association.,	2013).	It	has	been	theorised	that	heightened	approach	behaviour	and	difficulty	inhibiting	behaviour	combine	as	a	risk	factor	for	drug	addiction	(Gullo	et	al.,	2014;	Loxton	&	Dawe,	2001).	 In	other	words,	a	pre-morbid	 predisposition	 towards	 risk-taking	may	 incline	 one	 to	 initially	 try	drugs,	and	deficits	in	impulse	control	may	impede	regulation	of	the	intensity	of	drug	 taking,	 resulting	 in	 drug	 dependency.	 Once	 addicted,	 a	 lack	 of	 inhibitory	control	 may	 also	 interfere	 with	 attempts	 to	 quit	 or	 impede	 adherence	 to	 a	treatment	programme.		
Self-report	measures	of	impulsivity	Impulsivity	 is	 multi-dimensional,	 and	 a	 variety	 of	 measures	 have	 been	developed	to	evaluate	its	diverse	manifestations.	Self-report	questionnaires	that	assess	 impulsivity	as	a	general	personality	 trait	 include	 the	Barratt	 Impulsivity	Scale	 (BIS;	 Barratt,	 1965;	 Patton,	 Stanford	 &	 Barratt,	 1995),	 the	 Eysenck	Impulsivity	Questionnaire	(EIQ;	Eysenck,	Pearson,	Easting,	&	Allsopp,	1985),	and	the	 UPPS	 impulsive	 behaviour	 scale	 	 (Whiteside	 &	 Lynam,	 2001).	 Other	questionnaires	 measure	 particular	 impulsive	 behaviours	 and	 characteristics	such	 as	 the	 Sensation	 Seeking	 Scale	 of	 the	 Zuckerman-Kuhlman	 Personality	Questionnaire	 (SSS;	 Zuckerman,	 Kuhlman,	 Joireman,	 Teta,	 &	 Kraft,	 1993),	 the	novelty	seeking	and	harm	avoidance	subscales	of	the	Tridimensional	Personality	
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Questionnaire	 (TPQ;	 Cloninger,	 Przybeck,	 &	 Svrakic,	 1991),	 behavioural	inhibition	 and	 behavioural	 activation	 scales	 (BIS/BAS;	 Carver	 &	White,	 1994)	and	 the	Adult	and	Retrospective	Measure	of	Behavioural	 Inhibition	 inventories	(RMBI/AMBI;	Gladstone	and	Parker,	2005).	Of	all	the	self-report	questionnaires,	the	BIS	 is	considered	the	gold-standard	measure	of	 impulsivity	(Stanford	et	al.,	2009),	and	is	comprised	of	three	subtraits:	attentional	impulsiveness	(impaired	cognitive	 control),	 motor	 impulsiveness	 (acting	 without	 thinking)	 and	 non-planning	impulsiveness	(lack	of	future	thinking).	Table	1.1	provides	an	overview	of	 the	most	common	self-report	questionnaires	and	a	summary	of	 the	 facets	of	impulsivity	they	purport	to	measure.		The	 models	 of	 impulsivity	 that	 underpin	 self-report	 measures	 have	demonstrated	neurological	correlates.	For	example,	individuals	who	score	highly	on	 the	 BIS	 exhibit	 reduced	 neural	 responses	 to	 punishment	 (Potts,	 George,	Martin,	&	Barratt,	2006)	and	increased	reward	related	activation	in	response	to	rewards	(Martin	&	Potts,	2009).	BIS	scores	also	predict	dampened	activity	in	and	reduced	volume	of	the	PFC	(Brown,	Manuck,	Flory,	&	Hariri,	2006;	Matsuo	et	al.,	2009).	Thus,	 it	 can	be	argued	 that	 impulsive	personality	 traits	characteristic	of	addiction	 can	 arise	 from	 inborn	 neural	 variations	 in	 executive	 control	 and	reward	processing.			 	
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Table	1.1	
Summary	of	self-report	impulsivity	questionnaires	and	example	items	
Measure	 Impulsivity	subfactor	 Example	item	BIS-11	
Patton	et	al.	(1995)	
ñAttentional	 -	Lack	of	attentional	control	-	Difficulty	focusing	 “I	don’t	‘pay	attention’”	
ñMotor	 -	Acting	without	thinking	-	Behavioural	disinhibition		 “I	act	on	the	spur	of	the	moment”	
ñNon-planning	 -	Lack	of	future	thinking	-	No	long-term	planning	 “I	am	more	interested	in	the	present	than	the	future”	
Eysenck	Impulsiveness	Questionnaire		
Eysenck	et	al.	(1985)	
ñImpulsiveness	 -	Acting	and	thinking	quickly	without	much	forethought		 “Do	you	usually	think	carefully	before	doing	anything?”		
ñVenturesomeness	 -	Adventure	and	risk	seeking	 “Do	you	quite	enjoy	taking	risks?”	UPPS	Impulsive	Behaviour	Scale	
Whiteside	&	Lynam	
(2001)	
ñUrgency		 -	Strong	emotions	and	impulses,	particularly	under	negative	affect	 “It’s	hard	for	me	to	resist	acting	on	my	feelings”	
êPremeditation			 -	Diminished	deliberation	of	consequences	before	acting	 “I	usually	make	up	my	mind	through	careful	reasoning”	
ñSensation	seeking	 -	Pursing	exciting	activities	-	Openness	to	new	experiences	 “I	seek	new	and	exciting	experiences	and	sensations”	
êPerseverance			 -	Low	self-discipline	-	Inability	to	focus	on	boring	tasks	 “I	tend	to	give	up	easily”	Tridimensional	Personality	Questionnaire	
Cloninger	(1987)	
ñNovelty	seeking		 -	Excitement	in	response	to					appetitive	stimuli	-	Behavioural	activation	 “When	nothing	new	is	happening,	I	usually	start	looking	for	something	that	is	thrilling	or	exciting”	
ñêHarm	avoidance		 -	Intense	negative	response	to	aversive	stimuli	-	Behavioural	inhibition		 “I	often	feel	tense	and	worried	in	unfamiliar	situations”	Zuckerman-Kuhlman	Personality	Questionnaire	
Zuckerman	et	al,	
(1993)	
ñImpulsive	sensation	seeking	 -	Risk	taking	for	excitement	-	Acting	without	thinking		 “I	sometimes	do	‘crazy’	things	just	for	fun”	
Behavioural	Inhibition/	Behavioural	Activation	System	Scales	
Carver	&	White	(1994)	
êBehavioural	inhibition	 -	Sensitivity	to	punishment	and	novelty	 “I	worry	about	making	mistakes”	
ñBehavioural	activation	 -	Pursuit	of	desired	goals	-	Fun	seeking	-	Responsiveness	to	reward	 “I	crave	excitement	and	new	sensations”		
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Behavioural	measures	of	impulsivity	Self-report	 measures	 have	 many	 inherent	 limitations	 that	 restrict	 the	interpretation	of	their	results.	Primarily,	questionnaires	rely	upon	respondents’	ability	 to	accurately	and	objectively	assess	 themselves.	Questionnaires	are	also	vulnerable	 to	 intentional	 misreporting	 due	 to	 social	 desirability.	 These	limitations	are	particularly	problematic	for	research	with	impulsive	individuals,	as	they	may	not	answer	with	as	much	forethought	or	deliberation	as	would	non-impulsive	 comparison	 groups.	 Cognitive	 and	 behavioural	 measures	 have	 been	created	 to	 more	 precisely	 evaluate	 impulsivity.	 In	 a	 review	 conducted	 by	Verdejo-García,	Lawrence,	and	Clark	(2008),	the	authors	categorised	laboratory	measures	of	 impulsivity	 into	 three	groups	 that	will	be	utilised	here	 for	ease	of	discussion:	 Response	 inhibition,	 delay-discounting,	 and	 cognitive	 impulsivity.	Measures	 of	 response	 inhibition	 evaluate	 the	 ability	 to	 restrain	 automatic	behaviours,	 such	 as	 suddenly	 stopping	 a	 repetitive	 action	on	 the	Go-NoGo	and	Stop-Signal	 tasks.	 Poor	 performance	 on	 response	 inhibition	 tasks	 indicates	insufficient	 impulse	control.	Delay	discounting	tasks	assess	one’s	willingness	to	wait	 for	 a	 reward	 rather	 than	 take	 a	 smaller,	 but	 immediate	 reward.	 Choosing	the	 smaller	 immediate	 reward	 is	 thought	 to	 reflect	 a	 desire	 for	 immediate	gratification	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 a	 more	 profitable	 option	 (Madden	 &	 Johnson,	2010).	Cognitive	impulsivity	is	defined	in	terms	of	maladaptive	decision-making,	and	 will	 be	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 present	 thesis.	 Cognitive	 impulsivity	 relates	 to	choices	 that	 are	 made	 before	 acquiring	 an	 adequate	 amount	 of	 information	(Clark,	 Robbins,	 Ersche,	 &	 Sahakian,	 2006;	 Evenden,	 1999),	 or	 involve	 an	unnecessary	amount	of	 risk,	 such	as	 gambling	 tasks	 (Bechara	et	 al.,	 1994)	and	probability	discounting	(Green	&	Myerson,	2010).	Probability	discounting	tasks	
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require	 decisions	 about	 certain	 rewards	 or	 larger,	 probabilistic	 rewards,	 and	purport	 to	measure	 risk	 taking.	 Cognitive	 impulsivity	 also	 can	 be	 observed	 in	feedback	 learning	 tasks	 that	 require	 one	 to	 select	 optimal	 behaviours	 in	response	 to	 rewards	 and	 punishments	 (Bódi	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 A	 tendency	 to	 shift	away	from	a	rewarding	learning	strategy	after	negative	feedback	is	suggestive	of	choices	made	without	 careful	 consideration	 of	 an	 optimal	 long-term	 plan.	 The	wide	 range	of	measures	 illustrates	 the	multi-faceted	nature	of	 impulsivity,	 and	the	present	thesis	aims	to	utilise	a	number	of	measures	to	assess	impulsivity	in	addiction	from	multiple	angles.	
Impulsivity	and	addiction	Impulsivity	 is	 a	 key	 characteristic	 of	 SUD	 as	 diagnosed	 by	 the	 DSM-V	criteria	(American	Psychiatric	Association.,	2013).	Impaired	behavioural	control,	failure	 to	 consider	 future	 consequences,	 inability	 to	 delay	 gratification	 and	excessive	 risk	 taking	 are	 impulsive	 features	 of	 drug	 abuse,	 which	 are	 well	supported	in	the	literature.	For	example,	individuals	with	a	history	of	or	current	drug	abuse	score	highly	on	self-reported	measures	of	impulsivity	such	as	the	BIS,	EIQ	and	 the	TPQ	 (Allen,	Moeller,	Rhoades,	&	Cherek,	1998;	 Sher,	Bartholow,	&	Wood,	2000;	Stanford	et	al.,	2009).	Stimulant-dependent	 individuals	are	higher	in	 sensation	 seeking,	 poor	 attentional	 control,	 acting	without	 forethought,	 and	lack	 of	 future	 planning	 (Ersche,	 Turton,	 Pradhan,	 Bullmore,	 &	 Robbins,	 2010).	People	 dependent	 on	 a	 number	 of	 substances,	 including	 alcohol,	 nicotine,	stimulants	 and	 opioids	 show	 a	 preference	 for	 a	 smaller,	 immediate	 reward	rather	 than	 a	 larger,	 delayed	 reward	 (Allen	 et	 al.,	 1998;	Kirby,	 Petry,	&	Bickel,	1999;	Madden,	Petry,	Badger,	&	Bickel,	1997).	Substance	users	also	demonstrate	
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less	information	gathering	before	making	decisions	than	non-drug	using	controls	(Clark	et	al.,	2006).	The	National	Epidemiologic	Survey	on	Alcohol	and	Related	Conditions,	a	large	representative	sample	of	the	United	States,	found	that	62%	of	respondents	with	diagnosable	SUD	reported	acting	impulsive	most	of	the	time	in	their	daily	life	(Chamorro	et	al.,	2012).		
Impulsivity	and	opioid	abuse	High	 levels	 of	 impulsivity	 have	 been	 documented	 in	 opioid	 users	 using	both	 questionnaires	 and	 behavioural	 measures.	 Opioid	 abusers	 and	 opioid-dependent	 individuals	 have	 reported	 higher	 levels	 of	 EIQ	 impulsivity	 and	venturousness,	 and	 BIS	 non-planning	 and	 motor	 impulsivity	 (Kirby	 &	 Petry,	2004;	 Kirby	 et	 al.,	 1999;	 Madden	 et	 al.,	 1997)	 compared	 to	 non-drug	 using	controls,	 as	 well	 as	 higher	 sensation	 seeking	 (Franques	 et	 al.,	 2003).	 Opioid	addicted	 participants	 also	 have	 demonstrated	 high	 novelty	 seeking	 and	 low	harm	avoidance	on	the	TPQ	(Teh,	Izuddin,	Hatta,	Zakaria,	&	Salleh,	2012;	Wang	et	 al.,	 2013),	 and	 express	 less	 interest	 in	 planning	 for	 the	 future,	 feel	 that	 the	present	 is	 more	 important	 than	 the	 future,	 and	 do	 not	 believe	 that	 planning	ahead	 is	 useful	 (Petry,	 Bickel,	 &	Arnett,	 1998).	 Furthermore,	 opioid	 users	 also	exhibit	greater	discounting	of	delayed	monetary	rewards	(Kirby	&	Petry,	2004;	Kirby	 et	 al.,	 1999;	Madden	 et	 al.,	 1997;	 Petry	 et	 al.,	 1998).	 A	meta-analysis	 of	neuropsychological	 functioning	 of	 chronic	 opioid	 users	 conducted	 by	Baldacchino,	 Balfour,	 Passetti,	 Humphris,	 and	 Matthews	 (2012)	 revealed	abnormalities	 across	 a	 range	 of	 cognitive	 domains,	 particularly	 working	memory,	 cognitive	 impulsivity	 and	 cognitive	 flexibility,	 which	 are	 central	features	of	 impulsive	traits	and	behaviours.	While	there	is	reliable	evidence	for	
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heightened	impulsivity	in	opioid	users,	opioids	have	received	comparatively	less	attention	in	the	literature	compared	to	substances	such	as	nicotine	and	alcohol;	highlighting	 the	 need	 for	 continued	 research	 on	 impulsivity	 as	 a	 vulnerability	factor	for	addiction.		
Impulsivity	as	a	vulnerability	factor	for	addiction	Premorbid	sensitisation	of	dopamine	responsiveness	to	reinforcers	such	as	 drugs	 may	 be	 a	 vulnerability	 factor	 initiating	 drug	 use	 (Piazza	 &	 Le	 Moal,	1996),	and/or	may	make	one	more	sensitive	to	drugs’	reinforcing	effects	(Blum	et	al.,	2000;	Young,	Lawford,	Nutting,	&	Noble,	2004).	Cognitive	deficits	related	to	the	 PFC	may	 also	 result	 in	 reduced	 impulse	 control	 and	 willpower	 needed	 to	resist	 addictive	 drugs	 (Horn,	 Dolan,	 Elliott,	 Deakin,	 &	 Woodruff,	 2003).	Premorbid	abnormalities	may	help	explain	why	only	a	small	proportion	of	drug	taking	 individuals	 lose	control	over	their	use,	or	why	some	individuals	develop	an	 addiction	more	 rapidly	 than	 others	 (Gullo	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 For	 example,	males	who	 report	 impulsive	 behaviours	 exhibit	 heightened	 sensitivity	 to	 the	 stress	alleviating	effects	of	alcohol,	which	may	put	 these	 individuals	at	greater	risk	of	developing	an	alcohol	use	disorder	(Sher	&	Levenson,	1982).	In	regards	to	opioid	addiction,	Pud	et	al.	(2006)	found	that	greater	scores	on	the	TPQ	harm	avoidance	subscale	predicted	a	greater	increase	in	pain	threshold	in	response	to	morphine	and	a	larger	decrease	in	pain	magnitude	compared	to	placebo.	It	is	possible	that	those	 who	 have	 low	 levels	 of	 harm	 avoidance	 (which	 can	 be	 suggestive	 of	impulsivity)	may	 react	 to	 opioids	 in	 a	way	 that	makes	 these	 individuals	more	likely	to	abuse	the	drug,	and	thus	increase	their	risk	for	dependency.		
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Evidence	 supporting	heightened	 impulsivity	prior	 to	opioid	dependency	can	 be	 found	 in	 a	 study	 conducted	 by	 Baldacchino,	 Balfour,	 and	 Matthews	(2015).	 Illicit	 heroin	 users	 and	 methadone-maintained	 patients	 demonstrated	greater	 cognitive,	 motor	 and	 non-planning	 impulsivity	 compared	 to	 a	 healthy	control	 group,	 but	 a	 cohort	 of	 opioid	 pain	 management	 patients	 without	 a	history	 of	 drug	 abuse	 behaved	 similarly	 to	 controls.	 	 The	 opioid	 pain	management	patients	reported	an	average	length	of	opioid	use	similar	to	current	heroin	users	(M	=	5	years	and	M	=	6.1	years,	respectively),	which	suggests	that	the	neurophysiological	effects	of	long-term	opioid	exposure	cannot	fully	explain	differences	in	impulsivity.	Brain	development	from	childhood	also	contributes	to	our	 understanding	 of	 impulsivity	 as	 an	 underlying	 factor	 of	 substance	 abuse.	Risk-taking	 and	 poor	 impulse	 control	 are	 hallmarks	 of	 adolescence	 and	 are	believed	 to	 arise	 from	 the	 developmental	 immaturity	 of	 brain	 structures	involved	 in	 reward	 processing	 and	 behavioural	 inhibition.	 A	 neurobiological	triadic	model	has	been	proposed	by	Ernst,	Pine,	and	Hardin	(2006),	which	posits	that	 impulsivity	 in	 adolescence	 can	 be	 explained	 by	 immature	 development	 of	the	 nucleus	 accumbens,	 amygdala	 and	 PFC,	 which	 results	 in	 a	 hypersensitive	reward	 system,	 diminished	 harm-avoidance	 and	 weak	 self-regulatory	 control.	Consequently,	adolescence	is	a	high-risk	period	for	developing	a	SUD,	and	drug	experimentation	in	adolescence	may	transition	into	addiction	during	adulthood	(Chambers,	 Taylor,	 &	 Potenza,	 2003).	 Early	 life	 trauma	 and	 chronic	 stress	 are	widely	 known	 risk	 factors	 for	 drug	 addiction	 and	 relapse	 in	 vulnerable	individuals	 (Sinha,	 2008).	 Sustained	 activation	 of	 neural	 stress	 pathways	 can	result	 in	 long-term	 physiological,	 emotional	 and	 behavioural	 changes	 that	 are	implicated	in	drug	abuse	(Cleck	&	Blendy,	2008;	Sinha	et	al.,	2011).	Exposure	to	
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stress	 early	 in	 life	may	 alter	 the	 development	 of	 brain	 regions	 responsible	 for	regulating	 emotional	 and	 behavioural	 stress	 responses,	 decision-making,	reward-behaviours,	 and	 impulsivity,	 including	 the	 PFC	 (Blanco	 et	 al.,	 2015;	Heinrichs,	2005;	McCrory,	De	Brito,	&	Viding,	2012),	which	in	turn	may	influence	drug	use	later	in	life.	One	of	the	key	behaviours	implicated	in	the	development	of	opioid	 addiction	 is	 the	 use	 of	 opioids	 to	 cope	 with	 emotional	 pain,	 anxiety,	aggression	or	distress	(Khantzian,	1985).	There	 are	 also	 a	 number	 of	 longitudinal	 studies	 linking	childhood/adolescent	impulsivity	to	substance	use	and	abuse	in	adulthood,	such	as	 high	 novelty	 seeking	 (Cloninger,	 Sigvardsson,	 &	 Bohman,	 1988;	 Masse	 &	Tremblay,	1997;	Sher	et	al.,	2000),	 low	harm	avoidance	(Cloninger	et	al.,	1988;	Masse	 &	 Tremblay,	 1997),	 risk-taking	 (Ohannessian	 &	 Hesselbrock,	 2007),	heightened	 behavioural	 activation	 (Johnson,	 Turner,	 &	 Iwata,	 2003;	 Knyazev,	Slobodskaya,	 Kharchenko,	 &	 Wilson,	 2004),	 and	 poor	 behavioural	 control	(Dawes,	Tarter,	&	Kirisci,	1997;	King	&	Chassin,	2004;	McGue,	 Iacono,	Legrand,	Malone,	&	Elkins,	2001;	Sher,	Walitzer,	Wood,	&	Brent,	1991;	Tarter	et	al.,	2003;	Tarter,	 Kirisci,	 Reynolds,	 &	Mezzich,	 2004).	 Children	who	 develop	 behavioural	self-control	at	slower	than	average	rates	are	also	more	likely	to	start	using	drugs	in	adolescence	and	to	have	drug-related	problems	(Wong	et	al.,	2006).		There	are	converging	lines	of	evidence	for	genetic	and	biologically	based	impulsive	 risk	 factors	 for	 drug	 addiction.	 Siblings	 of	 substance	 dependent	individuals	 have	 reported	 greater	 levels	 of	 impulsivity	 compared	 to	 non-drug	taking	 controls,	 such	 as	 higher	 BIS	 scores	 (Ersche	 et	 al.,	 2010),	 impaired	response	inhibition	(Ersche	et	al.,	2012a;	Ersche	et	al.,	2012b),	reduced	executive	function	(Ersche	et	al.,	2012b),	and	smaller	volume	of	brain	regions	implicated	in	
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self	 control,	 learning	 and	 habit	 formation	 (Ersche	 et	 al.,	 2012a).	 There	 is	 also	evidence	 for	 neurophysiological	 correlates	 of	 impulsivity	 in	 the	 children	 of	substance	abusing	parents.	For	example,	reduced	neural	event-related	potentials	and	 event-related	 oscillations	 during	 a	 behavioural	 inhibition	 task	 are	phenotypic	 markers	 for	 alcoholism,	 and	 are	 observed	 in	 adult	 children	 of	alcoholic	 parents	 (Kamarajan	 et	 al.,	 2006;	 Kamarajan	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 Only	longitudinal	 studies	 can	confirm	a	 causal	 relationship	between	 impulsivity	and	addiction,	 but	 there	 is	 likely	 an	 interaction	 between	 premorbid	 vulnerabilities	and	neurobiological	changes	after	prolonged	drug	use.	It	is	the	aim	of	the	present	thesis	to	add	to	our	understanding	of	impulsivity	in	opioid-dependency,	as	well	as	 to	 clarify	 the	 link	 between	 impulsivity	 and	 other	 individual	 factors	 that	contribute	to	maladaptive	decision-making	in	drug	addiction.			
1.5	Uncertainty	Simply	 stated,	 decision-making	 involves	 the	 prediction	 of	 expected	outcomes	 and	 the	 selection	 of	 the	 most	 suitable	 action	 accordingly	 (Redish,	Jensen,	&	 Johnson,	2008).	Humans	 frequently	 face	complex	decisions	 that	have	varying	degrees	of	uncertainty,	and	the	ability	to	predict	possible	consequences	of	 behaviour	 from	 incomplete	 or	 ambiguous	 information	 is	 fundamental	 for	adaptive	behaviour	(Bland	&	Schaefer,	2012).	Impulsivity	can	thereby	be	viewed	as	 maladaptive	 decision-making	 resulting	 from	 impairments	 in	 evaluating	uncertainty,	predicting	outcomes	from	incomplete	information,	and/or	planning	behaviour	 appropriately.	 For	 example,	 a	 decision	whether	 to	 speed	 through	 a	yellow	 light	 involves	 evaluating	 the	 potential	 outcomes	 and	 their	 value	 (e.g.	getting	 to	 work	 on	 time	 versus	 incurring	 a	 traffic	 citation),	 predicting	 the	
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likelihood	 of	 the	 outcomes	 based	 on	 the	 available	 information	 (e.g.	 previous	experiences	 at	 the	 intersection	 or	 current	 traffic	 conditions),	 and	 choosing	 to	accelerate/decelerate	accordingly.	An	impulsive	decision	may	occur	because	of	a	failure	at	any	one	of	these	points.	For	example,	one	may	ignore	the	possibility	of	getting	caught	and	act	on	the	 first	 impulse	 instead	(e.g.	 the	desire	 to	get	 to	 the	destination	 on	 time),	 or	 underestimate	 the	 risk	 (e.g.	 chance	 of	 a	 red	 light	camera),	both	of	which	can	result	in	an	action	that	is	not	beneficial	for	the	future	(e.g.	 paying	 a	 citation).	 As	 such,	 impulsivity	 can	 be	manifested	 as	maladaptive	decision-making	in	the	face	of	uncertainty.	Uncertainty	can	arise	from	a	number	of	sources,	such	as	unpredictability,	unfamiliarity,	and	tentativeness	(Hillen,	Gutheil,	Strout,	Smets,	&	Han,	2017).	One	type	 of	 uncertainty	 that	 is	 of	 interest	 to	 the	 present	 thesis	 is	 outcome	uncertainty.	 Decision-making	 under	 uncertainty	 involves	 an	 analysis	 of	 the	anticipated	 outcomes	 through	 controlled	 and	 effortful	 information	 processing	(Starcke,	 Pawlikowski,	 Wolf,	 Altstötter-Gleich,	 &	 Brand,	 2011).	 Uncertainty	signals	to	the	brain	that	any	decisions	made	while	lacking	complete	information	in	the	given	scenario	may	be	harmful,	and	the	detection	of	uncertainty	initiates	cognitive	 and	 behavioural	 processes	 to	 resolve	 the	 uncertainty	 (Hsu,	 Bhatt,	Adolphs,	 Tranel,	 &	 Camerer,	 2005).	 Prediction	 error	 (i.e.	 the	 discrepancy	between	a	predicted	outcome	and	the	actual	outcome)	stimulates	dopaminergic	activity,	which	increases	as	a	function	of	uncertainty	(Fiorillo,	Tobler,	&	Schultz,	2003).	Uncertainty	about	outcomes	is	associated	with	areas	of	the	brain	involved	in	learning	and	decision-making.	The	anterior	cingulate	cortex	is	a	key	structure	for	learning	the	values	of	decision	options	based	on	previous	reward	prediction	errors	(Behrens,	Woolrich,	Walton,	&	Rushworth,	2007).	The	anterior	cingulate	
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cortex	helps	us	decide	whether	violations	of	reward	expectancy	indicate	that	our	behaviour	 is	 no	 longer	 optimal	 and	 whether	 we	 should	 change	 our	 actions	(Behrens	et	al.,	2007;	Kennerley,	Walton,	Behrens,	Buckley,	&	Rushworth,	2006;	O’Reilly,	 2013).	 The	 medial	 prefrontal	 cortex	 is	 also	 triggered	 by	 reward-prediction	 error	 and	 guides	 responses	 to	 uncertainty	 (Matsumoto,	Matsumoto,	Abe,	&	Tanaka,	2007),	and	the	orbitofrontal	cortex	and	amygdala	have	also	been	implicated	in	detecting	and	responding	to	uncertain	rewards	(Hsu	et	al.,	2005).		Uncertainty	about	outcomes	may	stimulate	brain	regions	responsible	for	detecting	 rewards	 and	 initiating	 adaptive	 behaviours,	 but	 research	 has	 shown	that	 uncertainty	 impairs	 decision-making	 (Shafir,	 1994).	 Humans	 tend	 to	 act	irrationally	when	 faced	with	uncertain	 situations,	 as	 demonstrated	by	Tversky	and	 Shafir	 (1992).	 They	 presented	 participants	 with	 a	 hypothetical	 gambling	scenario	that	had	equal	odds	of	winning	$200	or	losing	$100.	Participants	were	asked	whether	 they	would	 gamble	 a	 second	 time	 if	 they	won	 the	 first	 gamble,	lost	the	first	gamble,	and	if	they	didn’t	know	the	result.	Among	those	who	would	gamble	 a	 second	 time	 regardless	 if	 they	won	or	 lost	 the	 first	 round,	 only	65%	reported	 that	 they	would	gamble	again	 if	 they	didn’t	know	 the	outcome	of	 the	first	 round.	This	phenomenon	was	coined	 the	 “disjunction	effect”,	which	states	that	 people	 prefer	 inaction	when	 faced	with	 uncertain	 outcomes,	 even	 if	 their	actions	would	 not	 be	 impacted	 by	 the	 possible	 outcomes	 if	 they	were	 known.	Humans	also	have	difficulty	intuitively	judging	probabilities	and	demonstrate	the	disjunction	 effect	 when	 dealing	 with	 probabilistic	 scenarios.	 For	 example,	individuals	have	 shown	a	preference	 for	 games	with	one	probabilistic	 element	over	 games	 with	 two	 probabilistic	 elements,	 even	 though	 the	 probability	 of	winning	for	each	game	is	the	same	(Bar-Hillel,	1973).			
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If	the	decision-making	process	is	naturally	impaired	by	uncertainty,	then	deficits	 in	cognitive	function,	reward	processing,	and	associative	 learning	 likely	further	 impede	 adaptive	 decisions.	 Brevers	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 defines	 the	 cognitive	abilities	 necessary	 for	 adaptive	 decision-making	 under	 uncertainly	 as	 the	“integration	 of	 prechoice	 emotional	 processes	 and	 rational	 analytical	 system	aspects	that	require	the	capacity	to	represent	a	dilemma,	maintain	and	organize	information	in	working	memory,	strategically	plan	and	execute	a	response,	and	to	evaluate	the	efficacy	of	the	solution”	(p.	1925).	Furthermore,	deficits	in	neural	areas	 responsible	 for	processing	uncertainty	 inevitably	hamper	one’s	 ability	 to	make	 effective	 decisions	 under	 uncertainty.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	neural	 functioning	 underlying	 cognitive	 processing	 of	 uncertainty,	 such	 as	 the	dopaminergic	 system	 and	 PFC,	 have	 shown	 to	 be	 deficient	 in	 impulsive	 and	substance	abusing	individuals.		The	other	aspect	of	uncertainty	that	is	significant	to	the	present	thesis	is	the	 individual	 reaction	 to	 uncertainty	 that	 may	 impact	 subsequent	 decision-making.	Uncertainty	has	been	defined	as	a	metacognitive	state	 that	reflects	 the	way	one	appraises	circumstances	as	uncertain	(Han,	Klein,	&	Arora,	2011).	This	working	 definition	 conceptualises	 uncertainty	 as	 on	 overreaching	 state,	 rather	than	a	specific	feature	of	the	environment,	and	allows	us	to	synthesise	the	results	of	 research	 in	 this	 area.	 It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 a	 particular	 frontolimbic	neural	circuit	mediates	our	subjective,	emotional	and	physiological,	responses	to	uncertainty:	 the	 amygdala,	 anterior	 insula,	 bed	 nucleus	 of	 the	 stria	 terminalis,	and	 areas	 of	 the	 PFC	 (Gorka,	 Nelson,	 Phan,	 &	 Shankman,	 2016).	 Positive	cognitive,	emotional	and	behavioural	reactions	to	uncertainty	 include	curiosity,	excitement,	and	deliberation	 (Hillen	et	al.,	2017).	For	example,	people	who	are	
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fascinated	with	 UFO	 sightings	 can	 derive	 pleasure	 from	 pursuing	 information,	even	though	it	 is	unlikely	that	 they	will	 find	definitive	answers	about	alien	 life.	Uncertainty	can	also	motivate	exploration	around	one’s	environment	(Anselme,	2010),	which	can	be	beneficial	for	acquiring	knowledge	about	the	world.	However,	 research	has	 shown	 that	 certainty	 is	most	 often	preferable	 to	uncertainty	(Heine,	Proulx,	&	Vohs,	2006;	Lejuez,	Eifert,	Zvolensky,	&	Richards,	2000;	Mineka	 &	 Kihlstrom,	 1978),	 particularly	 uncertain	 threat	 (Grillon,	 Baas,	Cornwell,	&	Johnson,	2006;	Lejuez	et	al.,	2000).	Animal	research	has	established	that	 unpredictable	 shocks	 are	 more	 aversive	 to	 predictable	 ones	 (Fanselow,	1980;	Marlin,	1981),	and	human	research	has	shown	that	more	anxiety	is	elicited	by	unpredictable	shocks	than	predicable	shocks	(Badia,	McBane,	&	Suter,	1966;	Lanzetta	&	Driscoll,	1966).	The	startle	reflex	is	potentiated	by	the	anticipation	of	unpredictable	 shocks	 in	 humans	 (Bradford,	 Shapiro,	 &	 Curtin,	 2013;	 Grillon,	Baas,	Lissek,	Smith,	&	Milstein,	2004),	along	with	physiological	arousals	such	as	increased	 heart	 rate,	 skin	 conductance	 and	 blood	 pressure	 (Epstein	 &	Roupenian,	 1970;	 Jennings,	 Averill,	 Opton,	 &	 Lazarus,	 1970;	 Monat,	 Averill,	 &	Lazarus,	 1972).	 Furthermore,	 humans	 have	 shown	 a	 preference	 for	 contexts	previously	 paired	 with	 predicable	 shock	 compared	 to	 contexts	 paired	 with	unpredictable	shock	(Grillon	et	al.,	2006).		Uncertainty	in	itself	can	be	a	stressor,	as	unpredictable	neutral	tones	have	shown	 to	 elicit	 anxiety	 (Grupe	 &	 Nitschke,	 2013;	 Jackson,	 Nelson,	 &	 Proudfit,	2015),	 avoidance	 behaviour	 and	 anxiety	 related	 behaviour,	 such	 as	 increased	attention	 to	 emotional	 facial	 expressions	 (Herry	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 Even	 uncertain	rewards	 activate	 the	 anterior	 insula,	 which	 responds	 to	 uncertain	 threat	 in	individuals	with	high	anxiety	(Gorka	et	al.,	2016).	Stress	and	anxiety	prompted	
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by	uncertainty	can	reduce	neural	reward	system	functioning	(Nelson,	Shankman,	&	Proudfit,	2014),	reward	anticipation	(Nelson,	Kessel,	Jackson,	&	Hajcak,	2016),	as	well	as	require	considerable	cognitive	resources	to	suppress	(Milkman,	2012).		Importantly,	 uncertainty	 in	 one’s	 environment	 has	 shown	 to	 deplete	 the	willpower	 needed	 to	 resist	 temptation,	 as	 demonstrated	 in	 a	 series	 of	 studies	conducted	by	Milkman	(2012).	When	faced	with		“want”	or		“should”	options	(e.g.	eating	candy	versus	eating	fruit),	participants	who	were	in	a	state	of	uncertainty	regarding	an	unrelated	topic	(e.g.	what	movie	they	would	be	watching	during	the	experiment)	 tended	 to	 choose	more	 “want”	 options	 than	 participants	who	 did	not	 have	 uncertainty	 in	 their	 decision-making	 environment.	 In	 summary,	uncertainty	 is	 generally	 unpleasant	 and	 often	 invokes	 aversive	 cognitive	 and	physiological	reactions	that	can	impair	adaptive	decision-making.		
1.6	Intolerance	of	uncertainty	The	 way	 in	 which	 one	 responds	 cognitively,	 behaviourally	 and	emotionally	 to	 uncertainty	 has	 important	 implications	 on	 how	 uncertainty	impacts	decision-making.	Intolerance	of	uncertainty	(IU)	is	one	way	that	beliefs	and	attitudes	about	uncertainty	have	been	conceptualised	in	the	literature.	IU	is	a	 dispositional	 trait	 characterised	 by	 strong	 negative	 reactions	 to	 uncertainty,	which	arise	from	appraising	uncertainty	as	threatening	disproportionally	to	the	actual	 likelihood	 of	 aversive	 outcomes	 (Freeston,	 Rhéaume,	 Letarte,	 Dugas,	 &	Ladouceur,	 1994;	 Ladouceur,	 Gosselin,	 &	 Dugas,	 2000).	 Furthermore,	 IU	 is	characterised	by	an	“incapacity	to	endure	the	aversive	response	triggered	by	the	perceived	absence	of	salient,	key	or	insufficient	information”	(Carleton,	2016,	p.	31).	 In	 other	 words,	 an	 individual	 with	 high	 IU	 experiences	 a	 heightened	
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aversion	to	uncertainty	and	simultaneously	has	a	diminished	faculty	to	cope	with	the	negative	thoughts	and	emotions	that	uncertainty	engenders.		IU	has	been	associated	with	employing	dysfunctional	strategies	to	reduce	uncertainty,	which	impedes	the	ability	to	make	optimal	decisions.	Those	high	in	IU	 have	 demonstrated	 a	 need	 to	 acquire	 more	 information	 before	 making	decisions	than	those	with	low	IU,	as	demonstrated	by	their	performance	on	the	Beads	 Task.	 High	 IU	 has	 been	 associated	 with	 sampling	 a	 greater	 number	 of	beads	 before	 guessing	 whether	 a	 bag	 contains	 mostly	 white	 or	 mostly	 black	beads,	 indicating	 that	 those	with	high	 IU	have	a	 lower	 threshold	 for	ambiguity	(Ladouceur,	Talbot,	&	Dugas,	1997).	High	IU	has	also	been	linked	to	behavioural	inhibition	 in	 a	 timed	 typing	 study	 conducted	 by	 Thibodeau,	 Carleton,	 Gómez-Pérez,	and	Asmundson	(2013),	 in	which	high	IU	predicted	slower	typing	speed.	One	 interpretation	 posited	 by	 the	 authors	 is	 that	 IU	 prompted	 checking	 typed	letters	and/or	hesitation	before	each	keystroke.	However,	there	is	evidence	that	sub-optimal	decision-making	is	not	 just	a	consequence	of	an	excessive	need	for	certainty	 or	 overly	 cautious	 behaviour.	 	 Luhmann,	 Ishida,	 and	 Hajcak	 (2011)	observed	that	high	IU	was	associated	with	risky	gambles	and	less	willingness	to	wait	 for	 a	 reward	 with	 better	 odds.	 The	 aversiveness	 of	 a	 prolonged	 state	 of	uncertainty	 may	 have	 impelled	 high	 IU	 participants	 to	 make	 suboptimal	decisions.	 IU	 is	 also	 characterised	 by	 a	 lack	 of	 confidence	 in	 one’s	 ability	 to	manage	 uncertainty	 (Dugas,	 Freeston,	 &	 Ladouceur,	 1997),	 and	 it	 is	 apparent	that	 efforts	 to	 reduce	 or	 avoid	 uncertainty	 can	 be	 detrimental	 to	 decision-making.		IU	 elicits	 a	 number	 of	 cognitive	 and	 emotional	 reactions	 to	 threat	 in	everyday	 life.	 Those	with	 high	 IU	 exhibit	 a	 greater	propensity	 to	 seek	 out	 and	
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focus	 on	 threat-related	 information,	 which	 often	 results	 in	 exaggerated	 threat	perception	 and	heightened	psychological	 distress	 (Rosen,	Knäuper,	&	 Sammut,	2007).	 Worry	 elicited	 by	 IU	 has	 shown	 to	 disrupt	 cognitive	 processing	 of	ambiguous	 stimuli	 due	 to	 the	 intrusion	 of	 negative	 thoughts	 (Metzger,	 Miller,	Cohen,	 Sofka,	&	Borkovec,	 1990).	There	 is	 also	 evidence	 that	 IU	 intensifies	 the	effect	of	daily	stressors	on	anxiety	symptoms	in	non-clinical	populations	(Chen	&	Hong,	 2010;	 Ciarrochi,	 Said,	&	Deane,	 2005).	 Consequently,	 those	with	 high	 IU	may	perceive	 their	daily	 lives	 to	be	more	stressful	and	 less	manageable.	There	are	also	neural	 connections	between	 IU	and	 the	 insula;	 a	 structure	 involved	 in	the	emotional	response	to	negative	future	events	(Gorka	et	al.,	2016).	 Emotion-based	 responses	 to	 uncertainty	 may	 usurp	 rational	 thinking	 and	 adaptive	decision-making.	The	cognitive,	psychological	and	emotional	consequences	of	IU	also	have	a	serious	 impact	on	adaptive	coping	behaviours	due	 to	elevated	perceptions	of	threat,	negative	problem	orientation,	cognitive	avoidance,	and	overestimation	of	the	 likelihood	 and	 intensity	 of	 negative	 outcomes	 (Bredemeier	 &	 Berenbaum,	2008;	 Dugas	 et	 al.,	 1997).	 Negative-problem	 orientation	 is	 characterised	 by	interpreting	 problems	 as	 threats	 rather	 than	 challenges,	 which	 can	 result	 in	avoidance	 instead	 of	 solution-finding	 (Davey,	 1993).	 Those	 with	 high	 IU	demonstrate	low	appraisals	of	self-control	in	a	threatening	situation	and	greater	levels	 of	 emotion-focused	 coping	 (e.g.	 rumination,	 self-blame,	 or	 resignation),	compared	 to	 problem-solving	 coping	 methods	 (Taha,	 Matheson,	 Cronin,	 &	Anisman,	2014).	IU	is	considered	to	be	a	fundamental	aspect	to	worry,	and	worry	is	 often	 used	 as	 a	 maladaptive	 strategy	 for	 managing	 or	 preventing	 negative	outcomes,	 rather	 than	actually	 resolving	 the	undesirable	 situation	 (Freeston	et	
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al.,	1994).	IU	may	be	particularly	detrimental	to	drug	abusers’	perception	of	life	stress,	 as	 IU	 may	 compound	 drug-related	 abnormalities	 in	 stress	 regulation.	Overall,	 IU	 elicits	 stress	 and	 anxiety,	 which	 may	 further	 impede	 adaptive	decision-making.	The	role	IU	has	in	psychopathology	is	of	great	interest,	as	it	is	considered	to	 be	 a	 transdiagnostic	 vulnerability	 factor	 and	 “phenotypic	 core”	 for	internalising	disorders	(Barlow,	Sauer-Zavala,	Carl,	Bullis,	&	Ellard,	2014),	such	as	 major	 depressive	 disorder,	 obsessive	 compulsive	 disorder,	 generalised	anxiety	 disorder	 (GAD),	 panic	 disorder	 (Carleton	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Mahoney	 &	McEvoy,	 2012b;	 McEvoy	 &	 Mahoney,	 2012),	 and	 social	 anxiety	 (Carleton,	Collimore,	 &	 Asmundson,	 2010).	 Anxiety	 disorders	 and	 mood	 disorders	 are	highly	 comorbid	with	 SUD,	which	 is	 of	 great	 importance	 to	 the	 current	 thesis.	The	National	Institute	of	Mental	Health	Epidemiological	Catchment	Area	Survey	found	 28.3%	 comorbidity	 between	 SUD	 and	 anxiety	 disorder	 and	 26.4%	comorbidity	with	mood	disorders	in	a	large	representative	sample	of	the	United	States	 (Regier	 et	 al.,	 1990).	 The	 link	 between	 anxiety	 and	 SUD	 has	 been	 well	documented	 in	 the	 literature	 (Huang	&	Wang,	2015;	Kushner,	Krueger,	Frye,	&	Peterson,	 2008;	 Lai,	 Cleary,	 Sitharthan,	 &	Hunt,	 2015),	 and	 the	 comorbidity	 of	substance	dependence	and	anxiety	disorders	is	approximately	25%	(Grant	et	al.,	2004).	Non-clinical	anxious	traits	are	also	associated	with	addiction	as	reported	in	 multiple	 studies	 (Litt,	 Cooney,	 &	 Morse,	 2000;	 Mehroof	 &	 Griffiths,	 2010;	Wilsey	et	al.,	2008).	Of	 the	anxiety	disorders,	GAD	has	 the	highest	 comorbidity	rate	with	drug	dependence	(Grant	et	al.,	2009;	Grant	et	al.,	2004;	Kushner	et	al.,	2008).	 IU	 is	 thought	 to	 be	 a	 key	 causal	 factor	 of	 worry,	 and	 excessive	 and	uncontrollable	worry	about	potential	future	events	are	the	primary	symptoms	of	
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GAD	(American	Psychiatric	Association.,	2013).	Furthermore,	anxiety	disorders	and	SUD	share	many	common	features.	Both	disorders	are	based	on	maladaptive	associative	 learning:	 Addiction	 develops	 from	 hypersensitisation	 to	 the	conditioned	 associations	 between	 drugs	 and	 reward	 (Robinson	 &	 Berridge,	2001),	 and	 anxiety	 disorders	 arise	 from	 learned	 associations	 between	 stimuli	and	aversive	outcomes	 	(Pittig,	Treanor,	Lebeau,	&	Craske,	2018).	Chronic	drug	use	has	also	shown	to	alter	neural	stress	pathways,	which	implicates	anxiety	in	escalating	drug	use	and	triggering	relapse	(Sinha,	2001).	Emotional	distress	has	also	been	implicated	in	engaging	in	self-destructive	behaviours,	reduced	impulse	control,	and	a	need	for	immediate	gratification	(Tice,	Bratslavsky,	&	Baumeister,	2001).	 Despite	 the	 high	 co-morbidity	 and	 shared	 features	 between	 anxiety	disorders	and	substance	abuse,	there	has	not	yet	been	an	investigation	of	IU	and	drug-dependency.		Psychoactive	drugs	are	often	used	as	a	method	to	reduce	negative	affect	elicited	by	stress	or	distress	(Khantzian,	1985;	Sinha,	2001).	Drugs	may	be	used	as	 a	way	 to	 cope	with	unpleasant	 emotions	 and	anxiety	 that	 are	 elicited	by	 IU	(Carleton,	2016;	Robinson,	Sareen,	Cox,	&	Bolton,	2009),	or	to	avoid	the	distress	felt	 when	 thinking	 about	 an	 uncertain	 future.	 However,	 there	 is	 a	 dearth	 of	investigation	into	how	IU	relates	to	substance	abuse.	Based	on	a	comprehensive	review	of	IU	research,	there	is	a	strong	argument	for	examining	the	link	between	IU	and	addiction,	given	IU’s	role	in	psychopathologies	that	are	highly	co-morbid	with	addiction	and	which	share	similar	features.	The	existing	research	on	IU	and	substance	use	is	limited	to	motivations	for	drinking	alcohol.	Two	recent	studies	found	that	IU	predicts	using	alcohol	as	an	avoidance	strategy	to	cope	with	worry	and	 negative	 affect	 (Kraemer,	 McLeish,	 &	 Bryan,	 2015;	 Oglesby,	 Albanese,	
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Chavarria,	&	 Schmidt,	 2015).	Negative	 drinking	motivations,	 such	 as	 coping	 or	peer	conformity,	are	linked	to	alcohol	abuse	and	increase	the	risk	of	developing	an	 alcohol	 use	 disorder	 (Carpenter	 &	 Hasin,	 1999;	 Cooper,	 Frone,	 Russell,	 &	Mudar,	1995;	Cooper,	Russell,	Skinner,	&	Windle,	1992;	Park	&	Levenson,	2002).	There	is	a	need	to	investigate	the	relationship	that	IU	has	with	substances	other	than	alcohol,	and	how	IU	may	impact	problematic	substance	use	behaviours	that	lead	to	addiction.	IU	may	be	a	risk	factor	for	developing	an	addiction	if	drug	use	is	 employed	 as	 a	 long	 term	 coping	 strategy	 in	 the	 face	 of	 unavoidable	uncertainty.		
1.7	Aims	and	structure	of	the	thesis	Associations	between	IU	and	individual	differences	common	to	addiction	highlight	 the	 importance	 of	 further	 research	 of	 this	 topic.	 Impulsive	 traits	 and	behaviours	 are	 cardinal	 features	 of	 addiction	 that	 can	 impair	 decision-making,	particularly	 under	 uncertainty.	 The	 overall	 aim	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 investigate	relationships	 between	 IU	 and	 impulsivity	 in	 the	 context	 of	 opioid	 dependency.	The	 thesis	 consists	 of	 four	 empirical	 chapters	 that	 address	 these	 topics	individually,	followed	by	a	synthesis	of	the	results	that	draws	a	clearer	picture	of	the	role	of	 IU	 in	addiction.	A	stronger	understanding	of	 the	role	of	 IU	 in	opioid	dependency	will	 contribute	 to	 improved	substance	abuse	 treatment,	 as	well	 as	inform	transdiagnostic	therapy	for	related	psychological	disorders.						
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Chapter	2	Although	 there	 is	 clear	 evidence	 that	 anxiety	 and	impulsivity	are	associated	with	 substance	 abuse,	 there	 is	 a	 paucity	 of	 research	 examining	 the	role	of	IU	in	this	disorder.	IU	has	been	linked	to	a	number	of	anxiety	disorders,	and	 it	 has	 been	 postulated	 by	 recent	 research	 that	 anxiety	 felt	 in	 the	 face	of	uncertainty	may	 result	 in	 impulsive	 decision-making	 (Luhmann	 et	 al.,	 2011;	Pawluk	&	Koerner,	2013).	The	study	presented	in	chapter	two	tested	for	the	first	time	 whether	 opioid-dependent	 individuals	 are	 less	 tolerant	of	uncertainty	compared	 to	 a	 healthy	 comparison	 group.	 Chapter	 2	 also	investigates	 whether	 self-reported	 impulsive	 personality	 traits	 moderate	 the	relationship	between	opioid-dependency	and	IU,	and	aims	to	illuminate	how	IU	may	be	related	to	deficits	in	impulse	control	that	are	characteristic	of	compulsive	drug	 taking	 behaviour.	 The	 following	 publication	 is	 a	 product	 of	 the	 work	conducted	in	Chapter	2:	Garami,	 J.,	Haber,	P.,	Myers,	C.,	Allen,	M.,	Misiak,	B.,	Frydecka,	D.,	&	Moustafa,	A.	(2017).	Intolerance	of	uncertainty	in	opioid	dependency	–	Relationship	with	trait	anxiety	and	impulsivity.	PLoS	One,	12(7).		
Chapter	3		Chronic	 drug	 use	 has	 been	 associated	 with	 a	 dysfunction	 of	 the	dopaminergic	reward	system	that	may	predate	or	be	a	product	of	drug	addiction.	Furthermore,	 abnormal	 reward	 feedback	 learning	 has	 been	 observed	 in	 drug-addicted	 individuals	 and	 clinical	 populations	 that	 exhibit	 dopamine	dysregulation	(Frank,	Samanta,	Moustafa,	&	Sherman,	2007;	Frank,	Seeberger,	&	Reilly,	2004;	Haber	&	Behrens,	2014;	Moustafa,	Krishna,	Eissa,	&	Hewedi,	2013).	The	way	in	which	one	responds	to	feedback,	particularly	negative	feedback,	may	
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suggest	 impairments	 in	 impulse	 control	 and	 may	 negatively	 affect	 optimal	learning.	Previous	 studies	have	 largely	utilised	deterministic	 feedback	 learning	measures	 that	 have	 limited	 generalisability,	 as	 the	outcomes	of	 daily	decisions	often	 fluctuate	 in	 unpredictable	 ways.	 Chapter	 3	 presents	 a	 study	 that	 uses	 a	probabilistic	 feedback	 learning	 paradigm	 to	 assess	 the	 ability	 to	 learn	 from	uncertain	 reward	and	punishments	 in	opioid-dependent	 individuals,	 as	well	 as	impulsive	 responses	 to	 unpredictable	 feedback.	 Only	 one	 study	 to	 date	 has	investigated	probabilistic	feedback	learning	in	the	context	of	opioid	dependency	(Meyers	 et	 al.,	 2016),	 and	 Chapter	 3	 builds	 upon	 this	 study	 to	 be	 the	 first	 to	correlate	 IU	 with	 probabilistic	 learning	 and	 responsiveness	 to	 uncertain	feedback.	These	 relationships	provide	 further	 insight	 into	how	negative	beliefs	about	 uncertainty	 observed	 in	 opioid-dependent	 individuals	 may	 negatively	impact	 their	 capacity	 to	 effectively	 learn	 from	 reward	 and	 punishment	 in	everyday	life.	
Chapter	4		Excessive	 risk	 taking	 is	 also	 a	 common	 feature	 of	 drug	 addiction	 and	 is	exemplified	 by	 problematic	 drug	 use,	 particularly	 opioids,	 which	 carry	 a	 high	risk	of	overdose.	Uncertainty	is	inherent	in	risk-taking	situations,	as	at	least	one	of	 the	 possible	 outcomes	 is	 undetermined.	 Risk	 taking	 involves	 a	 decision	between	uncertain	outcomes	based	on	 the	 subjective	value	one	places	on	each	option	 relative	 to	 the	 probability	 of	 its	 occurrence.	 Humans	 tend	 to	 devalue	 a	reward	as	the	odds	against	receiving	it	grow	larger,	and	this	inclination	becomes	maladaptive	when	it	fails	to	maximise	benefits	(or	minimise	losses)	over	the	long	run.	 The	 study	 presented	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	 the	 first	 to	 utilise	 the	 probability	
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discounting	 (PD)	 paradigm	 to	 assess	 maladaptive	 risk-taking	 in	 opioid-dependent	 individuals.	 The	 PD	 measures	 developed	 in	 Chapter	 4	 involve	hypothetical	monetary	outcomes,	and	include	both	probabilistic	losses	as	well	as	rewards	 in	 consideration	 of	 the	 potential	 losses	 incurred	 by	 opioid	 abuse.	Furthermore,	 differences	 between	 PD	 of	 monetary	 gains	 compared	 to	 losses	have	received	comparably	less	attention	in	the	PD	literature,	particularly	in	the	context	of	addiction.	Chapter	4	also	provides	an	analysis	of	how	IU	may	influence	risk-taking	in	opioid	dependent	individuals	compared	to	controls.	
Chapter	5			It	can	be	argued	that	the	way	in	which	one	discounts	monetary	outcomes	may	 not	 generalise	 to	 behaviour	 outside	 the	 laboratory.	 In	 respect	 to	 this	limitation,	 the	 novel	 PD	 tasks	 developed	 in	 Chapter	 5	 comprise	 hypothetical	health	improvements	and	detriments,	similar	to	health	outcomes	experienced	by	chronic	 drug	 users.	 Health	 outcomes	 were	 specifically	 chosen	 for	 this	 study	because	of	their	applicability	to	the	physical	and	psychological	consequences	of	continued	 drug	 use	 versus	 those	 of	 abstinence.	 Similarly	 to	 Chapter	 4,	differences	in	PD	rates	were	assessed	between	opioid-dependent	individuals	and	healthy	 controls,	 and	 the	 relationships	 with	 IU	 were	 examined.	 Finally,	comparisons	are	made	between	the	discounting	patterns	observed	in	Chapters	4	and	5.		
1.8	Research	setting	The	 studies	presented	 in	 this	 thesis	were	 conducted	 at	 the	Drug	Health	Services	 and	Opioid	Treatment	Program	at	 the	Royal	 Prince	Alfred	Hospital	 in	
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Sydney,	Australia.	All	patient	participants	in	the	empirical	studies	reported	in	the	thesis	were	recruited	 from	this	program.	Patients	are	diagnosed	 for	opioid	use	disorder	 and	 receive	daily	methadone	or	buprenorphine	maintenance	 therapy.	Given	 the	 chronic	nature	of	 opioid	 addiction	 and	 the	high	 rate	 of	 relapse	 after	abstinence-based	 therapy,	 opioid	 maintenance	 programs	 are	 important	 in	reducing	 the	 personal	 and	 societal	 harms	 associated	 with	 opioid	 addiction	(World	Health	Organisation,	United	Nations	Office	 of	Drugs	 and	Crime,	&	 Joint	United	Nations	Programme	on	HIV/AIDS,	2004).	Methadone	is	the	most	common	form	 of	 maintenance	 treatment,	 and	 is	 a	 long-acting	 opioid	 that	 binds	 to	endogenous	 opioid	 receptors	 and	 reduces	 cravings,	 prevents	 withdrawal	 and	dampens	 the	 effect	 of	 other	 opiates	 (Kunc,	 Ketchen,	 Gorzelanczyk,	 &	 Fareed,	2015).	Buprenorphine	is	an	alternative	opioid	maintenance	medication	that	has	a	lower	risk	for	overdose	than	methadone	and	is	often	prescribed	for	short-term	treatment	in	patients	with	good	prognostic	factors	(Kahan,	Srivastava,	Ordean,	&	Cirone,	2011).		While	methadone	and	buprenorphine	are	longer-acting	opioids	compared	to	morphine	or	heroin,	patients	are	required	to	attend	the	clinic	daily	to	receive	their	 dose.	 Failure	 to	 take	 one’s	 daily	 medication	 can	 result	 in	 craving	 and	withdrawal	symptoms	(Koob	&	Le	Moal,	2006),	which	can	motivate	patients	 to	seek	 out	 illicit	 opioids.	 Some	 patients	 are	 also	 required	 to	 adhere	 to	 opioid	treatment	 as	part	 of	 a	 court	 order.	 Consequently,	 all	 of	 the	 experimental	 tasks	used	in	the	present	thesis	took	place	at	the	clinic	shortly	after	patients	received	their	 daily	medication	 (0-2	 hours)	 to	 ensure	 participation	would	 not	 interfere	with	treatment.	The	studies	conducted	in	this	thesis	were	approved	by	the	Ethics	Review	 Committee	 (RPAH	 Zone)	 of	 the	 Sydney	 Local	 Health	 District.
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Chapter	2	–	Intolerance	of	uncertainty	and	self-reported	
impulsivity		
2.1	Introduction	As	there	has	been	no	research	to	date	investigating	IU	and	drug	addiction,	the	primary	purpose	of	the	study	presented	in	this	chapter	is	to	assess	whether	opioid-dependent	individuals	experience	higher	levels	of	IU	compared	to	a	non-drug	abusing	control	group.	Because	impulsivity	and	anxiety	are	common	traits	to	addiction,	we	also	examined	whether	there	is	an	association	between	IU	and	impulsivity	 and	 whether	 this	 relationship	 might	 hold	 equally	 in	 opioid-dependent	patients	and	healthy	controls.		Typically,	 IU	 is	associated	with	overly	cautious	and	carefully	considered	behaviour,	but	there	is	also	evidence	that	IU	may	promote	hasty	and	maladaptive	decisions	 (Pawluk	 &	 Koerner,	 2013).	 The	 fear	 of	 uncertain	 future	 events	 has	been	 associated	 with	 heightened	 psychophysiological	 reactivity	 and	 amplified	startle	reflexes	in	anticipation	of	an	unpredictable	negative	event	(Nelson	et	al.,	2016).	 IU	has	been	 linked	 to	 the	propensity	 to	make	 rash	decisions	 (Furnham,	1994)	 as	 a	way	 to	 alleviate	 distress	 in	 stressful	 situations	 (Pawluk	&	Koerner,	2013).	 IU	 has	 also	 been	 related	 to	 a	 preference	 for	 an	 immediate	 reward	 as	relative	to	a	more	beneficial	delayed	reward,	which	has	been	 interpreted	as	an	aversion	 to	 the	 uncertainty	 involved	 in	 attempting	 to	 improve	 a	 future	 state	(Worthy,	Byrne,	&	Fields,	2014).	Individuals	higher	in	IU	also	show	a	tendency	to	select	 an	 immediately	 available,	 but	 less	 probable	 reward	 rather	 than	wait	 for	one	 with	 better	 odds	 (Luhmann	 et	 al.,	 2011),	 ostensibly	 because	 the	 aversive	state	of	uncertainty	motivates	a	quick,	but	suboptimal,	resolution.		
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Decisions	made	by	individuals	with	poor	impulse	control	(such	as	chronic	drug	users)	may	be	disproportionally	impacted	by	uncertainty,	and	uncertainty	in	one’s	environment	has	been	shown	to	deplete	the	willpower	needed	to	resist	temptation	 (Milkman,	 2012).	 Therefore,	 uncertainty	 may	 further	 impair	 the	ability	 of	 an	 impulsive	 person	 to	 make	 choices	 that	 are	 beneficial	 in	 the	 long	term.	 Increased	 activity	 in	 brain	 areas	 responsible	 for	 coding	 stimuli	 salience	suggests	 that	 drug	 abusers	 may	 feel	 a	 greater	 pressure	 to	 act	 in	 uncertain	situations	 because	 they	 find	 uncertain	 stimuli	 more	 salient	 and/or	 rewarding	(Leland,	Arce,	Feinstein,	&	Paulus,	2006).	There	is	evidence	that	IU	is	related	to	dysfunction	in	the	dopaminergic	system	and	prefrontal	executive	control,	which	may	contribute	to	the	disordered	processing	of	pleasurable	stimuli	(Gorka	et	al.,	2016)	that	has	been	observed	in	drug	abusing	individuals.	The	 current	 chapter	will	 assess	 impulsivity	 specifically	 in	 terms	 of	 self-reported	 thoughts,	 attitudes	 and	 behaviours	 as	 measured	 by	 the	 Barratt	Impulsivity	 Scale	 (BIS).	 Originally	 created	 in	 1959	 as	 a	 framework	 for	impulsivity	 as	 an	 overarching	 personality	 construct,	 the	 BIS	 is	 currently	 in	 its	11th	 revision	 (BIS-11)	 and	 considered	 to	 be	 the	 gold-standard	 self-report	measure	 of	 impulsivity	 (Stanford	 et	 al.,	 2009).	 Three	 subfactors	 have	 been	identified	 by	 Patton,	 Stanford,	 and	 Barratt	 (1995):	 Attentional	 impulsivity	(inability	 to	control	ones’	attention	or	 focus),	motor	 impulsivity	(acting	quickly	without	 forethought),	 and	non-planning	 impulsivity	 (not	planning	 for	 the	 long-term	 future).	 Each	 subtrait	 is	 comprised	 of	 two	 first-order	 factors,	 which	 are	summarised	in	Table	2.1.	The	full	BIS-11	questionnaire	can	be	found	in	Appendix	A.	The	BIS-11	has	robust	internal	consistency	(α	=	.83)	and	retest	reliability	(r	=	.83),	as	well	as	good	convergent	validity	with	the	EIS,	the	BIS/BAS,	and	the	ZSS	
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(Stanford	et	al.,	2009).	Total	BIS	score	is	typically	used	as	an	index	of	impulsivity,	but	 the	 individual	 subscales	 are	 also	 informative	 and	 have	 good	 internal	consistency	 (α	 =	 .74,	 .59	 and	 .72	 for	 attentional,	 motor,	 and	 non-planning,	respectively).	Total	BIS-11	scores	will	be	the	primary	indicator	of	impulsivity,	as	its	 three-factor	 structure	 has	 been	 questioned	 (Reise,	 Moore,	 Sabb,	 Brown,	 &	London,	 2013;	 Steinberg,	 Sharp,	 Stanford,	 &	 Tharp,	 2013).	 Nonetheless,	assessing	 the	 subtraits	 is	 important	 to	 better	 understand	 the	 individual	contributing	factors	to	impulsivity	in	drug	addiction.			Table	2.1		
First	and	second	order	factors	of	the	BIS-11	identified	by	Patton	et	al.	(1994)	
	 Second-order		 First-order		 Description	 Example	item	
Attentional	 Attention	 Focussing	on	a	current	task	 “I	don’t	‘pay	attention’”	Cognitive	instability	 Intrusive	or	racing	thoughts	 “I	often	have	extraneous	thoughts	when	thinking”	
Motor	 Motor	 Acting	on	the	spur	of	the	moment	 “I	act	on	‘impulse’”	Perseverance	 A	stable	lifestyle	 “I	change	jobs”	
Non-planning	 Self-control	 Thinking	and	planning	carefully	 “I	say	things	without	thinking”	Cognitive	complexity	 Enjoying	challenging	mental	tasks	 “I	like	to	think	about	complex	problems”		 				
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Research	questions	and	hypotheses	1.	Do	opioid-dependent	patients	who	receive	opioid	maintenance	therapy	report	higher	levels	of	IU	than	non-drug-abusing	control	participants?		2.	 In	 what	 way	 does	 IU	 relate	 to	 self-report	 impulsivity,	 and	 which	 types	 of	impulsivity	measured	by	the	BIS-11	have	the	strongest	association	with	IU	once	anxiety	is	accounted	for?			3.	 Is	 the	 relationship	 between	 IU	 and	 self-reported	 impulsivity	 different	 in	opioid-dependent	patients	compared	to	controls?		 Given	 that	 drug	 abuse	 is	 associated	 with	 neurological	 abnormalities	 in	stress	 and	 reward	 pathways,	 it	 was	 anticipated	 that	 patients	 would	 report	greater	IU.	Furthermore,	IU	will	predict	greater	impulsivity	in	opioid-dependent	patients,	but	not	control	participants.			
2.2	Method	
Participants	The	 study	 sample	 comprised	 of	 177	 participants,	 of	 which	 112	 were	opioid-dependent	 patients	 and	 69	 were	 healthy	 comparisons.	 Patients	 were	being	 treated	 for	opioid	addiction	by	either	methadone	or	buprenorphine.	The	control	group	participants	were recruited	from	psychology	students	at	Western	Sydney	 University	 and	 from	 the	 wider	 western	 Sydney	 community,	 through	
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snowballing	and	advertisements.	A	history	of	opioid	use	or	a	score	higher	 than	11	on	the	Drug	Abuse	Screening	Test	(described	in	detail	below)	were	exclusion	criteria	 for	 the	 control	 participants.	 All	 participants	 completed	 a	 demographic	questionnaire	assessing	age,	gender,	years	of	education,	and	efforts	were	made	to	 match	 control	 participants	 with	 patients	 on	 these	 variables.	 Patients	 also	answered	clinical	questions	regarding	their	age	of	first	opioid	use,	current	non-prescribed	 opioid	 use	 and	 any	 secondary	 drugs	 of	 abuse.	 Patients	 were	considered	to	be	poly-drug	users	if	they	reported	using	another	drug	of	concern	other	than	alcohol.	Patients	were	also	categorised	as	extra-medical	opioid	users	if	they	reported	non-prescribed	opioid	use	in	the	past	30	days.		
Measures		
Drug	Abuse	Screening	Test	(DAST):	The	DAST	was	developed	by	Skinner	 (1982)	as	a	 self-report	 screening	 tool	 for	substance	 abuse	 disorders.	 The	measure	 is	 comprised	 of	 28	 yes/no	 questions	about	the	use	of	illicit	drugs	or	misuse	of	medically	prescribed	drugs.	Each	“yes”	response	receives	a	score	of	1,	and	each	“no”	response	receives	a	score	of	zero	(three	items	are	reverse	scored).	Scores	are	tallied	and	a	sum	equal	to	or	greater	than	12	indicates	a	definite	substance	abuse	problem.	A	cut-off	score	of	<12	was	utilised	in	the	current	thesis	as	an	exclusion	criterion	for	control	participants,	as	this	 cut-off	 score	 has	 shown	 to	 accurately	 identify	 both	 individuals	 with	 and	without	a	SUD	(Gavin,	Ross,	&	Skinner,	1989).	 	
The	Intolerance	of	Uncertainty	Scale	(IUS):	The	 IUS	 is	 a	 27-item	 self-report	 scale	measuring	 negative	 beliefs	 about	the	 nature	 of	 uncertainty	 and	 its	 consequences	 (Freeston	 et	 al.,	 1994).	 The	
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English	version	developed	and	validated	by	Buhr	and	Dugas	(2002)	was	used	in	the	current	thesis	and	can	be	found	in	Appendix	B.	IU	is	measured	by	the	extent	to	 which	 the	 respondent	 relates	 to	 statements	 that	 describe	 thoughts	 and	reactions	to	uncertainty	on	a	5-point	scale	(1	=	not	at	all	characteristic	of	me	to	5	=	entirely	characteristic	of	me).	Total	IUS	score	is	typically	used	as	an	index	of	IU,	however	 two	 subfactors	 have	 been	 identified	 by	 Sexton	 and	 Dugas	 (2009).	Factor	1	(IUS-1),	 is	comprised	of	15	 items	regarding	the	belief	 that	uncertainty	has	negative	self-referent	implications	and	is	detrimental	to	behaviour.	Example	items	 are:	 “Being	 uncertain	 means	 that	 I	 lack	 confidence”	 and	 “When	 I	 am	uncertain,	I	can’t	go	forward”.	The	second	factor	(IUS-2)	consists	of	12	items	that	assess	 the	 belief	 that	 uncertainty	 is	 unfair	 and	 can	 spoil	 everything.	 Example	items	include:	“It’s	unfair	having	no	guarantees	 in	 life”	and	“One	should	always	look	ahead	so	as	to	avoid	surprises”.		Subsumed	within	the	subfactors	are	those	identified	by	(Carleton,	Norton,	&	Asmundson,	2007),	which	involve	“paralysis”	in	the	face	of	uncertainty	(IUS-1)	and	“a	need	for	predictability”	(IUS-2).	Ratings	 are	 totalled	 for	 an	 overall	 IUS	 score	 and	 for	 the	 individual	subscales.	Total	IUS	score	has	shown	high	correlations	with	GAD,	worry,	anxiety,	and	 depression	 and	 has	 excellent	 internal	 consistency	 (IUS-1	 :	α	 =	 .92	 for	 and	IUS-2:	α	=	.90;	Sexton	&	Dugas,	2009).	The	IUS	also	has	good	test-retest	reliability	(r	=	.74;	Buhr	&	Dugas,	2002).	The	IUS	has	been	subject	to	many	factor	analyses	and	 researchers	 have	 not	 reached	 a	 final	 consensus	 on	 how	 the	 subfactors	should	 be	 defined	 (Birrell,	Meares,	Wilkinson,	 &	 Freeston,	 2011).	 As	 such,	 the	IUS-1	and	IUS-2	will	be	included	in	the	statistical	analyses	of	the	present	thesis,	but	the	primary	focus	will	be	overall	IUS	scores	as	the	measure	of	IU.		
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The	Barratt	Impulsivity	Scale	–	11th	revision	(BIS-11):	The	BIS-11	is	a	30-item	self-report	measure	that	evaluates	impulsivity	as	a	 multifactorial	 behavioural	 and	 personality	 construct	 (Patton	 et	 al.,	 1995).	Respondents	rate	whether	a	statement	reflects	 the	way	they	act	or	 feel	on	a	4-point	 scale	 (1	 =	 rarely/never,	 2	 =	 occasionally,	 3	 =	 often,	 4	 =	 almost	always/always).	Ratings	are	summed	to	obtain	total	and	subscale	scores	(eleven	items	are	reverse	scored).	The	average	total	score	for	healthy	adults	is	estimated	to	be	around	62.3	(SD	=	10.3),	and	a	score	of	72	or	higher	is	thought	to	indicate	a	high	level	of	impulsiveness	(Stanford	et	al.,	2009).	Individuals	with	scores	of	74	or	 higher	 have	 demonstrated	 greater	 aggression	 (Lawrence	&	 Stanford,	 1998)	and	 low	baseline	 levels	 of	 arousal	 (Mathias	&	 Stanford,	 2003).	 The	BIS-11	has	also	 shown	 strong	 convergent	 validity	 across	 clinical	 populations,	 including	substance	 abuse	 disorder,	 depression,	 and	 bipolar	 disorder.	 And	 is	 correlated	with	deficient	executive	function,	working	memory	and	attention	(Stanford	et	al.,	2009).		
	The	State	Trait	Anxiety	Inventory	for	Adults	(STAI):	The	STAI	is	a	40-item	self-report	questionnaire	developed	by	Spielberger,	Gorusch,	Lushene,	Vagg,	and	Jacobs	(1977),	measuring	state	anxiety	(defined	by	transient	emotions	elicited	by	specific	 scenarios)	and	 trait	anxiety	 (a	 relatively	consistent	predisposition	to	react	to	circumstances	in	an	anxious	way).	The	STAI	is	 comprised	 of	 two	 forms:	 Form	 Y-1	 assesses	 state	 anxiety,	 and	 was	 not	administered	in	the	current	study	as	temporary	feelings	of	anxiousness	were	not	of	interest.	Form	Y-2	assesses	trait	anxiety	and	requires	respondents	to	indicate	on	a	4-point	scale	whether	a	statement	reflects	how	they	feel	generally	(1	=	not	
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at	all	to	4	=	very	much	so).	Form	Y-2	shows	strong	internal	consistency	(α	=.	89)	and	retest	 reliability	 (r	=	 .88;	Barnes,	Harp,	&	 Jung,	2002).	For	 the	purposes	of	this	 chapter,	 form	 Y-2	 will	 be	 referred	 to	 as	 the	 STAI,	 and	 can	 be	 found	 in	Appendix	C.	
Procedure	All	participants	were	administered	paper-and-pen	versions	of	 the	DAST,	IUS,	BIS-11	and	the	STAI,	in	order.		For	participants	who	had	difficulty	reading	or	writing,	 the	 researcher	 read	aloud	 the	questions	and	wrote	down	participants’	answers.	
Statistical	analyses	The	IBM	SPSS	Statistics	software	package	(version	24)	was	utilized	for	the	statistical	 analysis	 of	 the	 data	 in	 the	 current	 chapter,	 and	 all	 subsequent	empirical	 chapters	 of	 the	 thesis.	 Independent-samples	 t-tests	 were	 used	 to	assess	mean	differences	 in	demographic	variables	between	sample	groups,	and	the	 distribution	 of	males	 and	 females	 across	 groups	was	 determined	with	 the	chi-square	test.	 Independent-samples	t-tests	were	used	with	poly-drug	use	and	current	opioid-use	as	 independent	variables	and	scores	on	the	IUS,	BIS-11,	and	STAI	as	dependent	variables.	Analysis	of	covariance	(ANCOVA)	was	implemented	to	 test	 differences	 in	 IUS,	 BIS-11	 and	 STAI	 scores	 between	 groups,	 using	 age,	years	 of	 education,	 and	 gender	 as	 covariates.	 Zero-order	 correlations	 were	obtained	between	all	measures	and	clinical	variables,	and	hierarchical	regression	analyses	 were	 used	 to	 examine	 if	 the	 relationships	 between	 impulsivity	measures	were	different	between	patient	and	control	participants.	
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2.3	Results		The	patient	group	was	significantly	older	than	the	control	group	and	had	significantly	 fewer	 years	 of	 education.	 Gender	 was	 not	 distributed	 evenly	between	groups	in	that	there	were	a	higher	proportion	of	females	in	the	control	group.	 Accordingly,	 age,	 years	 of	 education	 and	 gender	 were	 entered	 as	covariates	 in	 the	 ANCOVAs.	 The	 participants’	 demographic	 and	 clinical	characteristics	can	be	found	in	Table	2.2			Table	2.2	
	
Participant	demographic	and	clinical	characteristics	
	Characteristic	 Mean	(SD)	 Statistic		 Control	 Patient	 	Age		 36.58	(12.12)	 40.27	(9.42)	 t	=	-2.30*	Female	(%)	 49	(71.00%)	 54	(47.40%)	 χ2	=	9.76**	Years	of	education		 12.57	(2.06)	 9.83	(12.06)	 t	=	8.67**	Age	of	first	opioid	use		 ---	 19.00	(5.64)	 ---	Years	of	opioid	use	 ---	 21.01	(9.86)	 ---	Poly-drug	user	(%)	 ---	 54	(49.10%)	 ---	Extra-medical	user	(%)	 ---	 63	(34.4%)	 ---	*	p	<	.05,	**	p	<		.001		 	Eleven	participants	were	not	included	in	the	analyses	of	certain	measures	due	to	failure	to	complete	all	the	questions	on	the	IUS	(n=4),	STAI	(n=2),	or	BIS-11	 (n=5).	 Data	 from	 these	 participants	were	 included	 in	 analyses	 that	 did	 not	involve	the	incomplete	questionnaire.	Results	of	ANCOVA	revealed	that	patients	scored	 significantly	higher	 than	 the	 control	 group	on	 the	 IUS,	BIS-11	and	STAI	and	subscales	(all	p	<	 .001).	Poly-drug	or	extra-medical	opioid	use	did	not	have	
		
	 46	
significant	 effects	 on	 any	 of	 the	 questionnaire	 measures	 (all	 p	 >	 .100).	 When	gender	differences	were	assessed,	males	and	females	scored	similarly	on	the	IUS,	but	males	reported	significantly	greater	attentional	impulsiveness,	non-planning	impulsiveness,	 and	 overall	 BIS-11	 scores.	 Means,	 standard	 deviations,	 and	statistical	analyses	can	be	found	in	Table	2.3.		Table	2.3			
Means,	standard	deviations	and	ANCOVA	results	comparing	IUS,	BIS-11,	and	STAI	
trait	scores	between	participant	groups	
	Measure	 Mean	(SD)	 									F		 Control	 Patient	 	IUS	 56.61	(16.83)	 72.61	(24.07)	 				15.90*						IUS-1	 28.43	(9.24)	 37.68	(13.50)	 				17.81*						IUS-2	 28.18	(8.34)	 34.37	(11.51)	 				11.43*	BIS-11	total	 59.19	(9.08)	 73.55	(11.08)	 				48.26*						Attentional	 15.51	(3.93)	 18.75	(4.18)	 				14.92*						Motor	 21.75	(3.66)	 26.28	(5.05)	 				30.20*						Non-planning	 21.93	(4.32)	 28.83	(5.29)	 				43.17*	STAI	trait	anxiety		 35.96	(8.20)	 48.25	(12.45)	 				51.91*	*	p	<	.001		
	
	 Zero-order	 correlations	 revealed	 significant	 positive	 relationships	between	all	the	questionnaires	and	subscales	(all	p	<	.001),	with	the	exception	of	motor	 subscale	 scores.	Motor	 impulsiveness	was	 correlated	with	 IUS	 total	 and	IUS-1	scores	at	the	p	<	.05	level,	and	did	not	have	a	significant	relationship	with	the	IUS-2.	Correlations	between	self-report	measures	and	the	demographic	and	clinical	variables	showed	that	education	was	significantly	negatively	correlated	with	 the	questionnaires	and	subscales,	 indicating	 that	more	years	of	education	
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predicted	lower	IU,	anxiety	and	impulsivity.		Years	of	opioid	use	did	not	correlate	significantly	 with	 any	 of	 the	 independent	 variables.	 A	 multiple	 regression	analyses	 was	 conducted	 to	 identify	 which	 impulsivity	 subtraits	 were	 the	 best	predictors	of	IU	when	education	and	anxiety	were	accounted	for.	Education	and	anxiety	were	 included	because	of	 their	 correlations	with	 IUS	 scores.	Results	of	the	 regression	 model	 showed	 that	 total	 IUS	 score	 was	 significantly	 predicted	only	by	attentional	impulsiveness	(B	=	1.26,	SE	=	.43,	p	=	.004).	A	 hierarchical	 moderated	 regression	 tested	 whether	 the	 relationship	between	overall	impulsivity	and	IU	were	similar	between	patients	and	controls.	Addiction	status	and	total	BIS-11	scores	were	entered	in	at	step	1,	for	which	the	overall	 model	 was	 significant	 (F(2,171)	 =	 14.71,	 p	 <	 .002)	 and	 accounted	 for	14.7%	of	the	variance	in	IU.	When	an	interaction	term	was	included	in	step	2,	it	did	not	 improve	 the	model	although	 it	 approached	significance	 (B	 =	 .633,	SE	 =	.339,	p	=	.064).	The	second	hierarchical	moderated	regression	analysis	assessed	whether	the	 relationship	between	 attentional	 impulsivity	 and	 IU	was	different	 between	participant	groups.	Addiction	status	and	scores	on	the	attentional	impulsiveness	subscale	 of	 the	 BIS-11	 comprised	 step	 1	 of	 the	 model,	 for	 which	 the	 overall	model	was	significant	 (F(2,174)	=	26.41,	p	<	 .001)	and	accounted	 for	23.3%	of	variance	 in	 IU.	 Introducing	 an	 interaction	 term	 into	 step	 2	 explained	 an	additional	2%	of	variance,	which	was	significant	(F(1,173)	=	4.65,	p	=	.032).	The	results	 of	 this	 regression	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Table	 2.4.	 Simple	 slopes	 analysis	revealed	 that	 there	 was	 a	 significant	 positive	 relationship	 between	 IU	 and	attentional	 impulsiveness	 in	 the	patient	group	 (B	=	2.550,	SE	=	 .455,	p	<	 .001),	but	 not	 in	 the	 control	 group	 (p	 =	 .157).	 The	 interaction	 between	 attentional	
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impulsivity	and	 IU	between	groups	 is	depicted	 in	Figure	2.1.	 It	appears	 that	 IU	predicts	 greater	 impulsivity	 only	 in	 opioid-dependent	 patients	 compared	 to	healthy	controls.				Table	2.4.			
Moderation	regression	analysis	summary	predicting	IUS	from	addiction	status	and	
attentional	impulsiveness		Predictor	 β	 R2	 ΔR2	 F	 ΔF	Step	1	 	 .233	 	 26.41**	 							Group	 .192*	 	 	 	 							ATT		 .378**	 	 	 	 	Step	2	 	 .253	 .020	 19.53**	 4.65*							Group	 -.392	 	 	 	 							ATT	 -.149	 	 	 	 							Group	x	ATT	 .929*	 	 	 	 	ATT	=	Attentional	impulsiveness	BIS-11	subscale	*	p	<	.05	
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		Figure	2.1.	Attentional	impulsivity	predicting	IUS	scores	between	patient	and	control	groups		
2.4	Discussion	This	study	assessed	the	relationship	between	opioid-dependency,	IU	and	facets	of	impulsivity	as	measured	by	the	BIS-11.	Firstly,	our	results	showed	that	opioid-dependent	 patients	 in	 the	 course	 of	 opioid	maintenance	 therapy	 report	higher	 IU	 than	 a	 healthy	 control	 group.	 One	 possible	 interpretation	 is	 that	addiction	 results	 from	 regularly	 taking	 drugs	 in	 order	 to	 cope	 with	 an	 often-unpredictable	world.	Chronic	high	levels	of	stress	and	poor	coping	strategies	are	associated	with	substance	abuse	(Sinha,	2008),	and	animal	models	have	shown	that	stress	may	permanently	alter	the	structure	of	the	neural	reward	system	in	a	way	 that	 increases	 the	 risk	 of	 developing	 addiction	 (Piazza	 &	 Le	 Moal,	 1998;	Sinha,	2001).	Uncertainty	can	result	in	hypervigilance,	which	in	drug-dependent	
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populations	may	result	 in	enhanced	attention	 to	drug-related	stimuli	 (Grupe	&	Nitschke,	2013).	 In	addition,	 stress	and	anxiety	associated	with	 IU	may	 lead	 to	increased	drug	use	and	relapse	(Jacobsen,	Southwick,	&	Kosten,	2001;	McCabe,	Cranford,	&	Boyd,	2016;	Sinha,	2001).	Alternatively,	IU	may	develop	after	the	onset	of	opioid	addiction,	or	even	reflect	 acute	 effects	 of	 current	 opioid	 therapy.	 	 Arguing	 against	 this	interpretation	 is	 our	 finding	 that	 neither	 the	 duration	 of	 opioid	 use	 nor	 poly-drug	abuse	had	a	 significant	 relationship	with	 scores	on	 the	 IUS.	This	 suggests	that	 IU	may	 be	 a	 relatively	 stable	 personality	 trait	 predating	 addiction,	 rather	than	arising	in	the	wake	of	opioid	use.	Only	longitudinal	studies	can	definitively	answer	whether	IU	is	an	antecedent	to	opioid	exposure	that	confers	a	risk	for	the	development	of	addiction.	The	second	aim	of	 the	study	was	to	explore	how	IU	relates	 to	 impulsive	traits	that	are	common	to	drug	addiction,	for	which	prior	research	findings	were	mixed.	 IU	 and	 trait	 anxiety	 in	 our	 study	 were	 associated	 with	 greater	 overall	impulsivity,	which	supports	research	linking	dimensions	of	impulsivity	to	worry	(Belzer,	Zurilla,	&	Maydeu-Olivares,	2002;	Cougle,	Goetz,	&	Timpano,	2012;	Gay,	Schmidt,	&	Linden,	2011),	GAD	(Miller,	Flory,	Lynam,	&	Leukefeld,	2003;	Pawluk	&	Koerner,	2013;	Worthy	et	al.,	2014),	and	IU	(Luhmann	et	al.,	2011;	Pawluk	&	Koerner,	 2013;	 Worthy	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 We	 also	 found	 that	 when	 anxiety	 was	accounted	 for,	 attentional	 impulsiveness	 was	 the	 only	 BIS-11	 subtrait	 that	significantly	 predicted	 IU.	 Attentional	 impulsiveness	 is	 characterised	 by	 an	inability	to	control	one’s	attention	or	concentration,	and	is	a	deficient	cognitive	process	 that	 may	 underpin	 many	 impulsive	 behaviours	 (Patton	 et	 al.,	 1995).	Impulsivity	 is	delineated	by	disordered	decision-making	that	results	 in	adverse	
		
	 51	
consequences.	 Accordingly,	 difficulty	 focusing	 on	 important	 tasks	 can	 prevent	advantageous	 choices	 and	 behaviours.	 Attentional	 impulsiveness	 may	 also	motivate	 one	 to	 seek	 out	 more	 stimulating	 activities	 at	 one’s	 detriment.	 For	example,	 attention	 deficit/hyperactivity	 disorder	 (ADHD)	 is	 characterized	 by	extreme	 difficulties	 in	 focusing	 attention	 that	 most	 often	 results	 in	 social,	academic	 and	 occupational	 disadvantages	 (American	 Psychiatric	 Association.,	2013).	 ADHD	 is	 correlated	with	 attentional	 impulsivity	 (Malloy-Diniz,	 Fuentes,	Leite,	 Correa,	 &	 Bechara,	 2007;	Müller	 et	 al.,	 2007),	 and	 illustrates	 the	way	 in	which	 lack	of	 attentional	 control	 results	 in	maladaptive	decision-making.	From	these	 results,	 we	 can	 conclude	 that	 poor	 attentional	 control	 is	 a	 predominant	driving	 factor	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 impulsivity	 and	 IU	 observed	 in	 the	current	study.		When	 the	 links	 between	 impulsivity	 and	 IU	 were	 analysed	 between	participant	 groups,	 a	 significant	 positive	 relationship	 between	 attentional	impulsivity	 and	 IU	was	 observed	 only	 in	 the	 patient	 group.	 IU	 and	 attentional	impulsivity	were	not	meaningfully	associated	in	control	participants.	There	was	also	a	similar	positive	correlation	between	overall	BIS-11	impulsivity	and	IU	that	was	 unique	 to	 patients.	While	 not	 significant,	 the	 trend	 neared	 the	 threshold,	which	makes	the	relationship	noteworthy	nonetheless.	It	appears	that	there	is	a	particular	interplay	between	impulsivity	and	IU	in	opioid-dependent	individuals	that	 is	 not	 present	 in	 non-drug-abusing	 populations.	 Impulsivity	 and	 IU	 may	additively	combine	to	heighten	one’s	risk	for	opioid	addiction,	so	that	individuals	with	 only	 one	 of	 these	 traits	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 develop	 addiction.	 Increased	activity	 in	 the	 striatum	 in	 response	 to	 decision-making	 under	 uncertainty	 has	been	 correlated	with	BIS-11	 impulsivity	 scores,	 and	 stimulant	drug	users	have	
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exhibited	stronger	neural	responses	to	uncertainty	in	the	striatum	(Leland	et	al.,	2006).	 In	 regards	 to	 attentional	 impulsivity,	 the	 damaging	 effects	 that	 chronic	opioid	 use	may	 have	 on	 executive	 control	may	 also	 arguably	 diminish	 control	over	 directing	 and	 focusing	 attention	 on	 important,	 but	 not	 particularly	enjoyable	tasks.		
Limitations	There	are	several	limitations	of	the	current	study	that	need	be	taken	into	account	and	used	to	direct	future	research.	Firstly,	the	self-report	methods	used	here	 are	 prone	 to	 recall	 errors	 or	 intentional	 misreporting	 of	 sensitive	information	 for	 social	 desirability	 (e.g.	 “I	 plan	 for	 financial	 security”).	 The	addition	 of	 an	 experimental	 manipulation	 for	 impulsivity	 would	 validate	 the	current	results	and	guide	our	interpretations.	This	is	addressed	in	the	following	chapters,	which	will	involve	behavioural	measures	of	impulsivity.	The	results	of	the	current	study	may	have	also	been	influenced	by	the	mismatch	between	the	control	 and	 patient	 groups	 in	 age,	 gender,	 and	 education.	 Previous	 research	using	opioid-maintenance	 therapy	patients	often	has	difficulty	 in	matching	 this	group	closely	to	community	controls	in	educational	attainment	because	patients	tend	to	have	completed	far	fewer	years	of	schooling	(Myers	et	al.,	2017;	Myers	et	al.,	2016;	Sheynin	et	al.,	2016).	However,	our	 statistical	 analyses	accounted	 for	differences	 in	demographic	characteristics	and	showed	that	 these	variables	did	not	 account	 for	 significant	 variations	 in	 the	 dependent	 variables.	 The	relationship	 between	 impulsivity	 and	 IU	 in	 opioid	 addiction	 is	 not	straightforward	and	requires	further	research	to	clarify	the	role	that	IU	plays	as	a	factor	in	theories	of	drug	addiction.		
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Chapter	3	–Probabilistic	feedback	learning	and	
impulsive	decision-making	
	Chapter	 2	 revealed	 that	 impulsivity	 as	 a	 self-reported	 personality	 construct	predicts	greater	IU	in	opioid-dependent	patients.	While	self-report	methods	are	valid	assessment	methods,	 they	require	respondents	 to	objectively	assess	 their	own	 behavioural	 tendencies.	 Accordingly,	 Chapter	 3	 utilises	 a	 behavioural	measure	to	assess	impulsive	decision-making.	Humans	are	frequently	presented	with	complex	situations	 in	which	they	need	to	 learn	from	feedback	and	modify	their	 behaviour	 in	 an	 adaptive	 manner.	 The	 current	 chapter	 investigates	 how	impulsive	 reactions	 to	 uncertain	 negative	 feedback	 differ	 between	 opioid-dependent	 individuals	 and	 healthy	 controls,	 and	 how	 such	 reactions	 are	impacted	by	one’s	ability	to	tolerate	uncertainty.		
3.1	Introduction	The	transition	from	initial	drug	use	to	addiction	involves	incentive-based	associative	learning	(Di	Chiara,	1999;	Robinson	&	Berridge,	2001).	Learning	the	relationships	between	stimuli,	response	and	outcome	guides	our	behaviour,	and	over	 time	 these	 links	 become	 strengthened	 and	 turn	 into	 habits,	 such	 as	 drug	abuse.	Difficulty	 learning	 from	previous	positive	and	negative	experiences	may	interfere	 with	 adaptively	 modifying	 behaviours	 (Haber	 &	 Behrens,	 2014).	 For	example,	 we	 learn	 from	 an	 early	 age	 that	 placing	 a	 hand	 (response)	 on	 a	 hot	surface	 (stimulus)	 results	 in	 pain	 (negative	 outcome).	 	 One	 type	 of	 associative	learning	 is	 probabilistic	 category	 learning,	 in	 which	 a	 response	 to	 a	 stimulus	does	 not	 result	 in	 the	 same	 outcome	100%	of	 the	 time.	 Probabilistic	 feedback	
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tasks	 allow	 us	 to	 assess	 decision-making	 under	 uncertainty	 by	 changing	 the	contingencies	 between	 the	 outcome	 and	 stimulus	 response	 (Bland	&	 Schaefer,	2012).	 In	 the	 probabilistic	 learning	 paradigm,	 one	 pattern	 of	 responding	maximises	rewards	(or	minimises	losses),	regardless	of	inconsistent	feedback.	A	typical	 probabilistic	 feedback	 task	 requires	 the	 participant	 to	 assign	 various	stimuli	to	different	categories	over	multiple	trials,	and	learning	is	assessed	by	the	proportion	 of	 optimal	 guesses	 made	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 task.	 Unlike	 a	deterministic	 task,	 the	probabilistic	design	occasionally	violates	 the	expectancy	that	 a	 certain	 stimuli	 will	 be	 associated	 with	 a	 specific	 category.	 The	 optimal	strategy	 is	 to	 select	 the	 most-often	 correct	 category	 for	 a	 particular	 stimulus,	regardless	of	occasional	trials	that	are	not	rewarded.		Associative	 learning	 is	 largely	controlled	by	 the	dopaminergic	system	 in	the	 basal	 ganglia	 (Belin,	 Jonkman,	 Dickinson,	 Robbins,	 &	 Everitt,	 2009),	which	has	 been	 implicated	 in	 diminished	 probabilistic	 feedback	 learning	 (Haber	 &	Behrens,	 2014).	 Support	 for	 the	 connection	 between	 dopamine	 and	 feedback	learning	can	be	found	in	clinical	populations	of	dopaminergic	dysfunction	related	disorders,	 such	 as	 Parkinson’s	 disease.	 Patients	 diagnosed	 with	 Parkinson’s	disease	have	exhibited	a	diminished	learning	from	reward	compared	to	healthy	controls	and	medicated	Parkinson’s	patients,	but	perform	similarly	to	or	better	than	 controls	 and	 medicated	 Parkinson’s	 patients	 when	 learning	 from	punishment	(Frank	et	al.,	2007;	Frank	et	al.,	2004;	Moustafa	et	al.,	2013;	Piray	et	al.,	2014).	Reward	learning	can	be	improved	by	the	administration	of	dopamine	agonists,	but	these	medications	can	simultaneously	impair	punishment	learning	(Bódi	et	al.,	2009;	Cools,	2006).	It	appears	that	Parkinson’s	disease	is	associated	
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with	 enhanced	punishment	 learning	 as	well	 as	with	 impaired	 reward	 learning,	and	that	this	pattern	is	most	likely	accounted	for	by	dopamine	deficiency.		Individuals	 with	 schizophrenia	 exhibit	 deficits	 in	 dopamine	 production	and	have	demonstrated	difficulty	 learning	 from	probabilistic	 reward	compared	to	 healthy	 controls	 (Waltz,	 Frank,	 Robinson,	 &	 Gold,	 2007).	 Abnormalities	 in	dopamine	 function	 are	 also	 associated	 with	 post-traumatic	 stress	 disorder	(PTSD),	 as	 research	 has	 found	 that	 veterans	 experiencing	 severe	 PTSD	symptoms	exhibit	superior	reward	learning	compared	to	veterans	with	little	or	no	 PTSD	 symptoms	 (Myers	 et	 al.,	 2013).	 However,	 the	 veteran	 groups	demonstrated	 similar	 punishment	 learning	 performance	 (Myers	 et	 al.,	 2013),	and	 Parkinson’s	 patients	 do	 not	 always	 perform	 differently	 on	 punishment	learning	tasks	than	healthy	individuals	(Moustafa	et	al.,	2013).	This	suggests	that	dopamine	deficiency	may	have	stronger	involvement	with	reward	learning	than	with	punishment	learning.				Research	 has	 shown	 that	 there	 are	 also	 abnormalities	 in	 probabilistic	feedback	 learning	 in	 substance	 abusers.	 Long-term	 cocaine	 users	 show	deficiencies	in	dopamine	transmission	in	the	striatum,	a	key	area	for	associative	learning	 (Martinez	 et	 al.,	 2004;	Martinez,	Narendran,	 Foltin,	&	 Slifstein,	 2007),	and	 exhibit	 a	 dampened	 ability	 to	 learn	 from	 both	 positive	 and	 negative	probabilistic	outcomes	(Vadhan,	Hart,	Haney,	van	Gorp,	&	Foltin,	2009;	Vadhan	et	 al.,	 2014).	 Other	 research	 shows	 that	 cocaine-dependent	 individuals	 are	impaired	 in	 learning	 from	 probabilistic	 positive	 outcomes	 relative	 to	 negative	outcomes,	 and	 are	 worse	 at	 learning	 from	 positive	 outcomes	 compared	 to	controls	 (Strickland,	 Bolin,	 Lile,	 Rush,	 &	 Stoops,	 2016).	 However,	 research	 has	not	 consistently	 found	differences	 in	probabilistic	 feedback	 learning	 in	 cocaine	
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dependency	(Vadhan	et	al.,	2008),	or	opioid	dependency	(Myers	et	al.,	2016),	and	one	 study	 showed	 that	 the	 administration	 of	 amphetamine	 to	 a	 control	 group	actually	improved	reward-learning	performance	(Lane	et	al.,	2014).	Using	 past	 experiences	 to	 take	 the	 most	 optimal	 course	 of	 action	 is	essential	 to	 adaptive	 decision-making	 (Kennerley	 et	 al.,	 2006).	 Decisions	 are	often	 made	 under	 uncertainty	 and	 require	 one	 to	 decide	 based	 upon	 the	expected	outcomes	of	the	possible	options	at	hand.	These	expectations	are	often	impacted	by	recent	history,	and	the	probabilistic	learning	paradigm	allows	us	to	assess	 the	 way	 in	 which	 one	 reacts	 to	 previous	 outcomes	 and	 how	 those	responses	relate	to	learning	performance.	There	are	two	types	of	responses	that	are	of	interest	in	a	probabilistic	learning	task.	A	“win-stay”	response	is	one	that	repeats	the	previously	rewarded	category	choice	for	a	particular	stimuli.	A	“lose-shift”	response	is	a	switch	to	the	alternate	option	following	a	punished	category	selection.	 A	 pattern	 of	 lose-shift	 responses	 may	 reflect	 maladaptive	 decision-making	 in	which	 an	 optimal	 strategy	 is	 deserted	 in	 response	 to	 an	 expectancy	violation.	 In	 this	 sense,	 a	 lose-shift	 response	 can	 be	 conceptualised	 as	 an	impulsive,	 “knee	 jerk”	 reaction.	 Differences	 in	 win-stay/lose-shift	 patterns	 of	behaviour	have	been	observed	in	addiction	literature.	Balconi,	Finocchiaro,	and	Campanella	 (2014)	 found	 that	 cocaine	 users	 tended	 to	 repeat	 previously	rewarded	 responses	more	 than	 non-drug	 using	 controls	 and	 scored	 higher	 on	sensitivity	 to	 rewards.	 Heroin	 users	 have	 made	 fewer	 lose-shift	 responses	 on	another	 probabilistic	 learning	 task	 than	 healthy	 controls,	 and	 lose-shift	responding	was	associated	with	sub-optimal	performance	overall	(Brevers	et	al.,	2014;	 Yan	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Conversely,	 opioid-dependent	 individuals	 have	 shown	more	lose-shift	responses	on	a	probabilistic	feedback	learning	task	employed	by	
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Myers	 et	 al.	 (2016).	 It	 is	 of	 interest	 to	 understand	 how	 opioid-dependent	individuals	 respond	 to	 punishments,	 as	 punishment	 sensitivity	 appears	 to	 be	both	attenuated	and	heightened	in	drug	abusers.		
The	role	of	uncertainty	Adaptive	 decision-making	 is	 dependent	 upon	 learning	 the	 relationship	between	 a	 stimulus,	 response	 and	 outcome,	 and	 uncertainty	 arises	 when	 this	relationship	 is	 unexpectedly	 violated.	 	 Uncertainty	 exists	 in	 a	 probabilistic	feedback	 task	 because	 the	 outcomes	 of	 the	 available	 options	 are	 at	 times	unpredictable.	 Decision-making	 under	 these	 uncertain	 circumstances	 requires	one	 to	 have	 the	 cognitive	 capability	 to	 infer	whether	 the	 unexpected	 feedback	signals	a	change	in	the	relationship	with	the	response,	and	if	one	needs	alter	the	responses	strategy	(Kennerley	et	al.,	2006).	This	process	necessitates	executive	functioning,	working	memory	and	self-regulation	(Milkman,	2012;	Venkatraman	&	 Huettel,	 2012),	 and	 proper	 functioning	 of	 neurotransmitters	 that	 signal	unexpected	uncertainty,	 such	as	acetylcholine	and	noradrenaline	(Kennerley	et	al.,	 2006).	 Decision-making	 subject	 to	 uncertainty	 also	 activates	 areas	 of	 the	brain	responsible	for	learning	in	response	to	performance	feedback	(Behrens	et	al.,	2007;	Matsumoto	et	al.,	2007).	Deficits	in	this	activation	have	been	exhibited	by	 opioid	 addicts	 (Ersche	 et	 al.,	 2012a;	 Yan	 et	 al.,	 2014),	 which	 can	 impede	adaptive	responses	to	feedback.		In	summary,	difficulty	in	cognitively	processing	uncertainty	 may	 impair	 learning	 from	 probabilistic	 feedback	 due	 to	 the	unpredictability	of	 outcomes	and	occasional	 expectancy	violations.	Uncertainty	has	 also	 been	 related	 to	 changes	 in	 reward	 system	 functioning,	 in	 that	 neural	activity	in	response	to	a	reward	(reward-related	positivity;	RewP)	is	diminished	
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when	 a	 reward	 is	 experienced	 in	 an	 unpredictable	 context.	 This	 was	demonstrated	in	a	study	conducted	by	Nelson	et	al.	(2016)	who	found	that	RewP	was	 inhibited	 during	 a	 gambling	 task	 when	 participants	 listened	 to	unpredictable	 tone	 sequences.	 Furthermore,	 stress	 and	 anxiety	 elicited	 by	uncertainty	has	the	potential	to	dampen	neural	sensitivity	to	reward	(Nelson	et	al.,	 2016;	 Porcelli,	 Lewis,	 &	 Delgado,	 2012)	 and	 can	 attenuate	 learning	 from	rewards	(Bogdan	&	Pizzagalli,	2006).	IU	may	also	 impact	probabilistic	 learning	by	biasing	response	strategies	after	feedback.	High	IU	has	been	associated	with	increased	win-stay	behaviour	in	a	 conditioned	 place	 preference	 task	 that	 has	 been	widely	 used	 in	 the	 study	 of	addiction	(Radell,	Myers,	Beck,	Moustafa,	&	Allen,	2016).	In	this	task	developed	by	 (Radell	 et	 al.,	 2016),	 participants	 explore	 two	 virtual	 rooms	 with	 different	frequencies	of	rewards	(a	“rich”	room	versus	a	“poor”	room).	During	a	post-test,	the	participant’s	preference	for	each	room	is	assessed.	Participants	with	higher	IU	 exhibited	 a	 tendency	 to	 enter	 the	 rich	 room	 first	 compared	 to	 those	 with	lower	 IU,	 who	 entered	 the	 rich	 and	 poor	 room	 at	 similar	 rates.	 The	 authors	concluded	 that	high	 IU	biases	an	 individual	 towards	exploiting	known	rewards	and	 away	 from	 exploring	 other	 potentially	 (more)	 rewarding	 options.	Interestingly,	 decreases	 in	 lose-shift	 responding	have	been	 related	 to	paralysis	or	impaired	functioning	in	response	to	uncertainty	(Hong	&	Lee,	2015;	Nelson	et	al.,	 2016),	 suggesting	 that	 individuals	 with	 high	 IU	 make	 more	 preservative	responses	 and	 may	 be	 less	 influenced	 by	 unexpected	 negative	 feedback.	 This	pattern	 of	 responding	 may	 ultimately	 result	 in	 poor	 learning	 performance.	 In	Chapter	2	of	the	present	thesis,	self-reported	impulsivity	predicted	IU	in	opioid-dependent	 patients.	 Chapter	 3	 investigates	 how	 IU	 relates	 to	 impulsive	
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responses	 to	 feedback	 in	 opioid-dependent	 individuals,	 and	 their	 capacity	 to	learn	 from	 probabilistic	 feedback.	 The	 current	 chapter	 also	 examines	whether	win-stay	 or	 lose-shift	 responding	 are	 beneficial	 to	 probabilistic	 learning	performance.	IU	may	bias	opioid-dependent	patients	towards	exploiting	known	rewards	 and	 away	 from	 exploration	 of	 new	 rewarding	 options,	 and	 these	strategies	may	negatively	impact	learning	from	feedback.		The	study	presented	here	builds	upon	the	research	conducted	by	Myers	et	al.	(2016),	who	discovered	that	opioid-dependent	individuals	more	frequently	shift	their	responses	after	negative	feedback	than	healthy	controls.	Correlational	analyses	were	not	conducted	between	learning	performance	and	win-stay/lose-shift	 responses,	 and	 as	 a	 result,	 whether	 lose-shift	 responding	 in	 the	probabilistic	feedback	task	was	suboptimal	to	learning	is	unknown.	The	current	study	 seeks	 to	 expand	 upon	Myers	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 by	 comparing	 how	 lose-shift	responding	relates	to	 learning	performance.	This	 is	of	great	 importance,	as	one	focus	of	 the	present	 thesis	 is	 how	uncertainty	 relates	 to	maladaptive	decision-making.	Increased	lose-shift	responses	may	reflect	impulsive,	poorly	thought	out	choices,	which	ultimately	 result	 in	poor	 feedback	 learning.	Deficits	 in	 feedback	learning	are	directly	related	to	the	development	of	addiction	in	that	the	negative	consequences	 of	 drug	 abuse	 do	 not	 appear	 to	 discourage	 harmful	 drug-taking	behaviour.					
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Research	questions	and	hypotheses	1.	 Do	 opioid-dependent	 individuals	 demonstrate	 an	 impaired	 ability	 to	 learn	from	probabilistic	feedback	compared	to	non-drug	abusing	controls?		2.	 Do	 opioid-dependent	 patients	 adhere	 to	 optimal	 response	 strategies	 when	faced	 with	 unexpected	 negative	 feedback,	 and	 how	 do	 win-stay	 and	 lose-shift	response	strategies	relate	to	overall	learning	performance?		3.	Does	IU	relate	to	probabilistic	feedback	learning	performance	or	to	impulsive	reactions	 to	 negative	 feedback?	 Are	 these	 associations	 similar	 between	 opioid	patients	and	controls?		Based	 on	 previous	 work	 with	 opioid-dependent	 cohorts,	 it	 is	 expected	 that	optimal	responses	on	a	probabilistic	 feedback	learning	task	will	be	comparable	between	opioid	patients	and	controls.	However,	it	is	also	expected	that	patients	will	 be	more	 reactive	 to	 negative	 feedback	 (i.e.	 demonstrate	 greater	 lose-shift	responses)	 in	a	way	 that	hampers	 learning	performance.	Given	 that	 IU	 reflects	heightened	 threat	 appraisals	 of	 uncertainty,	 we	 hypothesise	 that	 IU	 will	positively	correlate	with	lose-shift	responses.	
3.2	Method	
Participants	The	 study	 sample	 was	 comprised	 of	 69	 opioid-dependent	 patients	receiving	opioid-maintenance	medication	at	the	Drug	Health	Services	and	Opioid	
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Treatment	program.	Thirty-five	healthy	control	participants	were	recruited	from	psychology	students	and	Western	Sydney	University	and	from	the	wider	western	Sydney	 community	 via	 snowballing	 and	 advertisements.	 Exclusion	 criteria	 for	the	control	group	was	a	history	of	opioid	dependence	or	a	score	greater	than	11	on	 the	DAS,	 as	described	 in	 the	previous	 chapter.	Patients	 completed	a	 clinical	interview	regarding	their	history	of	drug	use,	and	were	categorised	as	poly-drug	patients	 if	 they	 reported	 using	 non-opioid	 substances	 other	 than	 alcohol,	 and	were	 considered	 to	 be	 extra-medical	 opioid	 users	 if	 they	 reported	 using	 non-prescribed	opioids	in	the	past	30	days.			
Materials	
Probabilistic	feedback	learning	task	The	probabilistic	learning	task	is	computer-based	and	is	comprised	of	80	reward	 learning	 trials	 and	 80	 punishment	 learning	 trials,	which	 are	 randomly	intermixed.	On	each	 trial,	 participants	 are	 asked	 to	 guess	whether	 four	unique	images	belong	to	“Category	A”	or	“Category	B”	by	pressing	the	corresponding	A	or	B	key	on	the	computer	keyboard.		
	
Reward	 learning	 trials:	 Two	 images	 are	 presented	 on-screen	 and	 belong	 to	Category	A	and	Category	B	with	differing	probabilities.	 Image	1	(S1)	belongs	to	Category	 A	 with	 80%	 probability	 and	 to	 Category	 B	 with	 20%	 probability.	Conversely,	 image	 2	 (S2)	 belongs	 to	 Category	 A	 with	 20%	 probability	 and	Category	 B	 with	 80%	 probability.	 On	 each	 reward	 learning	 trial,	 participants	either	receive	25	points	if	they	categorise	the	image	correctly	(displayed	as	+25	
		 62	
on	 the	 computer	 screen)	 or	 receive	 zero	 points	 if	 they	 answer	 incorrectly.	Therefore,	 incorrect	 guesses	 are	 not	 punished,	 and	 the	 participants	 are	 not	provided	with	feedback	that	explicitly	signals	an	incorrect	guess.			
Punishment	 learning	 trials:	 Punishment	 learning	 trials	 involve	 two	 unique	images.	Similar	to	the	reward-learning	trials,	image	3	(S3)	belongs	to	Category	A	with	80%	probability	and	to	Category	B	with	20%	probability,	and	image	4	(S4)	belongs	 to	 Category	 A	 with	 20%	 probability	 and	 Category	 B	 with	 80%	probability.	Incorrect	answers	incur	a	loss	of	25	points	(displayed	as	-25	on	the	computer	screen)	and	correct	answers	result	in	no	point	change.	Correct	guesses	are	not	explicitly	rewarded,	nor	is	there	feedback	indicating	a	correct	guess.	The	category	and	 reinforcement	 structure	of	 the	probabilistic	 feedback	 task	 can	be	found	in	Table	3.1.			Table	3.1	
Stimuli,	category	and	feedback	structure	for	the	reward	and	punishment	feedback	
trials		Stimulus	 Probability	category	A	 Probability	category	B	 Correct	response	feedback	 Incorrect	response	feedback	1	 80%	 20%	 +25	points	 No	feedback	2	 20%	 80%	3	 80%	 20%	 No	feedback	 -	25	points	4	 20%	 80%		The	 task	was	 administered	 on	 a	Macintosh	 i-book,	 of	which	 the	 keyboard	was	masked	 except	 for	 two	 keys,	 labelled	 “A”	 and	 “B”.	 The	 following	 instructions	were	given	to	each	participant	prior	to	testing:	
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In	 this	 experiment,	 you	 will	 be	 shown	 pictures,	 and	 you	 will	
guess	 whether	 those	 pictures	 belong	 to	 category	 “A”	 or	
category	 “B”.	 A	 picture	 does	 not	 always	 belong	 to	 the	 same	
category	each	time	you	see	it.	If	you	guess	correctly,	you	may	
win	points.	 If	 you	guess	wrong,	you	may	 lose	points.	You	will	
see	 a	 running	 total	 of	 your	 points	 as	 you	 play.	We	will	 start	
you	off	with	a	few	points	now.	Press	the	mouse	button	to	begin	
practice.	
	Testing	began	with	a	practice	session	 in	which	the	participant	completed	some	trials	in	order	to	become	familiar	with	the	reward,	punishment	and	no	feedback	outcomes.	Participants	were	then	presented	with	a	summary	of	instructions	on-screen:		
For	 some	 pictures,	 if	 you	 guess	 CORRECTLY,	 you	WIN	 points	
(but,	 if	 you	 guess	 incorrectly,	 you	 win	 nothing).	 For	 other	
pictures,	 if	 you	guess	 INCORRECTLY,	 you	LOSE	points	 (but,	 if	
you	 guess	 correctly,	 you	 lose	 nothing).	 Your	 job	 is	 to	win	 all	
the	 points	 you	 can	 –	 and	 lose	 as	 few	 as	 you	 can.	 Remember	
that	 the	 same	 picture	 does	 not	 always	 belong	 to	 the	 same	
category.	Press	the	mouse	button	to	begin	the	experiment.		Participants	were	allotted	with	500	points	at	the	start	of	the	experiment.	Reward	and	 punishment	 trials	 were	 presented	 in	 a	 random	 order,	 and	 the	 relevant	feedback	was	displayed	on	the	screen	immediately	following	each	guess	(+25	or	-25).	A	 running	 total	of	points	was	displayed	 in	 the	bottom	right	 corner	of	 the	computer	 screen	 throughout	 the	 experiment.	 Examples	 of	 a	 correct	 and	 an	incorrect	trial	can	be	found	in	Figure	3.1.	
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	Figure	3.1.	An	example	learning	trial	for	Stimulus	1	and	Stimulus	3	as	presented	to	participants	on-screen		 Overall	performance	on	 the	probabilistic	 classification	 task	 is	 calculated	by	the	total	number	of	points	accumulated	at	the	end	of	the	experiment.	Reward	and	 punishment	 learning	 are	 calculated	 separately	 as	 a	 proportion	 of	 optimal	responses	made	 on	 reward	 and	punishment	 learning	 trials.	 Optimal	 responses	are	defined	as	those	in	which	the	participant	chooses	the	category	that	an	image	is	most	 likely	to	belong	to,	regardless	of	whether	the	guess	was	correct	on	that	trial.	For	example,	S1	has	80%	probability	of	belonging	to	category	A,	therefore	A	is	an	optimal	response	for	this	image	on	each	trial	even	though	20%	of	the	time	this	answer	is	incorrect.		Win-stay	 responses	 are	 repeated	 category	 selections	 on	 the	 trial	immediately	 following	a	rewarded	(or	unpunished)	 trial	 for	 that	stimulus.	 	 	An	example	of	a	win-stay	response	is	assigning	S1	to	Category	A	on	a	given	trial	 if	Category	A	was	correctly	guessed	on	the	previous	presentation	of	S1.	Conversely,	
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lose-shift	 responses	 are	 those	 in	 which	 the	 participant	 does	 not	 repeat	 the	preceding	punished	(or	non-rewarded)	categorisation	for	an	image.	The	overall	number	 of	 correct	 guesses	 impacts	 the	 number	 of	 win-stay	 and	 lose-shift	responses,	thus	win-stay/lose-shift	responding	was	quantified	as	a	proportion	of	total	correct	and	incorrect	answers,	respectively.				
Drug	Abuse	Screening	Test	(DAST)	The	DAST	is	described	in	Chapter	2.	
Intolerance	of	Uncertainty	Scale	(IUS)	The	IUS	is	described	in	Chapter	2.		
Procedure		 Patient	participants	were	 first	 interviewed	about	 their	 current	 and	past	drug	 use	 and	 control	 participants	 completed	 the	 DAST.	 All	 participants	completed	the	feedback	learning	task	before	answering	a	pen-and-paper	version	of	the	IUS.			
Statistical	method	Preliminary	 independent-samples	 t-tests	 and	 chi-squared	analyses	were	conducted	 to	 ascertain	 whether	 there	 were	 any	 group	 differences	 in	demographic	 variables.	 Total	 points	 earned	 on	 the	 probabilistic	 learning	 task	were	 analysed	 with	 ANCOVA	 to	 determine	 group	 differences	 in	 learning	performance.	 The	 proportion	 of	 optimal	 responses	 on	 the	 reward	 and	punishment	 learning	 trials	 were	 calculated	 and	 analysed	 by	 a	 mixed	 ANOVA,	with	group	as	the	between-subjects	variable	and	trial	type	as	the	within-subjects	
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variable.	Win-stay	responding	was	calculated	as	a	proportion	of	correct	guesses	across	 both	 trial	 types	 (rewarded	 or	 non-punished),	 and	 lose-shift	 responding	was	 calculated	 as	 a	 proportion	 of	 incorrect	 responses	 across	 trial	 types	(punishment	or	non-reward).	Group	differences	in	win-stay	responses	and	lose-shift	 responses	 were	 analysed	 using	mixed-factors	 ANOVA,	 with	 win-stay	 and	lose-shift	 responding	 as	 the	within	 groups	 factor.	 ANCOVA	was	 used	 to	 assess	the	differences	between	group	scores	on	the	IUS	and	bivariate	correlations	were	conducted	between	the	IUS,	behavioural	data	and	clinical	characteristics.		
3.3	Results	Participants	 in	 the	 control	 and	 patient	 group	 were	 similar	 in	 age,	 but	patients	had	completed	significantly	 fewer	years	of	education	and	groups	were	imbalanced	in	gender	distribution.	Consequently,	years	of	education	and	gender	were	 used	 as	 covariates	 in	 the	 between-group	 analyses.	 The	 clinical	 and	demographic	characteristics	of	the	groups	can	be	found	in	Table	3.2.		
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Table	3.2			
Participant	demographic	and	clinical	characteristics		Characteristic	 Mean	(SD)	 	 Statistic		 Control	 Patient	 	 	Age	 39.03	(11.57)	 39.86	(9.57)	 	 t	=	.41	Education	 12.14	(2.45)	 10.00	(1.83)	 	 t	=	-5.01**	Female	(%)	 25	(71.4%)	 29	(40.6%)	 	 χ	2=	8.84*	DAST	 1.17	(1.24)	 19.32	(5.03)	 	 ---	Age	first	use	 ---	 19.69	(5.86)	 	 ---	Length	use	 ---	 20.25	(9.85)	 	 ---	Poly-drug	user	(%)	 ---	 13	(12.5%)	 	 ---	Extra-medical	user		(%)	 ---	 33	(53.2%)	 	 ---	*	p	<	.001		ANCOVA	 revealed	 that	 the	 patient	 group	 had	 a	marginally	 better	mean	total	 learning	 score	 than	 the	 control	 group,	 however	 this	 difference	 was	 not	significant	 (p	 =	 .652).	 	 Repeated-measures	 ANOVA	 showed	 that	 there	 was	 no	significant	effect	of	group	(p	=	.360)	or	trial	type	(p	=	.489)	on	performance,	and	there	was	not	a	significant	 interaction	between	group	and	trial	 type	(p	=	 .469).	When	win-stay	and	 lose-shift	responses	were	analysed,	an	 interaction	between	group	 and	 response	 type	was	 found	 (F(1,78)	 =	 16.474,	 p	 <	 .001).	 The	 opioid-dependent	 group	 exhibited	more	 lose-shift	 responses	 than	 controls	 (F(1,78)	 =	15.247,	 p	 <	 .001),	 but	 groups	 demonstrated	 a	 similar	 proportion	 of	 win-stay	responses.	 Figure	 3.2	 depicts	 between-group	 differences	 on	 the	 feedback	learning	trials.		ANCOVA	also	found	that	patients	scored	significantly	higher	than	controls	on	overall	IUS	and	subscales.	Gender,	extra-medical	opioid	use	or	poly-drug	 use	 did	 not	 have	 a	 significant	 effect	 on	 feedback	 learning	 performance,	
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feedback	response	type,	or	IUS	scores	(all	p	>	.05).	Results	from	between-group	analyses	can	be	found	in	Table	3.3.		Table	3.3.			
Means,	 standard	 deviations	 and	 ANCOVA	 results	 comparing	 groups	 on	 feedback	
performance,	response	type	and	IUS	scores		Measure	 Mean	(SD)	 	 			F		 Control	 Patient	 	 	Optimal	reward		 50.75	(21.52)	 56.35	(22.23)	 	 0.90	Optimal	punishment		 58.14	(12.87)	 59.20	(12.24)	 	 0.04	Total	Score	 605.00	(283.47)	 649.64	(332.25)	 	 0.20	Proportion	win-stay		 .673	(.13)	 .668	(.14)	 	 0.17	Proportion	lose-shift		 .356	(.11)	 .438	(.09)	 	 14.78**	IUS		 52.51	(12.25)	 72.38	(24.90)	 	 13.77**						IUS-1	 31.85	(15.24)	 38.00	(13.92)	 	 6.15*						IUS-2	 26.57	(5.98)	 34.10	(11.89)	 	 9.05*	
*	p	<	.05,	**	p	<	.001													
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		Figure	3.2.	Mean	group	learning	performance,	optimal	responding,	and	response	type	between	groups	
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	 Zero-order	correlations	were	obtained	between	all	behavioural	measures,	the	 IUS	 and	 length	 of	 opioid	 use.	 IUS	 total	 score	 correlated	 positively	 and	significantly	 with	 the	 number	 of	 optimal	 punishment	 learning	 choices,	 total	feedback	 learning	 score,	 and	 proportion	 of	 win-stay	 responses.	 When	 the	subscales	of	the	IUS	were	analysed,	a	more	nuanced	relationship	appeared.	The	IUS-1	 was	 correlated	 solely	 with	 win-stay	 responding,	 while	 the	 IUS-2	 was	correlated	 with	 optimal	 punishment	 responses	 and	 total	 learning	 score.	 Win-stay	 responses	were	positively	 correlated	with	 total	 learning	performance	 and	optimal	responding	on	both	reward	and	punishment	trials.	Conversely,	lose-shift	responding	 were	 negatively	 correlated	 with	 optimal	 choices	 on	 punishment	learning	 trials.	 Length	 of	 opioid	 use	was	 not	meaningfully	 correlated	with	 any	other	 measure	 (all	 p	 >	 .200).	 Full	 zero-order	 correlations	 and	 statistical	significances	are	 found	 in	Table	3.4.	Visual	 inspection	of	scatterplots	suggested	that	the	relationship	between	IU	and	the	feedback	learning	task	variables	were	almost	identical	between	groups.	Accordingly,	further	regression	analyses	were	not	conducted.		 	
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Table	3.4			
Zero-order	 correlations	 between	 learning	 performance,	 optimal	 responding,	
response	type,	IUS	scores	and	length	of	opioid	use			 IUS	 IUS1	 IUS2	 RO	 PO	 TS	 WS	 LS	 LU	IUS	 ---	 .847**	 .960**	 .164	 .194*	 .196*	 .226*	 .012	 -.044	IUS1	 	 ---	 .776**	 .118	 .177	 .155	 .255*	 .051	 -.048	IUS2	 	 	 ---	 .176	 .206*	 .223*	 .174	 .025	 -.036	RO	 	 	 	 ---	 .033	 .830**	 .348**	 .454**	 .036	PO	 	 	 	 	 ---	 .487**	 .738**	 -.449**	 -.136	TS	 	 	 	 	 	 ---	 .561**	 .171	 .001	WS	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ---	 -.439**	 -.164	LS	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ---	 .013	LU	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ---	IUS	=	Intolerance	of	Uncertainty	Scale,	RO	=	Optimal	responses	on	the	reward	task,	PO	=	Optimal	responses	on	the	punishment	task,	TS	=	Total	feedback	learning	score,	WS	=	Win-stay	responses,	LS	=	Lose-shift	responses,	LU	=	Length	of	opioid	use	*	p	<	.05,	*	p	<	.001		
	
3.4	Discussion	This	 study	 examined	 the	 differences	 in	 probabilistic	 feedback	 learning	between	opioid-dependent	individuals	and	healthy	controls,	and	how	responses	to	 unexpected	 feedback	 relates	 to	 IU	 across	 and	 between	 groups.	 	 Patients	marginally	outscored	controls	 in	 total	points	and	number	of	optimal	responses	on	 reward	 trials,	 however	 this	 difference	 was	 not	 statistically	 significant.	 Our	results	replicate	those	of	Myers	et	al.	(2016)	and	furnish	additional	support	for	the	 study	 conducted	 by	 Vadhan	 et	 al.	 (2008),	 which	 revealed	 that	 optimal	responding	 to	 a	 similar	 reward/punishment	 feedback	 task	 was	 comparable	between	cocaine-dependent	participants	and	non-drug	users.		However,	cocaine	
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users	have	also	been	shown	to	perform	poorly	compared	to	controls	(Vadhan	et	al.,	 2009).	 The	 disparate	 findings	 of	 previous	 research,	 including	 the	 current	study,	may	be	attributed	to	different	designs	of	probabilistic	feedback	measures.	For	example,	tasks	used	by	previous	researchers	provide	explicit	feedback	on	all	trials,	while	the	measure	used	in	the	current	study	included	ambiguous	feedback	in	 the	 form	 of	 non-punishment	 and	 non-reward.	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 optimal	responding	may	be	impeded	by	the	vagueness	of	some	feedback.	However,	both	groups	performed	similarly	indicating	that	if	there	was	an	affect	of	ambiguity,	it	affected	both	groups	similarly.	In	 regards	 to	 win-stay	 responding,	 the	 groups	 were	 similar	 in	 their	likelihood	to	repeat	a	response	to	a	stimulus	that	had	received	rewarding	or	non-punishing	feedback	on	the	previous	trial.	 In	other	words,	 the	opioid-dependent	patients	demonstrated	comparable	reward	sensitivity	to	the	control	participants,	which	was	unexpected	given	the	reward	system	dysfunction	and	sensitisation	to	reinforcers	 prevalent	 in	 long-term	 drug	 users	 (Robinson	 &	 Berridge,	 2001).	Importantly,	patients	were	more	likely	than	controls	to	change	responses	after	a	punishment	or	non-reward.	It	appears	that	opioid-dependent	individuals	may	be	particularly	 reactive	 to	 negative	 feedback	 and/or	 particularly	 averse	 to	punishments.	Loss	aversion	has	been	related	to	dopamine	function.	The	findings	of	 the	 current	 study	 replicates	 those	 of	Myers	 et	 al.	 (2016),	 and	 suggests	 that	patients	 are	 more	 likely	 to	 switch	 response	 strategies	 when	 experiencing	negative	or	non-confirmatory	feedback.		Moreover,	 lose-shift	 responding	was	 negatively	 correlated	with	 optimal	performance	on	punishment	trials,	indicating	that	a	greater	tendency	to	change	response	 strategies	 after	 punishment	 can	 adversely	 impact	 learning	 from	
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negative	feedback.	This	further	suggests	that	sensitivity	to	punishment	is	a	form	of	 impulsive	 decision-making,	 in	 that	 it	 fails	 to	 adaptively	 alter	 behaviour	 to	maximise	the	accrual	of	benefits.	Particularly	relevant	to	the	prevention	of	drug	relapse,	 we	 found	 that	 the	 patient	 group	 demonstrated	 greater	 lose-shift	responses.	 Relapse	 is	 often	 triggered	 by	 stressful	 (McCabe	 et	 al.,	 2016)	 or	distressing	 events,	 even	 in	 patients	 receiving	methadone-maintenance	 therapy	(Jaremko,	Sterling,	&	Van	Bockstaele,	2015),	and	more	understanding	about	how	negative	incidences	may	trigger	the	return	to	drugs.	On	the	other	hand,	greater	win-stay	 responding	 was	 positively	 correlated	 with	 both	 optimal	 reward	 and	punishment	 responses,	 which	 suggests	 that	 repetition	 of	 previously	 rewarded	actions	 may	 be	 an	 advantageous	 learning	 strategy.	 These	 findings	 are	 also	important	for	the	development	of	successful	addiction	treatment,	as	adhering	to	abstinence	is	the	long-term	rewarding	strategy	that	needs	to	be	pursued	despite	occasional	 setbacks.	 Relapse	 is	 highly	 common	 in	 opioid	 addiction	 and	understanding	 the	 cognitive	 mechanisms	 that	 hinder	 recovering	 individuals	adherence	 to	 treatment,	 and	 return	 to	 treatment	 after	 relapse,	 is	 extremely	valuable.		Scores	 on	 the	 IUS	 and	 IUS-1	 were	 correlated	 with	 greater	 optimal	responding	on	punishment	trials,	which	suggests	that	IU	may	facilitate	learning	from	 punishments.	 IU	 is	 characterised	 by	 a	 tendency	 to	 interpret	 uncertain	situations	as	threatening	and	highly	aversive	(Ladouceur	et	al.,	2000),	which	may	result	 in	 heightened	 attention	 to	 stimuli	 that	 can	potentially	 result	 in	 negative	outcomes.	 Greater	 attentiveness	 to	 aversive	 stimuli	 (e.g.	 uncertainty)	 may	enhance	 associative	 learning	 between	 a	 particular	 stimulus	 and	 its	 negative	outcome	 (Fiorillo	 et	 al.,	 2003),	 and	 sensitivity	 to	 punishment	 may	 serve	 as	 a	
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motivating	 factor	 to	 learn	 how	 to	 avoid	 aversive	 stimuli.	 Recent	 work	 with	learning	 tasks	 has	 found	 that	 anxiety-vulnerable	 individuals	 demonstrate	enhanced	associative	learning	(e.g.,	classical	eyeblink	conditioning)	in	situations	involving	 some	 form	 of	 uncertainty	 of	 stimulus	 presentation	 and	 trial	 timing	(Allen,	 Myers,	 &	 Servatius,	 2016;	 Allen	 et	 al.,	 1998;	 Holloway,	 Allen,	 Myers,	 &	Servatius,	2014),	possibly	because	more	attention	is	paid	to	uncertainty.	On	the	other	hand,	optimal	responses	on	reward	trials	were	not	meaningfully	correlated	with	 IU,	 which	 does	 not	 support	 previous	 findings	 that	 IU	 is	 related	 to	suboptimal	 decisions	 regarding	 probabilistic	 rewards	 (Luhmann	 et	 al.,	 2011).	The	 current	 study	 provides	 evidence	 that	 IU	 may	 not	 be	 influenced	 by	 the	uncertain	 nature	 of	 rewards	 in	 the	 probabilistic	 learning	 paradigm,	 possibly	because	uncertain	 rewards	do	not	elicit	 a	 similar	 threat	 response	produced	by	uncertain	punishment.		Greater	win-stay	responding	was	positively	correlated	with	total	IUS	and	IUS-2	scores,	which	aligns	with	the	results	from	the	conditioned	place	preference	task	 conducted	by	Radell	 et	 al.	 (2016).	Our	 results	 suggest	 that	 an	 aversion	 to	uncertainty,	 particularly	 a	 great	desire	 for	predictability	 and	 cognitive	distress	towards	 uncertainty,	 is	 related	 to	 continuing	 a	 rewarding	 response	 strategy	rather	 than	exploring	new	options.	 Interestingly,	 IU	did	not	have	 a	meaningful	relationship	 with	 lose-shift	 responding,	 suggesting	 that	 IU	 does	 not	 have	 an	impact	 on	 behaviour	 following	 violations	 of	 reward	 expectancy.	 This	 was	unanticipated	as	experiencing	a	loss	elicits	negative	emotions	and	activity	in	the	amygdala	 (Sokol-Hessner,	 Camerer,	 &	 Phelps,	 2013),	 and	 sad	 and	 angry	emotional	 states	 have	 shown	 to	 impact	 decision-making	 (Andrade	 &	 Ariely,	2009;	Harlé	&	Sanfey,	2007).	It	would	be	expected	that	because	uncertain	threat	
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is	 highly	 aversive	 to	 those	with	 high	 IU,	 these	 individuals	would	 have	 reacted	emotionally	to	unpredictable	punishments.	
Limitations	The	 feedback	 provided	 in	 the	 current	 study	 involved	 hypothetical	rewards	 and	 punishments	 in	 the	 form	 of	 points	 that	 did	 not	 translate	 into	tangible	 outcomes.	 Vadhan	 et	 al.	 (2009)	 found	 that	 on	 a	 similar	 feedback	 task	cocaine	dependent	participants’	 learning	performance	was	 improved	when	 the	outcomes	were	real	monetary	gains	and	losses.	Furthermore,	cocaine	dependent	participant’s	performance	was	 improved	 so	much	as	 to	become	 comparable	 to	non-drug-using	 controls	 when	 actual	money	was	 at	 stake.	 In	 contrast,	 opioid-dependent	participants	in	the	current	study	performed	similarly	to	controls	with	non-tangible	outcomes,	raising	the	possibility	that	the	hypothetical	nature	of	an	outcome	 may	 not	 necessarily	 impact	 learning	 distinctly	 in	 drug	 abusing	individuals	 and	 controls.	 Alternatively,	 the	 current	 study	 may	 have	 observed	learning	differences	between	groups	had	real	monetary	outcomes	been	at	stake,	given	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 cocaine	 abusers’	 learning	 performance	 improved	 in	Vadhan	 et	 al.	 (2009).	 Actual	money	may	have	 a	 heighted	 reinforcing	 effect	 for	drug	abusers,	which	would	have	predicted	that	opioid-dependent	patients	would	outperform	 controls	 in	 a	 tangible	 monetary	 outcome	 task.	 This	 is	 only	speculation,	given	that	there	was	not	a	cash	money	task	in	the	present	study,	but	would	be	of	interest	to	future	investigation.			 As	 was	 the	 case	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 the	 demographic	 characteristics	 of	 the	patient	 group	were	 different	 than	 the	 control	 group	 in	 education	 level,	 which	may	have	influenced	the	ability	to	learn.	It	 is	difficult	to	say	how	this	may	have	
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affected	our	 results,	 as	patients	 and	 controls	 scored	 similarly,	 and	 the	patients	actually	 accrued	 more	 points	 on	 the	 overall	 task.	 The	 cross-sectional	 design	prevents	making	 causal	 assumptions	 regarding	 addiction	 and	 performance	 on	the	experimental	measures.	However,	the	current	study	observed	that	the	length	of	 opioid	 use	 was	 not	 predictive	 of	 performance	 or	 responding	 type	 on	 the	feedback	tasks,	further	suggesting	that	responsiveness	to	negative	feedback	may	predate	addiction.	
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Chapter	4	–	Probability	discounting	of	hypothetical	
monetary	rewards	
		We	 may	 conclude	 from	 Chapter	 3	 that	 opioid-dependent	 individuals	 tend	 to	make	impulsive	decisions	when	receiving	unpredictable	negative	feedback,	and	that	 a	 knee-jerk	 reaction	 to	 punishment	 is	 a	 suboptimal	 learning	 strategy.	Chapter	 4	 continues	 the	 analysis	 of	 IU	 and	 impulsive	 decision-making	 under	uncertainty	in	opioid	addiction	by	focussing	our	attention	on	risk-taking.		
4.1	Introduction	Effective	decision-making	in	a	risk	situation	involves	assigning	subjective	values	 to	 the	outcomes	of	 the	available	options	and	selecting	 the	option	that	 is	deemed	the	most	advantageous	relative	to	its	risk.	Strategic	risk-taking	can	yield	great	 rewards,	 but	 the	 concept	 of	 risk	 also	 denotes	 undesirable	 consequences	such	as	danger,	harm	and	loss	(Slovic,	1987).	For	clarity	in	the	present	thesis,	the	term	 risk	 will	 be	 used	 in	 reference	 to	 the	 negative	 definition	 of	 risk	 and	 its	suboptimal	outcomes.	Risk	taking	is	evident	in	drug	addiction	when	one	chooses	to	 engage	 in	 drug	 use	 despite	 the	 high	 probability	 that	 it	 will	 result	 in	 acute	and/or	 long-term	 harm.	 As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 opioid	 abuse	 can	 be	especially	 damaging	 to	 one’s	 physical	 and	 mental	 health	 both	 directly	 (e.g.	overdose)	and	 indirectly	 (e.g.	 intravenous	disease	 transmission).	The	 literature	largely	supports	 the	 link	between	addiction	and	risk-taking.	A	meta-analysis	of	neuroimaging	studies	conducted	by	Gowin,	Mackey,	and	Paulus	(2013)	revealed	that	 individuals	with	 SUD	 exhibit	 neural	 activity	while	 engaging	 in	 risk	 taking	
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that	 is	 distinctly	 different	 than	 the	 activity	 witnessed	 in	 non-drug	 abusing	control	groups.	The	meta-analysis	also	found	that	the	neural	activation	observed	in	 SUD	 occurs	 in	 brain	 areas	 that	 are	 responsible	 for	 dopaminergic	 regulation	and	executive	functioning.	There	is	also	extensive	evidence	for	neural	correlates	with	risk	taking	and	desensitisation	to	risk	in	areas	of	the	brain	affected	by	drug	abuse	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 such	 as	 the	 OFC	 (Hsu	 et	 al.,	 2005)	 and	 the	 PFC	(Manes	et	al.,	2002;	Rahman,	Sahakian,	Hodges,	Rogers,	&	Robbins,	1999)	Decisions	 relating	 to	what	 rewards	 to	 pursue,	 or	which	 losses	 to	 avoid,	are	often	made	without	complete	certainty.	Uncertainty	plays	an	integral	part	in	risk-taking	because	the	outcomes	of	possible	options	are	either	unknown	or	not	guaranteed.	Decision-making	is	generally	hampered	by	uncertainty,	and	humans	tend	not	to	make	maximally	optimal	choices	about	uncertain	scenarios	(Tversky	&	Kahneman,	1974).	When	deciding	about	rewards,	utility	theory	describes	how	people	should	make	decisions	under	uncertainty.	For	example,	assured	rewards	are	more	valuable	than	uncertain	rewards	of	the	same	amount,	such	as	receiving	a	guaranteed	$100	is	more	attractive	than	taking	a	gamble	to	win	$100.	In	order	to	maximise	rewards	over	 the	 long	run,	one	should	also	subjectively	value	 two	probabilistic	 options	with	 differing	 odds	 but	 identical	 average	 payoffs	 equally.	Unfortunately,	 utility	 theory	does	not	 accurately	predict	behaviours	 in	 real-life	scenarios	because	humans	tend	to	be	risk-averse	(Kahneman	&	Tversky,	1982).	As	 a	 result,	 we	 tend	 to	 make	 suboptimal	 decisions	 by	 preferring	 an	 assured	reward	 even	 if	 it	 is	 lesser	 in	 value	 than	 the	 probability-weighted-sum	 (i.e.	objective	value)	of	a	larger,	uncertain	reward.	In	order	to	overcome	aversion	to	uncertainty,	the	objective	value	of	the	uncertain	reward	needs	to	be	considerably	higher	 than	 that	 of	 the	 certain	 one	 (Huettel,	 Stowe,	 Gordon,	 Warner,	 &	 Platt,	
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2006;	 Platt	 &	 Huettel,	 2008).	 This	 innate	 pattern	 of	 valuation	 is	 called	discounting,	and	can	be	conceptualised	as	a	type	of	aversion	to	uncertainty	that	ultimately	prevents	maximal	benefits	in	the	long	term.		As	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 repeated	 drug	 administration	 can	 cause	significant	changes	to	stress	and	reward	neural	pathways	(Koob	&	Kreek,	2007;	Sinha,	2008).	Chronic	use	of	and	repeated	withdrawal	 from	drugs	can	result	 in	neurobiological	adaptations	that	enhance	sensitivity	to	stress	and	modify	reward	valuation	 (Robinson	 &	 Berridge,	 2000).	 These	 neural	 changes	 can	 explicitly	impact	responses	to	uncertain	threat	rather	than	predictable	threat	(Bradford	et	al.,	 2013;	 Hefner	 &	 Curtin,	 2012;	 Hefner,	 Moberg,	 Hachiya,	 &	 Curtin,	 2013;	Moberg	&	Curtin,	2009).	Uncertainty	in	and	of	itself	is	a	stressor	(Bradford	et	al.,	2013;	Grupe	&	Nitschke,	2013;	Hefner	&	Curtin,	2012),	and	neural	adaptations	can	impair	decision-making	by	altering	the	subjective	value	of	uncertain	rewards	and	 impeding	 the	 ability	 to	 predict	 rewards	 (Berridge	 &	 Aldridge,	 2008).	Reduced	 accuracy	 of	 predicting	 reward	 value	 and	 an	 exaggerated	 asymmetry	between	the	subjective	and	objective	value	of	a	reward	may	result	in	suboptimal	decision-making	under	uncertainty	(Schultz,	2011).		As	a	result,	a	drug-addicted	individual	may	become	biased	towards	certain	rewards,	such	as	a	drug’s	desired	effects,	and	away	from	relatively	uncertain	non-drug	rewards.		Uncertainty	 exists	 when	 outcomes	 are	 either	 delayed	 or	 probabilistic.	Delay	discounting	(DD)	is	the	increasing	preference	of	small,	immediate	rewards	over	 delayed,	 larger	 ones	 as	 a	 function	 of	 the	 length	 of	 time	 to	 receive	 that	reward	 (Green	 &	 Myerson,	 2004).	 DD	 involves	 a	 cost/benefit	 analysis	 that	accounts	 for	 the	 inherent	uncertainty	of	receiving	 future	rewards	as	a	result	of	possible	interfering	factors	during	the	delay	(Heilbronner,	Hayden,	&	Platt,	2010;	
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Patak	 &	 Reynolds,	 2007).	 Receiving	 $100	 today	 may	 be	 more	 attractive	 than	receiving	 $105	 in	 ten	 years	 because	 the	 person	 offering	 the	 money	 may,	 for	instance,	 lose	your	address,	go	bankrupt,	or	even	pass	away.	Furthermore,	you	may	be	in	 immediate	need	of	$100	(e.g.	 to	pay	overdue	rent),	which	makes	the	value	 of	 receiving	 $100	 today	 greater	 than	 receiving	 $105	 far	 in	 the	 future.	However,	 discounting	 future	 rewards	becomes	maladaptive	when	 this	 strategy	does	not	maximize	one’s	 gains.	Opting	 for	 $20	 today,	 rather	 than	waiting	until	tomorrow	 to	 receive	 $100,	 is	 arguably	 suboptimal	 behaviour	 because	 the	likelihood	of	 intervening	 factors	 is	 relatively	 small.	 It	 is	 commonly	 accepted	 in	the	literature	that	high	levels	of	DD	reflect	a	desire	for	immediate	gratification	at	the	expense	of	better	long-term	benefits	(Green	&	Myerson,	2010).	It	has	been	widely	documented	in	the	literature	that	addictive	behaviours	are	related	to	greater	DD	of	money,	drugs	and	other	commodities	(Mackillop	et	al.,	 2011;	 Madden	 et	 al.,	 1997;	 Reynolds,	 Richards,	 Horn,	 &	 Karraker,	 2004;	Saville,	Gisbert,	Kopp,	&	Telesco,	2010;	Yi,	Mitchell,	&	Bickel,	2010).	DD	has	also	shown	 associations	 with	 high	 scores	 on	 the	 Eysenk	 Impulsivity	 Questionnaire	(Andrade	&	Petry,	2012;	Madden	et	al.,	1997),	BIS-11	non-planning	 impulsivity	(Mobini,	 Kass,	 Yeomans,	 &	 Grant,	 2007)	 and	 functional	 and	 dysfunctional	impulsivity	 (Andrade	&	Petry,	 2012;	Mobini	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 Cognitive	distortions	related	 to	 impulsivity	 are	 also	 linked	 with	 DD,	 such	 as	 the	 need	 for	 instant	satisfaction	and	short-term	thinking	(Mobini	et	al.,	2007).	There	is	also	evidence	that	 DD	 may	 occur	 as	 a	 result	 of	 aversion	 to	 uncertainty,	 as	 Luhmann	 et	 al.	(2011)	 found	that	high	 IU	was	associated	with	 the	 tendency	to	choose	smaller,	less	 probable	 rewards	 rather	 than	 wait	 for	 a	 larger,	 more	 certain	 reward.	 As	
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discussed	in	Chapter	2,	the	authors	attributed	this	economically	disadvantageous	behaviour	to	the	aversiveness	of	waiting	in	a	state	of	uncertainty.	Uncertainty	 is	 also	 inherent	 when	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 reward	 is	probabilistic.	Probability	discounting	(PD)	is	the	tendency	to	discount	the	value	of	 an	 uncertain	 reward	 as	 the	 probability	 of	 receiving	 that	 reward	 decreases	(McKerchar	&	 Renda,	 2012).	 Low	 levels	 of	 PD	 are	widely	 considered	 to	 be	 an	indication	of	risk	seeking	(Green	&	Myerson,	2010;	Patton	et	al.,	1995)	when	the	probability	 against	 receiving	 a	 reward	 compared	 to	 its	 actual	 value	 is	 not	factored	into	one’s	decision	(Shead	&	Hodgins,	2009).	Therefore,	someone	with	a	pattern	 of	 low	 PD	would	 be	more	 likely	 to	 choose	 a	 risky	 gamble	 rather	 than	settle	 on	 a	 smaller	 reward	 with	 better	 odds.	 The	 literature	 has	 failed	 to	consistently	find	correlations	between	PD	and	other	impulsivity	measures	such	as	 the	 BIS-11	 (Baumann	 &	 Odum,	 2012;	 Mitchell,	 1999),	 the	 EIQ	 (Andrade	 &	Petry,	 2012;	 Crean,	 de	 Wit,	 &	 Richards,	 2000;	 Reynolds	 et	 al.,	 2004),	 the	 SSS	(Mitchell,	 1999;	 Reynolds	 et	 al.,	 2004)	 and	 dopamine-related	 impulse	 control		(Mobini,	Chiang,	Ho,	Bradshaw,	&	Szabadi,	2000).	 It	 is	 likely	 that	PD	assesses	a	unique	aspect	of	impulsivity	that	is	not	captured	by	other	impulsivity	measures.	Furthermore,	positive	 correlations	have	 frequently	been	observed	between	DD	and	 PD	 (Baumann	 &	 Odum,	 2012;	 Crean	 et	 al.,	 2000;	 Johnson,	 Johnson,	Herrmann,	&	Sweeney,	2015;	Ohmura,	Takahashi,	&	Kitamura,	2005;	Richards,	Zhang,	 Mitchell,	 &	 Wit,	 1999),	 which	 suggest	 that	 those	 who	 prefer	 the	immediacy	of	a	reward	(i.e.	are	impulsive)	simultaneously	place	a	high	value	on	the	 certainty	 of	 a	 reward	 (i.e.	 are	 risk-averse).	 It	 is	 counterintuitive	 to	 predict	that	 an	 impulsive	 person	 would	 be	 less	 risk–seeking.	 Either	 PD	 and	 DD	 are	
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capturing	 different	 impulsivity	 facets	 or	 DD	 is	 actually	 assessing	 risk	 taking	rather	than	delayed	gratification,	given	that	delay	inherently	involves	risk.	There	is	very	little	research	regarding	PD	in	the	addiction	literature,	and	the	 existing	 studies	 have	 generated	 inconsistent	 results.	 The	 earliest	 addiction	PD	 research	 focused	 on	 nicotine	 dependency,	 and	 found	 that	 that	 cigarette	smokers	 tend	 to	 discount	 probabilistic	 rewards	 more	 so	 than	 non-smokers	(Reynolds	et	al.,	2004;	Yi,	Carter,	&	Landes,	2012;	Yi,	Chase,	&	Bickel,	2007).	This	pattern	suggests	 that	substance	users	are	more	risk-averse,	despite	substantial	research	linking	substance	abuse	and	risk	taking.	However,	other	studies	failed	to	 find	 differences	 in	 PD	 between	 smokers	 and	 non-smokers	 (Białaszek,	Marcowski,	 &	 Cox,	 2017;	 Mitchell,	 1999;	 Ohmura	 et	 al.,	 2005).	 More	 recent	research	 has	 expanded	 the	 investigation	 to	 include	 other	 substances	 of	 abuse,	with	varied	findings.	Bernhardt	et	al.	(2017)	found	that	individuals	with	alcohol	use	 disorder	 exhibited	 lower	 rates	 of	 PD	 compared	 to	 healthy	 controls,	suggesting	that	alcoholic	patients	were	less	risk	averse.	Alternatively,	marijuana	users	 do	 not	 appear	 to	 discount	 probabilistic	 outcomes	 differently	 than	 non	users	 (Mejía-Cruz,	 Green,	 Myerson,	 Morales-Chainé,	 &	 Nieto,	 2016).	 There	 are	only	 two	 studies	 to	 date	 to	 investigate	 PD	 and	 “harder”	 substances	 of	 abuse,	which	 found	that	cocaine-dependent	 individuals	discount	probabilistic	rewards	similarly	 to	 non-drug-users	 (Johnson	 et	 al.,	 2015;	 Mejía-Cruz	 et	 al.,	 2016).	Further	investigation	into	how	drug	addicted	individuals	make	risk-decisions	in	the	 PD	 paradigm	 is	 warranted	 because	 the	 existing	 literature	 is	 far	 from	conclusive.		
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Probability	discounting	of	losses	As	 has	 been	 discussed	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 certainty	 is	 generally	 preferred	 to	uncertainty,	and	uncertain	threat	 is	particularly	aversive.	However,	uncertainty	becomes	 desirable	 when	 a	 loss	 is	 at	 stake,	 and	 humans	 are	 willing	 to	 take	 a	chance	on	avoiding	a	small	loss,	even	if	the	odds	of	incurring	a	much	greater	loss	are	high	 (Tversky	&	Kahneman,	1981).	Humans	have	an	 innate	 tendency	 to	be	more	responsive	to	the	outcomes	of	losses	compared	to	those	of	gains	because	of	the	different	emotional	responses	 that	gains	and	 losses	elicit	 (Sokol-Hessner	et	al.,	 2013).	 Dissociable	 regions	 in	 the	 brain	 also	 encode	 gains	 and	 losses	differently	(Canessa	et	al.,	2013;	Cooper	&	Knutson,	2008;	Seymour,	Daw,	Dayan,	Singer,	&	Dolan,	 2007).	 People	will	 also	 irrationally	 devalue	 a	 course	 of	 action	that	 is	 merely	 framed	 as	 a	 loss	 even	 though	 the	 overall	 outcome	 is	 the	 same	when	the	option	is	worded	as	a	gain	(Tversky	&	Kahneman,	1981).	According	to	prospect	 theory,	 people	 are	 motivated	 to	 take	 risks	 when	 provided	 the	opportunity	 to	 avoid	 a	 loss	 but	 are	 more	 risk-averse	 about	 gaining	 a	 reward	because	of	the	negative	emotions	elicited	by	incurring	a	loss	(Heilbronner	et	al.,	2010;	 Tversky	 &	 Kahneman,	 1981).	 Our	 differential	 attitudes	 and	 behaviours	towards	 losses	necessitate	an	analysis	of	 impulsive	risk-taking	 for	positive	and	negative	outcomes	individually.		There	have	only	been	a	few	studies	to	date	that	assess	PD	of	losses	in	the	context	of	addiction.	Alcohol-dependent	patients	tend	to	show	lower	rates	of	PD	for	losses	than	controls,	indicating	that	alcohol	patients	are	more	risk	seeking	for	gains	and	less	risk	seeking	for	losses	(Bernhardt	et	al.,	2017).	Other	studies	have	found	 no	 correlation	 between	 frequency	 of	 alcohol	 use	 and	 PD	 of	 losses	(Takahashi,	Ohmura,	Oono,	&	Radford,	2009).	More	studies	are	needed	because	
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opioids	carry	a	high	probability	of	significant	losses	due	to	their	highly	addictive	nature,	 sedative	 effect	 and	 overdose	 potential	 (Inturrisi,	 2002).	 It	 is	 apparent	from	 drug	 taking	 behaviour	 that	 addicted	 individuals	 are	willing	 to	 take	 high-stake	 chances	 when	 they	 use	 drugs	 despite	 the	 incredibly	 serious	 negative	consequences.		
Assessing	probability	discounting	In	the	typical	PD	experimental	paradigm,	a	participant	is	presented	with	a	series	 of	 dichotomous	 choices	 between	 a	 small,	 certain	 outcome	 and	 a	 larger,	probabilistic	 outcome	with	 varying	 probabilities.	 For	 example,	 the	 respondent	may	be	asked	 to	 choose	between	receiving	an	assured	$75	and	receiving	$100	with	 a	 90%	 chance.	 The	 latter	 option	 carries	 an	 implicit	 risk	 of	 winning	 zero	dollars.	During	the	course	of	the	experiment,	the	value	of	the	probabilistic	option	remains	the	same	($100)	and	the	value	of	 the	certain	option	 is	adjusted	over	a	series	 of	 questions	 until	 an	 “indifference	 point”	 is	 reached	 (i.e.	 the	 subjective	value	 of	 the	 assured	 reward	 is	 the	 same	 as	 the	 objective	 value	 of	 $100).	 The	procedure	is	repeated	for	a	number	of	varying	percentages,	(typically	90,	75,	50,	25,	 10%).	 Appendix	 D	 is	 a	 schematic	 of	 discounting	 questions	 and	 the	way	 in	which	IPs	are	calculated	using	example	data.		The	discounting	rate	 is	 calculated	by	 fitting	a	hyperbolic	 function	 to	 the	indifference	 points	 obtained.	 Discounting	 of	 probabilistic	 outcomes	 has	 been	described	by	the	following	hyperbolic	function	(Rachlin,	Raineri,	&	Cross,	1991).	V	=	A/(1	+h	Θ)	In	this	equation,	h	is	a	free	parameter	that	specifies	the	degree	of	discounting,	V	is	the	subjective	value	of	the	certain	outcome	as	described	above,	A	is	the	value	
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of	 the	 probabilistic	 outcome,	 and	Θ	 is	 the	 odds	 against	 receiving	 the	 outcome.	The	values	of	V	are	entered	into	the	equation	to	obtain	a	discounting	parameter	for	 each	 individual.	 Higher	 h	 values	 result	 in	 a	 function	 that	 declines	 steeply,	which	indicates	a	high	rate	of	discounting.		The	 area	 under	 the	 curve	 (AUC)	 is	 another	 method	 of	 assessing	discounting	that	does	not	rely	on	theoretical	assumptions	about	the	form	of	the	discounting	 function	 (Myerson,	Green,	&	Warusawitharana,	2001).	 	The	AUC	 is	derived	by	plotting	a	participant’s	subjective	values,	expressed	as	a	proportion	of	the	actual	amount,	as	a	 function	of	 the	odds	against	 the	outcome	and	summing	the	area	of	the	trapezoids	below	the	data	points.	Values	range	from	.00	(highest	discounting)	to	.10	(no	discounting).	AUC	data	is	more	normally	distributed	than	h	discounting	parameters,	eliminating	the	need	for	non-parametric	analyses	that	often	have	less	statistical	power	(Myerson	et	al.,	2001).	Discounting	of	probabilistic	losses	is	assessed	and	calculated	in	the	same	way	as	the	discounting	of	probabilistic	gains.	Indifference	points	are	obtained	by	the	 same	 procedure,	 except	 the	 options	 are	 between	 a	 certain	 loss	 and	 a	probabilistic	loss.	For	example,	a	participant	may	be	asked	to	lose	$75	for	certain	or	risk	losing	$100	with	a	90%	chance.	There	is	no	option	to	gain	anything	in	this	scenario,	 but	 there	 is	 a	 10%	 possibility	 to	 avoid	 a	 loss	 that	 is	 inherent	 in	 the	decision.	 	Constructing	a	separate	PD	paradigm	for	losses	that	does	not	 involve	reward	allows	us	to	isolate	reactions	to	negative	outcomes.		In	 the	 PD	 paradigm,	 greater	 discounting	 of	 gains	 is	 indicative	 of	 risk-aversion,	 but	 greater	 discounting	 of	 losses	 is	 suggestive	 of	 risk	 seeking.	 Shead	and	 Hodgins	 (2009)	 proposed	 that	 attitudes	 towards	 risk	 are	 defined	 by	 the	weight	given	to	the	probability	of	an	undesirable	outcome	relative	to	the	value	of	
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the	preferred	outcome.	According	 to	 this	 interpretation,	 greater	discounting	of	probabilistic	 losses	 is	 indicative	 of	 risk	 taking	 because	 the	 probability	 of	incurring	 a	 great	 loss	 is	 underweighted.	 A	 risk-seeking	 person	 will	 place	 less	importance	on	the	least	desirable	outcome,	thereby	will	be	more	inclined	to	risk	winning	nothing	and	be	more	open	to	risking	incurring	a	large	loss.	The	figures	found	in	Appendix	E	 illustrate	how	to	 interpret	the	discounting	of	probabilistic	losses	versus	gains	in	relation	to	risk	attitudes.		
Intolerance	of	uncertainty	and	discounting	There	 is	 a	 dearth	 of	 research	 that	 utilises	 behavioural	 measures	 to	investigate	 IU	 and	 risk	 taking.	 There	 is	 only	 one	 study	 to	 date	 that	 directly	assesses	 risk-taking	 conducted	 by	 Macatee	 et	 al.	 (2015).	 On	 each	 trial,	participants	chose	between	receiving	a	small,	medium	or	large	amount	of	money,	and	 each	 amount	 had	 a	 corresponding	 low,	 medium	 and	 high	 risk	 of	 being	accompanied	by	an	electric	 shock.	There	was	also	a	 “pass”	option	 in	which	 the	participant	could	skip	to	the	next	trial	without	the	risk	of	receiving	a	shock.	The	authors	found	that	IU	was	positively	correlated	only	with	the	number	of	“pass”	options,	 indicating	 that	 high	 IU	 related	 to	 the	 complete	 avoidance	 of	making	 a	decision	 in	 a	 risky	 scenario.	 Skipping	 a	 trial	 resulted	 in	 no	 monetary	 gain,	meaning	 that	 avoiding	 a	 decision	 was	 detrimental	 to	 the	 participants’	 overall	monetary	 benefit;	 illustrating	 how	 IU	 can	 lead	 to	 maladaptive	 decisions.	Uncertainty	 is	 a	 key	 factor	 of	 PD,	 so	 accordingly	 it	 would	 be	 expected	 that	negative	 beliefs	 about	 uncertainty	 would	 play	 a	 role	 in	 the	 extent	 which	 one	devalues	uncertain	outcomes.	Macatee	et	al.	(2015)	found	that	IU	predicted	risk-aversion,	which	corroborates	that	those	with	high	IU	tend	to	be	more	cautious	in	
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their	 decisions.	 In	 light	 of	 Chapter	 2,	 which	 found	 that	 high	 IU	 predicted	impulsivity	 in	 opioid-dependency,	 it	 is	 of	 interest	 of	 the	 current	 study	 to	investigate	how	IU	relates	to	the	risk	taking	in	opioid-dependent	patients,	and	if	the	relationship	 is	different	compared	to	non-drug-abusing	controls.	Given	that	opioid	patients	were	more	reactive	to	unexpected	punishments	 in	Chapter	3,	 it	was	also	of	interest	to	examine	risk	taking	for	losses	independently,	as	patients	may	make	more	 impulsive,	 risky	 choices	when	 faced	with	 a	 potential	 negative	outcome	compared	to	a	reward.		
The	current	study	The	present	chapter	 is	 the	 first	 to	 investigate	PD	of	monetary	gains	and	losses	 in	 the	 context	 of	 opioid	 addiction.	 Expanding	 the	 literature	 to	 include	opioids	 is	 crucial	 as	 each	 drug	 is	 unique	 in	 its	 availability,	 social	 acceptance,	addictive	 potential,	 acute	 effects	 and	 long-term	 consequences.	 Although	 risk	seeking	 is	 a	 key	 feature	 of	 addiction,	 the	 behaviours	 involved	 in	 drug	 abuse	indicate	that	drug	addicted	individuals	show	a	preference	for	relatively	smaller,	certain	 rewards	 of	 the	 drug	 rather	 than	 the	 probabilistic,	 larger	 rewards	 of	abstinence.	 There	 has	 been	 even	 less	 investigation	 into	 the	 discounting	 of	probabilistic	 losses,	 but	 there	 is	 evidence	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 discounting	 of	losses	involve	separate	processes	than	gains	(Heilbronner	et	al.,	2010;	Tversky	&	Kahneman,	1992).	PD	of	 losses	 is	observed	when	 the	harmful	 consequences	of	drug	abuse	are	ignored	in	order	to	avoid	losing	the	effect	of	a	drug.	Essentially,	the	 loss	experienced	from	abstinence	 is	 the	absence	of	 the	desired	effect	of	 the	drug,	which	can	result	in	the	persistence	of	negative	emotions,	less	enjoyment	in	social	 settings,	 exclusion	 from	 a	 drug-taking	 peer	 group,	 or	 withdrawal	
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symptoms.	 Abstinence	 can	 also	 elicit	 dysphoria	 and	 an	 inability	 to	 derive	pleasure	 from	 non-drug	 reinforcers	 due	 to	 reduced	 dopamine	 activity	 (Koob,	Caine,	 Parsons,	 Markou,	 &	 Weiss,	 1997).	 Therefore,	 it	 was	 of	 interest	 to	 the	current	study	to	assess	discounting	of	gains	and	losses	individually.	
Research	questions	and	hypotheses	1.	Do	opioid-dependent	 individuals	discount	hypothetical	monetary	gains	more	than	healthy	controls?	What	are	the	implications	in	terms	of	risk	taking?				2.	Do	opioid-dependent	individuals	discount	hypothetical	monetary	losses	more	than	healthy	controls?		3.	 Is	 there	 an	 inverse	 relationship	 between	 IU	 and	 risk	 taking	 in	 opioid-dependent	patients?		In	accordance	with	previous	research	using	cigarette	smokers,	it	was	anticipated	that	opioid-dependent	patients	will	be	more	risk	averse	when	deciding	between	potential	gains		(i.e.	exhibit	greater	PD),	and	be	more	risk	seeking	when	chosing	between	 possible	 losses	 (i.e.	 exhibit	 less	 PD)	 than	 controls.	 Given	 the	 positive	correlation	 between	 IU	 and	 impulsivity	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 it	 was	 expected	 that	 IU	would	predict	greater	risk	taking	in	opioid-dependent	patients,	but	not	controls.		
4.2	Method		
Participants		
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The	 sample	 group	 was	 comprised	 of	 55	 control	 participants	 and	 56	patients	receiving	maintenance	therapy	at	the	RPA	Opioid	Treatment	Program	as	described	 in	 Chapter	 1.	 Control	 participants	 were	 recruited	 from	 the	 wider	Sydney	community	via	word	of	mouth	and	snowballing.	Exclusion	criteria	for	the	control	group	was	a	history	of	drug	dependence	or	a	score	greater	than	11	on	the	DAST.		
	
Materials		
Probability	discounting	tasks		The	PD	tasks	were	comprised	of	100	items	that	consisted	of	choices	between	a	smaller,	certain	reward	and	a	larger,	uncertain	reward.	Each	question	was	posed	in	this	way:	“Would	you	rather	receive	$_______	for	sure	or	receive	$1000	with	a	_____%	chance?”	Questions	were	divided	into	5	blocks	of	20	items	for	each	percentage	of	receiving	money	(90,	75,	50,	25,	10%).	The	probabilistic	amount	for	each	block	descended	from	$1000	to	zero	in	$50	increments.	Figure	4.1	is	an	example	item	as	presented	to	the	participant	on-screen.						
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	Figure	4.1.	Example	of	a	monetary	reward	item	as	presented	on-screen	to	participants			For	the	gains	task,	the	participants	are	presented	with	the	following	on-screen	instructions:		
In	 this	 part	 of	 the	 study,	 you	 will	 be	 asked	 a	 series	 of	
questions	 about	 receiving	 hypothetical	 money.	 We	 are	
interested	 in	 what	 you	 would	 choose	 if	 you	 were	 offered	
these	 choices	 in	 real	 life.	 There	 are	 no	 right	 or	 wrong	
answers;	we	are	just	interested	in	your	personal	preferences.		
	
Please	 imagine	 that	 you	may	 be	 receiving	 real	money.	 You	
will	be	presented	with	two	choices:	An	amount	that	you	will	
receive	 FOR	 SURE	 or	 $1000	 that	 you	 MIGHT	 receive.	 The	
screen	will	show	you	the	chances	of	receiving	$1000.	Note:	If	
you	 chose	 the	 amount	 that	 you	 MIGHT	 receive,	 you	 risk	
receiving	no	money	at	all.		 Participants	completed	5	practice	questions	and	were	invited	to	ask	any	questions	 before	 moving	 on	 to	 the	 actual	 experimental	 questions.	 The	instructions	for	PD	loss	task	were	identical	to	the	gains	PD	task,	except	the	word	“gain”	was	replaced	by	the	word	“lose”.	Questions	were	presented	 individually,	
		 91	
in	 which	 participants	 used	 a	 mouse	 or	 track	 pad	 to	 click	 on	 their	 preferred	option	and	then	click	a	“next”	button	to	move	on	to	the	next	item.	Options	were	presented	side	by	side,	 and	 in	 random	order	 for	each	question	so	 that	half	 the	questions	read	“Would	you	rather	receive	$1000	with	a	_____%	chance	or	receive	$_______	for	sure?”	Randomising	the	order	of	presentation	of	options	ensured	that	the	consistent	choosing	of	one	type	of	answer	was	not	 incorrectly	attributed	to	clicking	 on	 one	 side	 of	 the	 screen.	 The	 order	 of	 presentation	 of	 the	 gains	 and	losses	task	was	counterbalanced.		
	
Drug	Abuse	Screening	Test	(DAST)	As	described	in	Chapter	2.	
	
Intolerance	of	Uncertainty	Scale	(IUS)		As	described	in	Chapter	2.	
	
Barratt	Impulsivity	Scale	–	version	11	(BIS-11)		As	described	in	Chapter	2.			
Procedure	A	pen-and-paper	clinical	 interview	was	conducted	with	patients	prior	to	testing	 regarding	 demographic	 information,	 history	 of	 opioid	 use	 and	 current	substance	use.	A	question	regarding	the	age	of	regular	opioid	use	was	included	to	differentiate	between	the	 length	of	opioid	use	and	 length	of	opioid	abuse,	 in	order	 to	 more	 clearly	 ascertain	 patients’	 lifetime	 involvement	 with	 opioids.		Patients	 were	 considered	 to	 be	 poly-drug	 users	 if	 they	 reported	 using	 other	drugs	 besides	 opioids	 or	 alcohol.	 Patients	 who	 reported	 use	 of	 non-medicinal	
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opioids	 in	 the	 previous	 30	 days	 were	 considered	 to	 be	 extra-medical	 opioid	users.	 The	 experimental	 tasks	 were	 administered	 via	 SurveyMonkey	 on	 a	MacBook	Pro	laptop	with	a	wireless	mouse.	Participants	were	asked	if	they	had	difficulty	 reading	 or	 using	 the	 computer.	 If	 so,	 the	 researcher	 read	 aloud	 each	question	and/or	operated	the	mouse.		
	
Statistical	method	As	 discussed	 earlier	 in	 the	 chapter,	 the	 extent	 of	 a	 participant’s	discounting	is	measured	by	obtaining	an	indifference	point	(IP)	for	each	block	of	questions	and	entering	each	IP	into	the	hyperbolic	discounting	equation.	The	IP	was	calculated	as	the	mean	of	the	values	around	which	the	participant	“switches”	from	a	certain	to	uncertain	reward.	For	example,	as	the	certain	monetary	amount	decreases	 in	 value,	 the	 “switch	 point”	 is	 when	 a	 participant	 changes	 from	 the	certain	 options	 and	 begins	 selecting	 the	 uncertain	 option.	 In	 the	 case	where	 a	participant	had	multiple	switch	points,	the	final	switch	was	considered	to	be	the	participants’	final	decision	and	used	to	calculate	the	IP.	The	IP	is	calculated	as	the	mean	of	 the	monetary	 value	 of	 the	 certain	 option	 and	uncertain	 option	 at	 this	point.	The	IP	corresponds	to	the	subjective	value	of	the	probabilistic	outcome	in	comparison	to	the	certain	outcome.		The	indifference	points	for	each	participant	and	 group	 medians	 were	 entered	 into	 the	 hyperbolic	 discounting	 equation	described	 above	 to	 obtain	 a	 probability	 discounting	 value	 (h).	 Differences	 in	discounting	 rates	were	obtained	by	 comparing	mean	h	values	between	patient	and	control	groups.	The	degree	of	discounting	was	also	measured	by	calculating	the	area	under	the	discounting	curve	(AUC)	for	each	participant.	Mean	AUC	was	compared	 between	 groups	 to	 assess	 differences	 in	 discounting.	 Multiple	
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moderated	regression	analyses	were	also	conducted	to	assess	the	relationships	between	IU	and	discounting	between	participant	groups.	
	
Data	management	
	 Scores	 on	 the	 DAS	 identified	 six	 control	 participants	 as	 being	 ineligible	based	on	possible	drug	dependency	(a	score	greater	than	12	on	the	DAS).	Data	from	 these	 participants	 were	 excluded	 from	 analyses	 comparing	 group	differences.	 The	 data	 for	 a	 number	 of	 participants	 showed	 multiple	 “switch	points”	 within	 blocks	 of	 percentage	 values.	 Exclusion	 criteria	 for	 discounting	analyses	were	more	than	2	switch	points	in	any	block	of	questions	or	a	pattern	of	increasing	 IP	 values	 within	 a	 block.	 These	 criteria	 were	 chosen	 as	 they	 were	considered	 to	 be	 an	 indication	 of	 either	 participant	 inattention,	 random	answering,	or	lack	of	understanding	of	the	task.	After	excluding	participants	who	did	 not	 meet	 response	 criteria,	 there	 were	 39	 control	 participants	 and	 44	patients	 that	 were	 used	 in	 the	 statistical	 analysis.	 The	 sample	 size	 varied	between	the	discounting	gains	and	 losses	 tasks	as	some	participants	either	did	not	 complete	 both	 discounting	 tasks	 or	 had	 their	 data	 excluded	 from	one	 task	due	 to	 non-systematic	 responding.	 Additionally,	 not	 all	 participants	 completed	the	self-report	measures.	The	sample	sizes	are	provided	for	each	analyses	below.	
4.3	Results	Independent	t-tests	were	conducted	between	groups	to	assess	differences	in	demographic	variables.	The	groups	did	not	differ	significantly	in	age;	however	the	patient	group	completed	significantly	fewer	years	of	education	than	controls.	Accordingly,	education	was	used	as	a	covariate	in	subsequent	analyses	of	group	
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differences.	 Chi-squared	 analysis	 revealed	 that	 gender	 was	 distributed	 evenly	between	groups.	Length	of	opioid	dependency	was	calculated	by	subtracting	the	age	of	regular	opioid	use	from	the	participant’s	current	age.	Length	of	opioid	use	was	 calculated	 by	 subtracting	 age	 of	 first	 opioid	 use	 from	 current	 age.	 Full	demographic	and	clinical	details	can	be	found	in	Table	4.1.		
		Table	4.1	
Participant	demographic	and	clinical	characteristics			Characteristic	 Mean	(SD)	 	 Statistic		 Control	 Patient	 	 	Age	 36.59	(17.30)	 41.05	(8.36)	 	 t	=	-1.52	Education	 11.59	(1.37)	 10.43	(1.82)	 	 t	=	3.23*	Female	(%)	 19	(48.7%)	 24	(51.8%)	 	 χ2	=	.28	DAS		 1.77	(2.62)	 ---	 	 ---	First	opioid	use	 ---	 19.30	(6.77)	 	 ---	First	regular	use	 ---	 22.00	(7.60)	 	 ---	Years	of	use	 ---	 21.79	(9.22)	 	 ---	Years	of	abuse	 ---	 19.07	(2.62)	 	 ---	Poly-drug	user	(%)	 ---	 16	(42.1%)	 	 ---	Extra-medical	user	(%)	 ---	 10	(25.0%)	 	 ---	*	p	<	.05	
Statistical	analysis	of	gains	data	Hyperbolic	 discounting	 functions	 were	 fitted	 to	 the	 group	 median	indifference	points	and	individual	participant	data	using	nonlinear	least	squares	regression	conducted	through	Microsoft	Excel’s	SOLVER	Add-in	(Brown,	2001).	Proportion	 of	 explained	 variance	 (R2)	 and	 a	 discounting	 parameter	 (h)	 were	obtained	for	group	medians	and	individual	data.	The	discounting	value	found	for	
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the	control	group	was	h	=	2.550	and	the	proportion	of	variances	accounted	for	by	 the	model	 was	R2	 =	 .607.	 Patient	 data	 revealed	 a	 discounting	 value	 of	 h	 =	5.846	 and	 proportion	 of	 variance	R2	 =	 .470.	 Figure	 4.2	 depicts	 the	 best-fitting	hyperbolic	model	 for	 control	 and	patient	 groups.	 The	R2	values	 of	 both	 groups	were	 comparatively	 lower	 than	 those	 typically	 found	 in	 the	 discounting	literature	 (R2	 	 >	 .80),	 indicating	 that	 the	 participant	 data	 did	 not	 fit	 the	hyperboloid	 function	 well	 (Estle,	 Green,	 Myerson,	 &	 Holt,	 2006;	 Mazur,	 1987;	Rachlin,	 2006).	 When	 individual	 indifference	 points	 were	 entered	 into	 the	equation,	36%	of	participants	had	a	R2	less	than	zero.	Of	those	with	a	R2	greater	than	zero,	 the	values	 ranged	between	R2	=	 .335	and	R2	=	 .994,	 indicating	 that	a	large	 proportion	 of	 individual	 data	was	 not	well	 described	 by	 the	 discounting	function.	 Consequently,	 only	 AUC	 analysis	 was	 utilised	 to	 determine	 group	differences	 in	 discounting.	 As	 earlier	 discussed,	 AUC	 is	 a	 valid	 method	 of	discounting	that	is	not	based	on	the	assumptions	of	human	behaviour	posited	by	the	 hypothetical	 function,	 and	 allowed	 for	 a	 larger	 sample	 size	 in	 the	 current	study	(Control	n	=	36,	patient	n	=	39).									
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	Figure	4.2.	Best	fitting	hyperbolic	probability	discounting	curves	for	patient	and	control	groups		The	 participant’s	 proportional	 subjective	 values	 of	 the	 probabilistic	outcome	were	plotted	as	a	function	of	the	odds	against	receiving	$1000,	and	the	AUC	was	calculated	by	summing	the	area	of	the	trapezoids	underneath	the	data	points.	 Preliminary	 analyses	 of	 data	 revealed	 that	 AUC	 data	 was	 positively	skewed,	 which	 was	 corrected	 by	 eliminating	 two	 outliers.	 Results	 of	 ANCOVA	found	 that	 patients	 had	 significantly	 lower	 AUC	 (F(1,72)	 =	 4.441,	 p	 =	 .039),	
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indicating	 that	 patients’	 responses	 were	 more	 risk-averse	 than	 control	responses.		
Statistical	analyses	of	losses	data	Group	 median	 and	 individual	 indifference	 points	 were	 fit	 to	 the	hyperbolic	equation	in	the	same	way	as	the	gains	data.	The	best	fitting	curves	for	participant	 groups	 are	 depicted	 in	 Figure	 4.2.	 The	 median	 R2	 for	 the	 control	group	 was	 	 .741	 and	 the	 discounting	 rate	 was	 h	 =	 1.149.	 The	 median	 R2	 for	patients	was	-	 .020,	and	a	discounting	rate	of	h	=	3.205.	As	was	the	case	for	the	probabilistic	gains	task,	both	group’s	data	did	not	fit	the	discounting	model	well	and	 when	 participant	 R2	 values	 were	 inspected	 independently,	 40.3%	 of	participants	 had	 a	R2	below	 zero.	 Consequently,	 the	 AUC	method	 was	 used	 to	assess	discounting	differences	between	groups	(Control	n	=	33,	patient	n	=	34).	Results	 from	 ANCOVA	 showed	 that	 patients	 had	 significantly	 lower	 AUC	 than	controls	 (F(1,	 64)	 =	 5.574,	 p	 =	 .021),	 indicating	 that	 patients	were	more	 risk-taking	than	control	participants.	Figure	4.3	depicts	the	mean	differences	in	AUC	between	groups	for	gains	and	losses	data.			
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	Figure	 4.3.	 Mean	 differences	 in	 AUC	 between	 participant	 groups	 for	 the	probabilistic	gains	and	losses	tasks.		
	
Group	comparisons	on	self-report	measures	A	series	of	ANCOVAs	were	performed	to	assess	differences	in	IUS	and	BIS-11	 scores	 between	 groups.	 Patients	 scored	 significantly	 higher	 on	 overall	 IUS	and	 IUS	1	 subscale,	 and	scores	between	groups	on	 the	 IUS	subscale	2	 failed	 to	reach	significance	(p	=	.051).	While	patients	reported	higher	levels	of	impulsivity	on	the	BIS-11,	only	attentional	impulsiveness	neared	significance	(p	=	.084).	The	results	of	all	ANCOVA	analyses	can	be	found	in	Table	4.2.		Independent	t-tests	were	conducted	to	assess	discounting	in	patients	who	were	 poly-drug	 users	 or	 who	 were	 currently	 using	 non-prescribed	 opioids.	Results	 showed	 that	 there	 were	 no	 effects	 of	 poly-drug	 use	 or	 extra-medical	opioid	use	on	discounting	rates,	IU	or	impulsivity	measures	(all	p	>	.300).			
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	Table	4.2.			
Results	of	ANCOVA	assessing	differences	in	AUC,	IUS	scores,	and	BIS	scores	between	
participant	groups	
	Measure	 Mean	(SD)	 	 				F		 					Control	 					Patient	 	 	AUC	Gain	a	 .34334	(.13)	 .25383	(.15)	 	 4.44*	AUC	Loss	b	 .42095	(.17)	 .30980	(.19)	 	 5.57*	IUS	c	 62.92(17.64)	 77.53	(28.33)	 	 4.56*						IUS-1	 32.82	(10.62)	 41.53	(16.19)	 	 4.47*						IUS-2	 30.10	(8.35)	 36.00	(12.80)	 	 3.93	BIS-11d	 64.67	(10.22)	 69.37	(12.77)	 	 1.46						Attentional	 15.51	(3.47)	 17.29	(4.05)	 	 3.06						Motor	 22.92	(3.87)	 24.44	(4.18)	 	 1.19					Non-planning	 26.23	(5.49)	 28.61	(5.38)	 	 1.04	a	Control	n	=	36,	patient	n		=	39;	b	Control	n	=	33,	patient	n	=	34;	c	Control	n	=	39,	patient	n	=	39;	d	Control	n	=	39	,	patient	n	=	41.	*	p	<	.05	
Correlations	between	measures	Zero-order	 correlations	 were	 obtained	 between	 AUC	 of	 the	 gains	 task,	AUC	of	 the	 loss	 task,	 scores	 on	 the	 IUS	 and	 scores	 on	 the	BIS-11.	Neither	AUC	gain	 nor	 AUC	 loss	 was	 significantly	 related	 to	 scores	 on	 the	 IUS.	 Surprisingly,	AUC	gain	had	a	significant	negative	correlation	with	non-planning	impulsiveness,	indicating	 that	more	 risk-taking	 for	monetary	 gains	 predicted	 a	 greater	 future	thinking.	 	AUC	of	 the	 losses	 task	had	no	 significant	 correlation	with	any	of	 the	measures.	Replicating	Chapter	2	of	the	present	thesis,	 IUS	total	and	IUS-1	were	positively	correlated	with	all	BIS-11	impulsivity	scores.	Scores	on	the	IUS-2	were	not	correlated	with	total	BIS-11	or	impulsivity	subscales.	Zero-order	correlations	were	 also	 calculated	 between	 experimental	 and	 clinical	 variables.	 Length	 of	
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opioid	use	and	opioid	abuse	were	not	correlated	with	discounting	or	self-report	measures.		
Moderation	analyses	Two	 hierarchical	 moderation	 regression	 analyses	 were	 conducted	 to	determine	 whether	 the	 relationship	 between	 PD	 and	 IU	 is	 different	 between	opioid-dependent	 individuals	 and	 non-drug	 abusing	 controls.	 The	 detailed	results	of	both	analyses	can	be	found	in	Table	4.3.	Gender,	addiction	status	and	AUC	for	gains	were	the	predictive	variables	the	first	step	of	the	first	regression	model	with	 IUS	score	as	 the	dependent	variable.	Gender	was	 included	because	preliminary	analyses	showed	that	females	scored	significantly	higher	on	IU.	The	overall	 model	 was	 statistically	 significant	 (F(3,66)	 =	 6.85,	 p	 <	 .001),	 and	accounted	for	23.8%	of	variance.	Gender	and	group	were	significant	predictors	of	 IU	 (B	 =	 15.70,	 SE	 =	 5.28,	 p	 =	 .004	 and	 B	 =	 16.16,	 SE	 =	 17.83,	 p	 =	 .005,	respectively),	but	AUC	was	not	(p	=	 .513).	Step	 two	of	 the	regression	added	an	interaction	 between	 group	 and	 AUC,	 which	 did	 not	 significantly	 increase	 the	variance	 accounted	 for	 by	 the	model	 (R2	 =	 .239,	p	 =	 .729).	 It	 appears	 that	 the	relationship	between	IU	and	PD	of	gains	are	non-significant	 in	both	the	patient	and	control	group.			 The	 second	 hierarchical	 moderation	 analysis	 was	 conducted	 predicting	IUS	 score	 from	 gender,	 addiction	 and	 AUC	 for	 losses.	 The	 overall	 model	 was	significant	(F(3,60)	=	6.37,	p	=	 .001)	and	accounted	for	20.4%	of	variance.	Step	two	 added	 an	 interaction	 variable	 between	 group	 and	 AUC	 of	 losses,	 which	significantly	 improved	 the	 model	 (R2	 =	 .300,	 p	 =	 .30).	 The	 results	 of	 this	regression	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Table	 4.3.	 Simple	 slopes	 analysis	 revealed	 a	
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significant	negative	relationship	between	scores	on	the	IUS	and	AUC	for	losses	in	patient	participants	 (b	=	 -47.803,	SE	=	20.82,	p	<	 .001),	but	not	 for	controls.	 In	other	words,	higher	IU	in	patients	related	to	greater	risk-seeking	decisions	about	probabilistic	 losses,	while	 IU	 did	 not	 appear	 to	 significantly	 relate	 to	 decision-making	 in	controls.	Figure	4.4	depicts	the	relationships	between	IU	and	AUC	of	losses	between	groups.		Table	4.3		
Results	from	the	hierarchical	moderation	regression	analyses	predicting	IUS	scores	
from	addiction	and	the	AUC	of	the	PD	losses	task	
	Predictor	 β	 R2	 ΔR2	 F	 ΔF	Step	1	 	 .242	 	 6.37**	 							Gender	 -.389**	 	 	 	 							Group	 .177	 	 	 	 							AUC	loss	 -.123	 	 	 	 	Step	2	 	 .300	 .059	 	 4.941*							Gender	 -.366*	 	 	 	 							Group	 .684*	 	 	 	 							AUC	loss	 .148	 	 	 	 							Group	x	AUC	loss	 -.553*	 	 	 	 	*	p	<	.05,	**	p	<.001	
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 Figure	4.4.	AUC	for	the	PD	monetary	losses	task	as	a	function	of	IUS	score	between	participant	groups.		
4.4	Discussion	This	chapter	is	the	first	to	use	the	PD	paradigm	to	investigate	risk-taking	in	opioid-dependent	individuals,	and	how	attitudes	towards	uncertainty	relate	to	the	 subjective	 values	 placed	 on	probabilistic	monetary	 gains	 and	 losses.	When	the	extent	of	PD	was	compared	between	groups,	patients	demonstrated	greater	gain	 discounting	 compared	 to	 controls.	 In	 other	 words,	 opioid-dependent	participants	tended	to	choose	monetary	rewards	that	were	lesser	in	value	rather	than	 risk	 receiving	 a	 larger	 amount,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 subjective	 value	 of	assured	 monetary	 gains	 was	 much	 greater	 to	 patients	 than	 to	 controls.	 Our	results	 align	 with	 previous	 research	 on	 cigarette	 smokers,	 which	 found	 that	nicotine	dependent	individuals	discount	monetary	gains	more	than	non-smokers	(Reynolds	et	al.,	2004;	Yi	et	al.,	2012;	Yi	et	al.,	2007).	Adding	to	the	literature,	the	current	chapter	is	the	first	to	provide	evidence	that	those	who	are	dependent	on	
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substances	 other	 than	 nicotine	 discount	 monetary	 rewards	 more	 than	 non-addicted	cohorts.	It	appears	that	the	opioid-dependent	patients’	decisions	about	rewards	may	have	been	disproportionally	impacted	by	risk,	in	that	the	certainty	of	a	reward	was	valued	over	the	monetary	amount	of	the	uncertain	reward.		The	subjective	 value	 of	 uncertain	 rewards	 may	 be	 diminished	 as	 a	 result	 of	neurological	abnormalities	 in	stress	regulation	that	augment	negative	reactions	to	uncertainty	(Koob	&	Kreek,	2007).	As	a	result,	drug	addicted	individuals	may	become	biased	towards	certain	rewards	(e.g.	the	drug’s	desired	effect)	at	the	cost	of	 relatively	 indefinite	 non-drug	 rewards	 (e.g.	 improved	 relationships	 with	friends	 and	 family).	 Additionally,	 opioid-dependent	 individuals	 may	 have	 a	preference	 for	 “certainty	 of	 supply”	 that	 develops	 from	 childhood	 adversity	(Barker	et	 al.,	 2015).	 Interpreted	 in	 these	 terms,	our	 results	 suggest	 that	prior	negative	experiences	with	uncertainty	have	a	significant	impact	on	risk	decisions	about	monetary	gains.	Considered	 in	 isolation,	 the	 observation	 that	 opioid-dependent	participants	discounted	probabilistic	gains	more	than	controls	does	not	speak	to	the	 quality	 of	 decisions	 between	 groups.	 Instead,	 the	 choices	 made	 by	participants	 need	 to	 be	 interpreted	 in	 the	 context	 of	 the	 probability-weighted	values	 of	 the	 uncertain	 options.	 In	 the	 PD	 paradigm,	 $900	 is	 the	 probability-weighted	value	of	receiving	$1000	with	a	90%	chance,	and	selecting	an	assured	monetary	 value	 less	 than	 $900	 is	 too	 conservative	 of	 a	 strategy	 to	 maximise	one’s	gains	in	the	long-term.	Conversely,	values	greater	than	$900	are	ultimately	too	risky	to	be	beneficial	over	time.	As	discussed	earlier	in	this	chapter,	decisions	made	 under	 uncertainty	 tend	 to	 be	 impaired,	which	 is	 illustrated	 by	 the	 $650	median	value	chosen	by	 the	control	group	 in	 the	current	example.	The	median	
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subjective	 value	 for	 patients	 was	 $475,	 indicating	 that	 opioid-dependent	individuals’	desire	for	certainty	would	result	in	less	advantageous	decisions	than	healthy	 controls	 over	 the	 long-run.	Hence,	 avoiding	 risk	 is	 not	 always	optimal,	and	 aversion	 to	 risky	 rewards	 may	 be	 related	 to	 neurological	 abnormalities	implicated	in	overvaluing	assured	rewards.	Damage	to	the	dopaminergic	reward	system	that	results	from	chronic	opioid	use	may	decrease	the	subjective	value	of	probabilistic	 rewards	 and	 promote	 the	 pursuit	 of	 assured	 ones.	 As	 such,	heightened	 PD	 of	 positive	 outcomes	 may	 reflect	 a	 greater	 aversion	 to	uncertainty,	 which	 ultimately	 results	 in	 maladaptive	 decision-making.	 Risk	aversion	 for	uncertain	 rewards	may	also	have	 implications	 for	drug	 relapse	 as	Gowin,	Ball,	Wittmann,	Tapert,	and	Paulus	(2015)	found	when	comparing	neural	activity	during	risk-taking	in	methamphetamine-dependent	individuals	one	year	after	 rehabilitation.	 Abstinent	 individuals	 exhibited	 increased	 activation	 of	 the	striatum	and	insula	in	response	to	large,	risky	rewards	compared	to	small,	safe	rewards.	 Relapsing	 individuals	 did	 not	 show	 differential	 activation,	 suggesting	that	deficits	in	risk	processing	may	be	a	factor	in	relapse.	Furthermore,	reward-related	 brain	 activity	 in	 response	 to	 risk	was	 associated	with	 better	 outcomes	after	 treatment,	 supporting	 the	 supposition	 that	 risky	 gains	 may	 be	 less	rewarding	to	relapse-vulnerable	individuals.			Patients	 also	 exhibited	 a	 greater	 level	 of	 loss	 discounting	 in	 that	 they	tended	 to	 risk	 high	 amounts	 of	 monetary	 losses	 with	 less	 advantageous	 odds	than	 did	 controls.	 This	 pattern	 of	 behaviour	 suggests	 that	 opioid-dependent	individuals	are	more	sensitive	to	losses	and	are	incentivised	to	take	large	risks	in	order	to	avoid	suffering	a	loss.	It	appears	that	the	risk-taking	observed	in	opioid-dependent	participants	also	resulted	 in	 less	optimal	decisions	 than	controls,	as	
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illustrated	 by	 the	 median	 values	 of	 choices	 made	 compared	 to	 probability-weighted	 values.	 The	 risks	 taken	 by	 patients	 when	 considering	 uncertain	hypothetical	 monetary	 losses	 reflects	 drug-taking	 behaviour	 in	 which	 the	probability	of	 immense	drug-related	 losses	 is	 ignored	 in	 favour	of	avoiding	 the	certain	 loss	 of	 the	 drug’s	 desired	 effect.	 However,	 the	 severe	 withdrawal	symptoms	 associated	 with	 sudden	 cessation	 of	 opioids	 must	 be	 taken	 into	account	when	 generalising	 our	 results	 to	 real-world	behaviour.	Many	 addicted	individuals	continue	to	use	opioids	in	the	absence	of	euphoria	or	other	enjoyable	effect	 primarily	 to	 avoid	 withdrawal	 symptoms	 (Koob,	 Stinus,	 Moal,	 &	 Bloom,	1989).	In	such	a	scenario,	withdrawal	is	so	aversive	that	the	need	for	relief	feels	worth	 the	 risk	 of	 the	 dangerous	 consequences.	 Future	 studies	 would	 benefit	from	 using	 a	 more	 realistic	 scenario	 rather	 than	 hypothetical	 money,	 which	Chapter	5	of	the	present	thesis	aims	to	address.	PD	of	gains	and	losses	were	not	related,	 which	 was	 interesting	 given	 that	 the	 Shead	 &	 Hodkins	 (2009)	 risk-attitudes	model	predicts	a	negative	correlation	between	risk-aversion	and	risk-seeking	 behaviours.	 It	 would	 be	 anticipated	 that	 participants	 who	 were	 risk-averse	on	the	gains	task	would	also	be	risk-averse	on	the	losses	task.	Instead,	the	lack	 of	 any	 correlation	 suggests	 that	 there	 are	 distinct	 cognitive	 processes	 at	work	when	contemplating	uncertain	gains	compared	to	uncertain	losses.		In	 light	of	 the	correlations	between	 impulsivity	and	IU	 in	Chapter	2,	we	anticipated	a	similar	relationship	between	IU	and	PD	in	the	current	study.	There	were	no	significant	overall	correlations	between	either	PD	task	and	the	IUS,	and	when	 the	 associations	 between	 IU	 and	 PD	 of	 gains	were	 analysed	 in	 terms	 of	opioid-dependency,	 there	 were	 no	 differential	 relationships	 patients	 and	controls.	 However,	 we	 found	 that	 greater	 IU	 predicted	 risk	 taking	 for	
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probabilistic	 losses	 in	 the	 patient	 group,	 but	 did	 not	 predict	 risk	 taking	 in	 the	control	 group.	 It	 appears	 that	 IU	 is	 related	 to	 risky	 decisions	 concerning	probabilistic	 losses	 in	 opioid-dependent	 individuals,	 but	 not	 in	 a	 non-drug-abusing	 sample.	 Previous	 research	 has	 shown	 that	 high	 IU	 is	 linked	 to	 risk-aversion	 (Ladouceur	 et	 al.,	 1997;	 Luhmann	 et	 al.,	 2011;	 Macatee	 et	 al.,	 2015;	Thibodeau	et	 al.,	 2013),	 and	 the	 results	of	 the	 current	 study	 suggests	 that	 role	that	 IU	 has	 in	 risk-avoidance	 is	 in	 the	 opposite	 direction	 than	 has	 been	demonstrated	 by	 non-addicted	 individuals.	 The	 present	 chapter	 thus	 lends	additional	support	for	a	unique	link	between	IU	and	impulsivity	in	addiction.	Non-planning	impulsiveness	was	correlated	with	risk-aversion	on	the	PD	gains	 task,	 which	 was	 unexpected	 given	 that	 making	 sound	 decisions	 about	probabilities	involves	future	planning.	There	were	no	relationships	between	self-reported	 impulsivity	and	PD	of	 losses.	When	considered	 in	 tandem,	 the	 lack	of	meaningful	 relationships	 corroborates	 previous	 research	 that	 have	 observed	weak	 correlations	between	PD	and	 impulsivity	measures,	 and	 further	 suggests	that	the	PD	paradigm	is	a	measure	of	a	relatively	unique	facet	of	impulsivity.	
Limitations	An	alternative	interpretation	of	our	results	can	be	made	depending	upon	how	we	define	risk-attitudes.	Risk	attitudes	can	also	be	conceptualised	in	terms	of	uncertainty,	in	which	case	a	probabilistic	outcome	is	always	the	riskier	choice.	Therefore,	a	risk-seeker	places	less	importance	on	the	uncertainty	involved	in	a	decision	(i.e.	the	chance	of	not	achieving	the	desired	goal)	and	more	importance	on	 the	 value	 of	 the	 outcomes	 at	 stake	 (Shead	&	Hodkins,	 2009).	 Conversely,	 a	risk-averse	 person	would	 regard	 uncertainty	 to	 be	 a	more	 important	 deciding	
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factor	 and	 place	 less	 weight	 on	 the	 outcome.	 Conceptualised	 in	 this	 way,	 the	greater	 PD	 of	 losses	 exhibited	 by	 patients	 in	 the	 current	 would	 suggest	 that	patients	 were	 less	 risk	 taking	 because	 of	 an	 aversion	 to	 uncertainty.	 Thus,	patients	 favoured	 the	 assured	 option	 over	 the	 uncertain	 loss,	 regardless	 of	probability.		When	applying	discounting	of	probabilistic	outcomes	 to	drug	 taking,	we	must	 consider	 the	 temporal	 elements	 involved	 in	 the	 rewards	 of	 abstinence.	Compared	 to	 the	 immediate	 rewards	 of	 a	 drug,	 there	 is	 a	 significantly	 longer	delay	between	drug	 cessation	 and	positive	 outcomes	 such	 as	 improved	health,	pro-social	 relationships,	 and	 regular	 employment.	 As	 discussed	 earlier	 in	 the	current	chapter,	drug	addicted	individuals	exhibit	greater	discounting	of	delayed	outcomes,	 which	 the	 literature	 has	 interpreted	 as	 an	 inability	 to	 delay	gratification.	Therefore,	DD	may	be	more	descriptive	of	drug	addiction	than	PD	or	may	 be	 an	 underlying	 factor	 in	 the	 relationship	 between	 addiction	 and	 PD.	However,	 there	 is	 little	evidence	 that	DD	and	PD	are	similar	constructs	or	 that	they	 reflect	 similar	 cognitive	 processes.	 Future	 studies	 should	 investigate	 the	power	of	DD	versus	PD	to	predict	drug	addiction.			The	 large	 amount	non-systematic	 responses	may	be	due	 to	 flaws	 in	 the	discounting	tasks	used	in	the	current	study.	There	were	more	participants	in	the	patient	group	that	were	excluded	due	to	a	low	R2,	which	may	be	attributed	to	the	effects	of	opioid	maintenance	medication.	Drowsiness	and	sedation	are	common	effects	 of	 all	 opioids,	 and	 acute	 cognitive	 deficits	 are	 possible	 side	 effects	 of	methadone	 medication	 (Gritz	 et	 al.,	 1975)	 which	 may	 have	 interfered	 with	patients’	ability	 to	understand	the	 task.	Furthermore,	a	 test	was	not	conducted	prior	 to	 the	 experiment	 to	 ensure	 that	 participants	 possessed	 adequate	
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mathematical	 skills	 to	 understand	 the	 concept	 of	 percentage.	 However,	 each	response	 choice	 was	 represented	 in	 two	 different	 ways	 to	 make	 percentage	easier	to	comprehend	to	counteract	this	possibility	(e.g.	“10%	chance”	and	“1	out	of	10	chance”).	We	cannot	make	the	assumption	that	medication	side	effects	or	lack	 of	 mathematical	 ability	 is	 responsible	 for	 patient	 non-systematic	 data,	 as	there	were	control	participants	that	also	responded	non-systematically	(some	of	whom	had	completed	tertiary	education).			Another	factor	to	consider	is	the	nature	of	the	outcomes	involved	in	the	PD	 tasks.	 While	 participants	 were	 paid	 for	 their	 time,	 the	 money	 in	 the	discounting	 tasks	was	 hypothetical.	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 participants	would	 have	made	different	risk	choices	if	tangible	money	was	at	stake,	but	there	are	mixed	views	 on	 this	 issue.	 Kirby	 et	 al.	 (1999)	 found	 that	 both	 heroin-dependent	participants	and	a	control	group	discounted	real	monetary	gains	at	a	higher	rate	than	hypothetical	monetary	gains,	suggesting	that	people	generally	may	be	less	able	to	resist	immediate	gratification	about	tangible	money.	In	the	current	study,	patient	 participants	 may	 have	 been	 less	 risky	 with	 their	 decisions	 about	hypothetical	 money.	 However,	 multiple	 studies	 have	 failed	 to	 find	 differential	discounting	rates	between	real	and	hypothetical	monetary	outcomes	(Hinvest	&	Anderson,	 2010;	 Johnson	 &	 Bickel,	 2002;	 Lawyer,	 Schoepflin,	 Green,	 &	 Jenks,	2011).	Finally,	participants’	current	financial	circumstances	may	have	impacted	the	amount	of	risk	they	were	willing	to	take.	It	is	feasible	that	participants	with	low	 incomes	are	more	 likely	 to	accept	 smaller,	 certain	sums	of	money	because	the	 relative	 value	 of	 that	 sum	 compared	 to	 their	 income	 is	 greater	 than	 those	with	larger	incomes.	
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Chapter	5	–	Probability	discounting	of	hypothetical	
health	outcomes	
	
Opioid-dependent	 patients	 appear	 to	 be	 risk	 averse	 when	 deciding	 between	probabilistic	 monetary	 gains,	 but	 tend	 to	 take	 risks	 for	 monetary	 losses.	Moreover,	negative	attitudes	towards	uncertainty	are	associated	with	risk	taking	in	 opioid	 patients	 but	 seem	 to	 have	 no	 relationship	 in	 healthy	 controls.	 These	patterns	of	behaviour	are	similar	to	the	impulsive	decisions	that	are	exhibited	by	chronic	drug	users	when	they	persist	 in	drug	 taking	despite	 the	risk	of	serious	harm.	Not	only	 the	risk	of	damage	caused	by	 the	drug	 itself,	but	also	 the	harm	involved	 in	 contracting	 illnesses	 from	 intravenous	 administration.	 Illicit	substance	 use	 involves	 a	 number	 of	 health	 related	 decisions,	which	 span	 from	seeking	 out	 rehabilitation	 to	 engaging	 in	 safer	 drug	 use	 practices.	 Chapter	 5	builds	 upon	 the	 monetary	 nature	 of	 the	 previous	 chapter	 by	 investigating	probabilistic	 health	 related	 improvements	 and	 detriments,	 with	 the	 aim	 to	ascertain	 whether	 the	 risky	 decision	 making	 observed	 in	 Chapter	 4	 can	generalise	to	a	more	drug-relevant	domain.	
5.1	Introduction	Health-related	 decision-making	 involves	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 options	 that	involve	balancing	the	potential	costs	involved	against	the	probabilities	of	health	benefits.	For	example,	chemotherapy	carries	the	risk	of	painful	side	effects,	and	the	odds	of	the	treatment	extending	one’s	life	are	highly	variable.	Changing	one’s	lifestyle	 is	not	necessarily	 guaranteed	 to	 improve	one’s	health	and	also	 carries	
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subjective	 costs.	 Similar	 decisions	 are	 also	 made	 when	 choosing	 to	 engage	 in	activities	 that	 are	 harmful	 to	 one’s	 health,	 such	 as	 the	 abuse	 of	 harmful	substances	 like	opioids.	 Impaired	decision-making	can	result	 from	the	effect	of	the	drug	itself,	such	sharing	needles	or	participate	in	risky	sexual	activity	while	under	 the	 influence	 of	 drugs	 which	 carry	 the	 risk	 of	 blood	 and	 bodily	 fluid	transmitted	 diseases	 such	 as	 hepatitis,	 HIV	 and	 other	 sexually	 transmitted	infections	(Chitwood	et	al.,	2003;	Degenhardt	et	al.,	2007;	Elliott,	Hasin,	Stohl,	&	Des	 Jarlais,	 2016).	 Lowered	 inhibitions	 can	 result	 in	 poor	 judgements	 when	deciding	to	operate	a	motor	vehicle	intoxicated	or	engage	in	other	activities	that	can	cause	bodily	harm.	Drug	overdose	 is	also	a	serious	risk	 for	opioid	users	as	the	purity	of	illicit	opioids	such	as	heroin	is	highly	variable	(Uporova,	2018).	Drug	 taking	 also	 has	 damaging	 health	 consequences	 that	manifest	 after	chronic	 use.	 As	 discussed	 in	 previous	 chapters,	 there	 is	 strong	 evidence	 that	regular	 substance	engenders	 long-term	changes	 in	neural	 stress	pathways	 in	a	way	that	may	make	one	more	sensitive	to	stress	and	make	adaptive	coping	more	difficult	(Sinha,	2008).	Another	lasting	effect	of	opioid	abuse	is	an	increased	risk	of	 overdose	 death	 after	 rehabilitation.	 Tolerance	 to	 the	 euphoric	 properties	 of	opioids	is	believed	to	build	more	rapidly	than	tolerance	to	the	lethal	respiratory	effects	 (White	 &	 Irvine,	 1999),	 increasing	 the	 chance	 of	 overdose	 after	abstinence.	It	is	clear	that	chronic	drug	use	can	cause	both	short	term	and	long-term	health	harms,	and	that	decision-making	regarding	health	outcomes	appears	to	be	seriously	impaired	in	chronic	drug	users.		According	 to	 behavioural	 economics,	 health-related	 choices	 are	influenced	 by	 similar	 factors	 that	 guide	 decisions	 about	 monetary	 outcomes	(Tucker,	Simpson,	&	Khodneva,	2010).	Like	money,	health	has	functional	value	in	
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that	 good	 health	 facilitates	 our	 ability	 to	 engage	 in	 valued	 activities,	 while	 ill	health	costs	 resources	and	 time.	Engaging	 in	health	promoting	behaviours	also	involve	costs	and	benefits,	 such	spending	 time	at	 the	gym	or	buying	expensive	organic	 food.	 Health	 can	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 commodity	 in	 itself,	 as	 shown	 by	Chapman	and	Johnson	(1995),	who	found	that	healthy	 individuals	were	willing	to	 exchange	 years	 of	 life	 expectancy	 with	 other	 commodities	 such	 as	 cars,	vacation	homes,	and	food.	The	DD	paradigm	can	also	be	applied	to	health	and	the	value	 of	 delayed	 health	 outcomes	 has	 been	 shown	 to	 decay	 according	 to	 the	hyperbolic	discounting	function	(Baker,	Johnson,	&	Bickel,	2003;	Johnson,	Bickel,	&	 Baker,	 2007),	 and	 health	 and	 money	 are	 biased	 similarly	 by	 the	 outcome	magnitude	and	length	of	delay	(Chapman	&	Elstein,	1995).	It	appears	that	there	are	similar	cognitive	process	at	work	when	making	decisions	about	monetary	and	health	outcomes.	However,	there	is	a	plethora	of	evidence	 that	 individuals	 make	 different	 decisions	 about	 uncertain	 health	outcomes	compared	to	uncertain	monetary	outcomes.	As	discussed	in	Chapter	4,	discounting	 is	 a	 phenomenon	 in	 which	 the	 subjective	 value	 of	 a	 reward	decreases	 according	 to	 the	 length	 of	 delay	 or	 probability	 against	 its	 receipt.	Delayed	health	outcomes	have	been	shown	to	be	more	steeply	discounted	than	monetary	 outcomes.	 For	 example,	 participants	 have	discounted	delayed	health	improvements	 from	 a	 disease	 more	 than	 they	 discounted	 delayed	 money,	suggesting	 that	 the	 immediacy	 of	 health	 improvements	 was	 more	 desirable	compared	 to	 the	 immediacy	 of	 a	 monetary	 gain	 (Chapman	 &	 Elstein,	 1995;	Lazaro,	 Barberan,	 &	 Rubio,	 2002).	 There	 are	 also	 low	 correlations	 between	discounting	rates	of	delayed	monetary	gains	and	delayed	health	 improvements	(Chapman,	1996;	Chapman	&	Elstein,	1995;	Chapman,	Nelson,	&	Hier,	1999).		
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The	inconsistent	relationship	between	the	discounting	rates	of	health	and	money	can	be	explained	by	the	differential	cost/benefit	analyses	involved	when	considering	 the	 two	 domains.	 Unlike	many	 tangible	 goods,	 it	 is	 not	 feasible	 to	assign	dollar	 amounts	 to	health	 that	 can	be	agreed	upon	universally	 (Keeler	&	Cretin,	 1983),	 and	 there	 are	 a	 myriad	 of	 non-monetary	 variables	 that	 impact	one’s	economic	evaluation	of	health	outcomes.	There	are	time	and	effort	costs	to	improving	 health	 (e.g.	 regular	 exercise	 and	 cooking	 healthy	 food)	 that	 are	weighed	 against	 the	 predicted	 outcomes	 of	 success	 (Drummond,	 2015).	 Even	when	health	gains	or	losses	are	defined	numerically,	there	is	no	evidence	for	an	intrinsic	equivalent	to	money,	as	a	study	conducted	by	Petry	(2003)	illustrated.	The	authors	found	that	participants’	discounting	rates	did	not	correlate	with	the	monetary	value	they	assigned	to	a	one-year	delay	of	an	illness.	Similarly,	Baker	et	al.	(2003)	found	that	DD	rates	for	monetary	gains	did	not	differ	according	to	the	 monetary	 amounts	 participants	 assigned	 to	 a	 10%	 improvement	 of	 their	overall	health.	It	appears	that	decisions	made	regarding	health	do	not	accurately	reflect	 the	 perception	 of	 what	 one’s	 health	 is	 worth	 in	 monetary	 terms;	highlighting	the	need	for	domain-specific	measurements.	
Discounting	differences	between	domains	Domain-specific	 discounting	 refers	 to	 decisions	 as	 they	 relate	 to	 the	nature	 of	 the	 commodity	 considered	 in	 the	 discounting	 task.	 The	 monetary	domain,	which	is	by	far	the	most	common	domain	used	in	discounting	research,	is	 used	 to	 infer	 patterns	 of	 behaviours	 in	 domains	 outside	 of	 the	 laboratory.	However,	 it	 is	 not	 clear	 whether	 discounting	 of	 one	 type	 of	 commodity	 can	accurately	 predict	 behaviours	 in	 different	 domains.	 Positive	 correlations	 have	
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been	observed	between	DD	of	monetary	outcomes	and	DD	of	other	commodities	such	 as	 food	 (Hirst	 &	 DiGennaro	 Reed,	 2016;	 Odum,	 2011),	 cigarettes	 (Bickel,	Odum,	&	Madden,	1999),	 entertainment	 (Charlton	&	Fantino,	2008),	marijuana	(Johnson	et	al.,	2010),	heroin	(Hirst	&	DiGennaro	Reed,	2016;	Odum,	2011)	and	sexual	activity	(Lawyer	&	Schoepflin,	2013).	Furthermore,	discounting	rates	for	food,	 sex,	 and	 drugs	 have	 been	 positively	 correlated	 with	 each	 other	 (Holt,	Newquist,	Smits,	&	Tiry,	2014;	Odum,	2011).	However,	 there	 is	 evidence	 for	 a	 “domain	 effect”	 in	 which	 discounting	differs	depending	upon	the	commodity	 in	question.	The	majority	of	research	in	this	 area	 has	 been	 conducted	 on	 DD	 and	 has	 provided	 solid	 evidence	 that	individuals	 in	 the	 general	 population	 tend	 to	 prefer	 more	 immediate	commodities	 compared	 to	 immediate	 monetary	 gains.	 For	 example,	 delayed	consumable	 goods	 have	 been	 discounted	 at	 higher	 rates	 than	 delayed	money,	such	as	 favourite	 foods,	alcohol	and	soda	 (Estle,	Green,	Myerson,	&	Holt,	2007;	Holt	et	al.,	2014;	Odum	&	Baumann,	2007;	Odum,	Baumann,	&	Rimington,	2006),	non-consumable	 commodities	 such	 as	 books,	 music	 and	 movies	 (Charlton	 &	Fantino,	2008),	 and	 sex	 (Holt	 et	 al.,	 2014).	Probabilistic	monetary	 rewards	are	also	discounted	less	steeply	than	leisure	time	in	the	form	of	mobile	phone	access	(Hirst	&	DiGennaro	Reed,	2016).	Interpreted	in	impulsivity	terms,	it	appears	that	humans	 prefer	 immediate	 gratification	 from	 consumable	 and	 non-consumable	commodities,	 compared	 to	 money,	 and	 are	 more	 conservative	 when	 risking	access	to	leisure	time.		Domain-specific	discounting	tasks	may	be	more	appropriate	for	assessing	domain-relevant	 behaviours.	 Johnson	 and	 Bruner	 (2012)	 found	 that	 cocaine-dependent	 participants	 who	 discounted	 delayed	 condom	 use	 with	 partners	
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deemed	 likely	 to	 have	 a	 sexually	 transmitted	 infection	 predicted	 reported	HIV	risk-taking	 sexual	 behaviour.	 The	 authors	 did	 not	 observe	 a	 relationship	between	 risky	 behaviour	 and	 discounting	 of	 delayed	 monetary	 rewards.	Similarly,	 DD	 for	monetary	 outcomes	was	 not	 predictive	 of	 high-risk	 sexuality	factors	(e.g.	 sexual	 interest	and	desire)	or	behaviours	(e.g.	 sexual	disinhibition;	Lawyer	&	Schoepflin,	2012).	Lawyer	 (2013)	also	 found	 that	 scores	on	a	 sexual	risk	taking	measure,	but	not	on	a	monetary	risk	taking	measure,	predicted	self-reported	sexual	excitability	outside	of	the	laboratory	setting.	Furthermore,	high	body	 fat	has	shown	to	be	more	strongly	related	 to	DD	of	 food	 than	with	DD	of	monetary	 rewards	 (Hendrickson	 &	 Rasmussen,	 2013;	 Rasmussen,	 Lawyer,	 &	Reilly,	2010).	It	is	apparent	that	monetary	discounting	paradigms	may	not	be	the	best	 indication	 of	 decision	 making	 in	 other	 domains,	 particularly	 decision	making	about	health-related	outcomes	such	as	STIs	or	obesity.		
Health-related	discounting	In	 general,	 those	 who	 are	 at	 risk	 for	 negative	 health	 consequences	discount	 delayed	 health-related	 outcomes	 steeply,	 suggesting	 impulsive	decision-making	 for	 potential	 averse	 health	 consequences.	 For	 example,	individuals	 with	 a	 high	 percentage	 of	 body	 fat	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 discount	delayed	 food	 rewards	 more	 than	 those	 with	 body	 fat	 in	 a	 healthier	 range	(Hendrickson	&	Rasmussen,	2013).	There	is	substantial	evidence	that	individuals	who	 use	 both	 legal	 and	 illicit	 substances	 DD	money	 less	 steeply	 compared	 to	their	drug	of	choice	such	as	cigarettes	(Odum	&	Baumann,	2007),	alcohol	(Odum	&	Rainaud,	2003),	cocaine	(Bickel	et	al.,	2011;	Coffey,	Gudleski,	Saladin,	&	Brady,	2003)	and	heroin	(Madden,	Bickel,	&	Jacobs,	1999;	Madden	et	al.,	1997).	Delayed	
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heroin	 has	 been	 discounted	 more	 than	 money	 in	 a	 sample	 of	 needle	 sharing	opioid	 users	 (Odum,	 Madden,	 Badger,	 &	 Bickel,	 2000).	 Beyond	 the	 harmful	consequences	 of	 drug	 taking,	 drug	 abusers	 display	 greater	 DD	 of	 other	 health	outcomes,	 such	 as	 the	 onset	 of	 a	 hypothetical	 illness	 (Petry,	 2003),	 indicating	that	drug	users	prefer	 a	 sooner,	 smaller	health	 loss,	 rather	 than	delay	 a	 larger	health	loss.	Alcohol-dependent	individuals	discount	a	greater	number	of	delayed	sex	 acts	 to	 a	 greater	 extent	 that	 non-alcohol	 abusing	 controls,	 which	 suggests	that	 alcohol-dependent	 individuals	 may	 have	 less	 impulse	 control	 in	 sexual	situations;	 increasing	 their	 risk	 of	 disease	 (Jarmolowicz,	 Bickel,	 &	 Gatchalian,	2013).	 Cocaine-	 and	 opioid-dependent	 individuals	 have	 exhibited	 greater	discounting	 of	 delayed	 condom	 use	 compared	 to	 controls	 (Herrmann,	 Hand,	Johnson,	 Badger,	 &	Heil,	 2014;	 Johnson	 et	 al.,	 2015),	 even	when	 there	was	 an	explicit	risk	of	contracting	a	STI	(Koffarnus	et	al.,	2016).	Cigarette	smokers	were	also	shown	to	steeply	discount	delayed	hypothetical	health	gains	and	detriments	compared	 to	 never	 smokers	 (Baker	 et	 al.,	 2003;	 Friedel,	Dehart,	 Frye,	 Rung,	&	Odum,	2016;	Odum,	Madden,	&	Bickel,	2002),	and	there	 is	evidence	 that	heavy	smokers	 discount	 probabilistic	 health	 outcomes	 less	 than	 non-smokers	(Poltavski	 &	 Weatherly,	 2013),	 suggesting	 greater	 risk	 taking	 for	 health	compared	 to	 money.	 The	 acute	 effects	 of	 drug	 use	 can	 also	 impair	 health-protective	 decision-making.	 For	 example,	 cocaine	 administration	was	 found	 to	decrease	 the	 likelihood	 of	 using	 a	 condom	 when	 there	 was	 a	 chance	 of	contracting	 a	 sexually	 transmitted	 infection	 compared	 to	 a	 placebo	 (Johnson,	Herrmann,	Sweeney,	LeComte,	&	Johnson,	2017).	Alcohol	consumption	can	also	not	only	decrease	the	likelihood	of	waiting	for	a	condom	before	having	sex,	but	also	 decrease	 the	 probability	 of	 using	 an	 immediately	 available	 condom	
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(Johnson,	Sweeney,	Herrmann,	&	Johnson,	2016).	It	is	apparent	that	drug	use	and	abuse	is	associated	with	impulsive	decisions	that	put	drug-abusing	individuals	at	serious	 harm.	 Research	 using	 the	 health-discounting	 paradigm	 is	 necessary	 to	lower	 the	 barriers	 to	 addiction	 treatment	 and	 motivate	 safer	 drug-taking	practices.	
Health	discounting	and	intolerance	of	uncertainty	Although	 research	 is	 very	 limited,	 the	 existing	 studies	 have	 evidenced	that	IU	may	influence	health	decisions.	Monitoring	is	a	behaviour	characterised	by	 seeking	 out	 threat	 related	 information	 and	 focussing	 attention	 on	 potential	threats	 in	 the	 environment	 (Miller,	 Brody,	 &	 Summerton,	 1988).	 In	 the	 health	domain,	 “monitors”	are	 individuals	who	request	a	great	deal	of	 illness-relevant	information	rather	 than	avoid	 focusing	on	 their	 illness.	Greater	 IU	 is	 related	 to	health	 monitoring,	 and	 it	 has	 been	 hypothesised	 that	 seeking	 out	 excessive	information	about	a	health	threat	is	motivated	by	a	need	to	reduce	uncertainty,	rather	than	by	a	desire	to	gain	control	over	one’s	illness.	For	example,	Miller	et	al.	 (1988)	 found	 that	 high	 monitors	 preferred	 to	 play	 a	 passive	 role	 in	 their	medical	 treatment	 despite	 requesting	 more	 diagnostic	 tests,	 information	 and	counselling	than	low	monitors.	Rosen	et	al.	(2007)	found	that	high	IU	was	related	to	 health	 monitoring	 in	 women	 regarding	 the	 human	 papilloma	 virus	 (HPV).	Higher	IU	was	related	to	gathering	more	information	about	HPV	and	requesting	more	 clinical	 intervention.	 However,	 reduction	 of	 uncertainty	 as	 a	 primary	motivating	 factor	 for	monitoring	has	 yet	 to	be	 established.	Rosen	 et	 al.	 (2010)	found	that	providing	women	with	a	great	deal	of	information	about	HPV	induced	anxiety	 in	high	 IU	women	compared	 to	 low	 IU	women.	Those	with	elevated	 IU	
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may	seek	out	more	disease	relevant	information	to	reduce	uncertainty,	although	the	information	they	receive	may	actually	increase	distress	when	the	uncertainty	cannot	be	resolved	in	its	entirety.	Furthermore,	during	the	H1N1	virus	pandemic	Taha	et	al.	(2014)	found	that	higher	IU	was	associated	with	greater	perceptions	of	the	health	threat,	lower	perceived	control,	and	greater	use	of	emotion-focused	coping	methods.	IU	may	heighten	threat	perceptions	of	an	uncertain	illness,	but	also	may	reduce	effective	coping	strategies	by	augmenting	distress	and	negative	problem	orientation.			 	
Measuring	probability	discounting	of	health	outcomes	Many	 studies	 have	 shown	 that	 discounting	 health	 outcomes	 fits	 the	hyperbolic	 function	 that	 was	 developed	 originally	 for	 monetary	 rewards	 and	losses	(Baker	et	al.,	2003;	Johnson	et	al.,	2007;	Odum	et	al.,	2002).	Discounting	of	probabilistic	 health	 outcomes	 can	 be	 described	 by	 the	 same	 equation	 used	 in	Chapter	4:		 V	=	A/(1	+h	Θ)	Past	 research	 has	 defined	 health	 outcomes	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 ways,	 but	 the	most	common	 is	years	of	overall	health.	The	subjective	value	of	gained/lost	years	of	health	 (V),	 as	 it	 relates	 to	 its	 actual	 amount	 (A),	 is	 comparable	 to	 a	monetary	reward/loss	because	V	is	mathematically	expressed	as	a	proportion	of	A	in	both	domains.	The	variable	A	is	the	probabilistic	number	of	years	of	improved	health	and	 V	 is	 the	 certain	 number	 of	 years	 that	 is	 subjectively	 equivalent	 to	 A.	 The	variable	Θ	represents	the	odds	against	the	probabilistic	years,	and	is	calculated	as	1	 -	p	/p	(where	p	 is	 the	probability	of	receipt	divided	by	the	number	of	 lost	years).	Finally,	h	is	the	discounting	parameter	that	reflects	the	rate	in	which	the	
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probabilistic	 number	 of	 years	 decreases	 in	 subjective	 value.	 Steeper	 curves	indicate	greater	discounting.			 Discounting	 of	 non-monetary	 outcomes	 such	 as	 health	 can	 also	 be	calculated	with	 the	AUC	method,	 in	which	 the	 subjective	 values	 of	 guaranteed	years	of	health	(V)	are	plotted	as	a	function	of	the	odds	against	the	probabilistic	number	of	years	(A).	The	area	between	the	x-axis	and	the	plotted	data	is	used	as	an	 index	of	discounting	 (0	=	highest	 level	 of	discounting	 to	1	=	 lowest	 level	 of	discounting).	 The	 AUC	 method	 does	 not	 rely	 upon	 the	 assumptions	 of	 the	hyperbolic	model,	and	does	not	exclude	participants	based	on	how	their	data	fits	the	hyperbolic	assumptions.		As	with	monetary	outcomes,	greater	discounting	of	health	gains	suggests	risk	aversion,	while	greater	discounting	of	losses	suggests	risk	seeking.	
The	current	study	There	is	a	dearth	of	investigation	into	the	discounting	of	health	outcomes	by	drug-dependent	individuals,	and	no	research	has	been	done	to	date	regarding	opioids.	 The	 current	 study	 sought	 to	 better	 understand	 opioid-dependent	individuals’	 decisions	 about	 health	 by	 using	 the	 PD	 paradigm	 to	 assess	 risky	decision-making	about	health	 losses	and	gains.	 	 	The	majority	of	 studies	 in	 the	health	 domain	 have	 focused	 on	 delayed	 health	 gains	 or	 preventative	 health	behaviours	(e.g.	protected	sex	or	using	clean	syringes),	or	outcomes	tangential	to	health,	such	as	drug	use	itself.	Little	enquiry	has	been	made	into	discounting	of	probabilistic	health	gains	and	losses.	The	results	of	the	study	reported	in	Chapter	4	revealed	distinct	patterns	of	responding	between	opioid	patients	and	controls.	Specifically,	 patients	 discounted	 large,	 uncertain	 monetary	 rewards	 while	
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discounting	large,	uncertain	monetary	losses,	compared	to	controls.	The	pattern	of	 responding	 to	monetary	outcomes	may	reflect	 the	decision-making	 involved	in	addiction,	however	the	generalisability	of	the	results	of	Chapter	4	is	debatable.	Because	of	 the	potential	domain	effect,	 the	current	study	sought	 to	expand	 the	findings	of	the	previous	chapter	to	the	PD	of	health	gains	and	detriments.		 Drug	 taking	 behaviour	 involves	 a	 trade-off	 between	 the	 pleasurable	effects	of	the	drug	and	the	improved	health	associated	with	abstinence.	From	the	drug	 abuser’s	 perspective,	 consuming	 a	 drug	 may	 convey	 subjective	 health	benefits	 in	 terms	 of	 easing	 psychological	 distress,	 enhancing	 mood,	 and	preventing/alleviating	 withdrawal	 symptoms.	 Abstinence	 carries	 objective	health	gains,	which	are	realistically	greater	in	value	than	the	perceived	benefits	of	the	drug.	The	current	study	also	assessed	discounting	of	health-related	losses,	as	this	is	crucial	to	better	understand	why	chronic	illness,	overdose	or	death	are	risked	in	order	to	avoid	the	loss	of	the	drug’s	desired	effects.	There	is	only	one	study	 to	 date	 that	 has	 assessed	 PD	 of	 health-related	 losses	 in	 the	 addiction	literature,	 which	 failed	 to	 find	 differences	 between	 cocaine-dependent	individuals	and	healthy	controls	in	discounting	the	risk	of	contracting	a	sexually	transmitted	infection	(Johnson	et	al.,	2015).	However,	the	study	did	not	separate	gains	and	losses,	as	the	decision	was	between	a	 loss	(infection)	and	a	gain	(sex	with	 a	 desired	 partner),	 rather	 than	 the	 avoidance	 of	 a	 loss.	 The	 distinction	between	an	explicit	gain	and	an	avoidance	of	loss	is	important	for	understanding	risk	 attitudes	 towards	 negative	 outcomes	 in	 isolation	 from	 positive	 ones.	 The	current	 study	 sought	 to	 expand	 previous	 findings	 regarding	 health-related	behaviours	 (e.g.	 condom	use,	 needle	 sharing,	 or	 drug	 taking)	 to	 general	 health	improvements	or	detriments	that	are	relevant	to	drug	users.	
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Research	questions	and	hypotheses	1.	Do	opioid-dependent	individuals	discount	probabilistic	health	gains	or	losses	differently	than	non-drug-abusing	controls?	What	are	the	implications	regarding	risk	taking?				2.	Do	negative	beliefs	about	uncertainty	relate	to	the	discounting	of	probabilistic	health	outcomes?		3.	 Does	 IU	 relate	 to	 PD	 of	 health	 outcomes	 differently	 in	 opioid-dependent	patients	 compared	 to	 controls,	 and	 is	 this	 relationship	 similar	 to	 the	 pattern	observed	regarding	monetary	outcomes?		4.	How	does	the	PD	of	health	outcomes	appear	to	compare	to	the	PD	of	monetary	outcomes	in	Chapter	4?	What	are	the	implications	for	the	generalisability	of	PD	tasks	to	real-world	behaviours?		We	anticipated	similar	discounting	patterns	to	Chapter	4,	in	that	patients	would	demonstrate	greater	PD	for	gains	and	less	PD	for	losses	than	controls.	Although	not	observed	in	the	previous	chapter,	a	positive	correlation	between	risk-taking	and	 IU	 for	 health	 losses	 was	 anticipated	 in	 opioid-patients,	 given	 the	 greater	applicability	of	health	outcomes	to	drug	abuse.			
5.2	Method	
Participants	
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The	sample	groups	consisted	of	55	control	participants	and	49	patients	at	the	 RPA	 Opioid	 Treatment	 Program	 who	 were	 receiving	 opioid-maintenance	medication.	 Control	 participants	 were	 recruited	 from	 the	 wider	 Sydney	community	via	word	of	mouth	and	snowballing.	Exclusion	criteria	for	the	control	group	were	 a	 history	 of	 drug-dependence	 and	 a	 score	 greater	 than	 11	 on	 the	DAST.	As	described	 in	previous	 chapters,	 patients	were	 considered	 to	be	poly-drug	 users	 if	 they	 reported	 using	 non-opioid	 substances	 other	 than	 alcohol.	Extra-medical	 opioid	 user	 status	 was	 determined	 by	 self-reported	 non-prescribed	opioid	use	in	the	previous	30	days.		
	
Materials	
Probability	discounting	tasks	There	were	 two	 PD	 tasks	 that	were	 comprised	 of	 50	 items	 each.	 Items	consisted	 of	 a	 binary	 choice	 between	 a	 smaller,	 certain	 health	 outcome	 and	 a	larger,	uncertain	health	outcome.	Outcomes	were	quantified	in	terms	of	years	of	better	 or	worse	 health,	 respective	 of	 task	 type.	 Questions	were	 divided	 into	 5	blocks	of	10	 items	with	different	odds	of	experiencing	 the	health	outcome	(90,	75,	50,	25,	10%).	The	certain	number	of	years	for	each	block	descended	from	10	years	to	one	year	in	increments	of	one	year.		Participants	 are	 presented	 with	 two	 hypothetical	 health	 scenarios	 that	are	 adapted	 from	 those	 used	 by	 Chapman	 and	 Elstein	 (1995).	 The	 scenarios	include	functioning	in	a	range	of	domains	that	are	used	to	classify	health	status	(sensation,	 emotion,	 cognition,	 usual	 activity,	 and	 vitality;	 Drummond,	 2015).	
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Both	 tasks	 were	 conducted	 using	 a	MacBook	 pro	 15”	 laptop,	 and	 participants	read	the	following	instructions	and	scenario	for	the	PD	gains	task:	
	
In	this	part	of	the	study,	you	will	be	presented	with	a	series	of	
questions	about	a	health	related	scenario.	There	are	no	right	
or	wrong	answers;	we	are	just	interested	in	your	preferences.		
	
	
	
Imagine	that	for	the	past	two	years	you	have	felt	this	way:	
	 - You	often	feel	tired	and	sometimes	feel	light-headed	- You	 have	 trouble	 falling	 asleep	 and	 sometimes	 have	
nightmares	- Your	mouth	 feels	dry,	and	 foods	do	not	 seem	 to	have	as	
much	taste	as	they	used	to	- You	often	feel	angry	or	irritated	- It	is	difficult	to	concentrate	
	
Imagine	 that	 this	 state	of	health	will	 continue	 for	 the	 rest	of	
your	life.		
	
Now	imagine	that	there	are	two	treatments	available	that	will	
return	you	back	to	good	health,	for	a	limited	number	of	years.	
One	 treatment	 is	 100%	 effective,	 but	 the	 other	 treatment	 is	
not	guaranteed	to	work.	You	can	choose	between:	
	 - A	 treatment	 which	 MIGHT	 return	 you	 to	 health	 for	 10	
years	- A	 treatment	which	will	 return	 you	 to	 health	 FOR	 SURE,	
but	for	a	fewer	number	of	years	
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Please	note:	If	you	choose	the	treatment	that	MIGHT	work,	you	
risk	the	treatment	not	working	at	all.			 Each	item	posed	the	question	“Which	would	you	prefer?”	followed	by	two	options.	 Either:	 “______	 years	 of	 better	 health	 for	 sure”	 or	 “_______%	of	 10	 years	better	health”.	For	example:	“Which	would	you	prefer?	5	years	better	health	or	90%	 chance	 of	 10	 years	 better	 health”.	 An	 example	 item	 as	 presented	 on	 the	computer	 screen	 is	 depicted	 in	 Figure	 5.1.	 Questions	 were	 presented	individually,	 in	which	participants	 used	 a	mouse	 or	 track	pad	 to	 click	 on	 their	preferred	 option	 and	 then	 click	 a	 “next”	 button	 to	 move	 on	 to	 the	 next	 item.	Options	 were	 presented	 side	 by	 side,	 and	 the	 order	 of	 the	 options	 was	randomised	for	each	item.	This	was	done	so	that	the	consistent	choosing	of	one	type	 of	 answer	 was	 not	 incorrectly	 attributed	 during	 data	 analyses	 to	 a	participant	inattentively	clicking	one	side	of	the	screen.		
	Figure	5.1.	Example	health	gains	item	as	presented	on-screen	to	participants		The	hypothetical	health	scenario	presented	for	the	losses	task	is	as	follows:	
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Imagine	that	you	have	been	diagnosed	with	an	illness	and	you	
need	 to	 undergo	 treatment.	 At	 the	 moment,	 you	 feel	 fine.	
However,	the	treatment	may	involve	temporary	side	effects:	
	 - You	will	feel	tired	and	sometimes	feel	light-headed	- You	will	have	trouble	 falling	asleep	and	sometimes	have	
nightmares	- Your	mouth	will	 feel	dry,	and	food	will	not	seem	to	have	
as	much	taste	it	used	to	- You	will	often	feel	angry	or	irritated	- It	will	be	difficult	to	concentrate	
	
Now	 imagine	 that	 there	 are	 two	 choices	 of	 treatments	
available,	which	will	both	cure	you:	
	 - A	treatment	which	MIGHT	make	you	sick	with	side	effects	
for	10	years	- A	treatment	which	will	make	you	sick	FOR	SURE,	but	for	
a	fewer	number	of	years	
	
Please	note:	If	you	choose	the	treatment	that	MIGHT	make	you	
feel	sick,	there	is	a	chance	that	you	will	not	feel	sick	at	all.			Each	item	was	posed	as	“Which	would	you	prefer?	________	years	of	feeling	sick	 for	 sure	 or	 _________%	 chance	 of	 feeling	 sick	 for	 10	 years”.	 For	 example:	“Which	would	you	prefer?	Seven	years	of	feeling	sick	for	sure	or	90%	chance	of	feeling	sick	for	10	years”.	Items	were	presented	in	the	same	manner	as	the	gains	task,	and	participants	completed	5	practice	items	for	each	task.	The	order	of	the	gains	and	losses	tasks	was	counterbalanced.	
Procedure	
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	 A	pen-and-paper	clinical	 interview	was	conducted	with	patients	prior	to	testing	 regarding	 demographic	 information,	 history	 of	 addiction	 and	 current	substance	 use.	 The	 PD	 tasks,	 IUS	 and	 BIS-11	 were	 administered	 via	SurveyMonkey	 on	 a	 MacBook	 Pro	 laptop	 with	 a	 wireless	 mouse.	 Participants	were	 asked	 if	 they	 had	 difficulty	 reading	 or	 using	 the	 computer.	 If	 so,	 the	researcher	read	aloud	each	question	and/or	operated	the	mouse.		
	
Statistical	method	The	magnitude	 of	 a	 participant’s	 discounting	was	 assessed	 in	 the	 same	way	as	in	Chapter	4.	An	indifference	point	(IP)	for	each	percentage	block	of	the	PD	 task	was	 obtained	 by	 calculating	 the	mean	 of	 the	 values	 around	which	 the	participant	“switched”	from	a	certain	to	uncertain	reward.	In	the	case	of	multiple	switch	points	within	blocks	of	percentage	values,	the	last	switch	was	considered	to	 be	 the	 participants’	 final	 decision	 and	 used	 to	 calculate	 the	 IP.	 The	 IP	corresponds	to	the	subjective	value	of	the	probabilistic	outcome	(V),	which	was	operationalized	as	number	of	years	improved	or	diminished	health.	The	absolute	value	of	the	IPs	for	each	participant	and	group	median	IPs	were	entered	into	the	hyperbolic	 discounting	 equation	 to	 calculate	 discounting	 rates	 (h)	 between	groups.	The	degree	of	discounting	was	also	measured	by	the	AUC	method.	Each	participant’s	 proportional	 subjective	 value	 was	 plotted	 as	 a	 function	 of	 odds	against	 receiving/losing	 years	 of	 health.	 Mean	 AUC	 was	 compared	 between	groups	 and	 correlated	 with	 scores	 on	 the	 IU	 and	 BIS-11.	 Moderated	 multiple	regression	 analyses	 were	 also	 conducted	 to	 further	 investigate	 differential	relationships	between	IU	and	discounting	between	participant	groups.		
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Data	management	Scores	on	the	DAS	identified	five	control	participants	who	were	ineligible	based	on	possible	drug	dependency.	Data	from	these	participants	were	included	only	 in	 correlational	 analyses.	 Exclusion	 criteria	 for	 discounting	 analyses	were	more	than	2	switch	points	in	any	block	of	questions,	or	a	pattern	of	increasing	IP	values.	 After	 participants	 were	 excluded	 according	 to	 criteria,	 there	 were	 42	control	participants	and	45	patient	participants.	The	participant	sample	sizes	of	the	 discounting	 tasks	 and	 self-report	 measures	 varied	 due	 to	 incomplete	questionnaires	or	excluded	data	on	one	discounting	task	due	to	non-systematic	responses.	The	sample	sizes	are	reported	in	the	following	analyses.		
5.3	Results	Means	 were	 obtained	 for	 demographic	 and	 clinical	 variables,	 and	independent	t-tests	were	conducted	between	groups	on	demographic	variables.	Patients	and	controls	were	similar	 in	age	and	the	gender	distribution	was	even	between	groups.		However,	the	patient	group	had	completed	significantly	fewer	years	 of	 education	 than	 the	 control	 group.	 See	 Table	 5.1	 for	 participant	demographic	and	clinical	data.								
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	Table	5.1		
Participant	demographic	and	clinical	characteristics	
	 Characteristic	 Mean	(SD)	 	 Statistic		 				Controls	 Patients	 	 	Age	 37.54	(18.42)	 41.58	(9.72)	 	 t	=	-1.20	Years	of	education	 11.51(1.34)	 10.37	(1.93)	 	 t	=	3.01*	Female	(%)	 20	(54.10)	 22	(48.90)	 	 χ2	=	0.21	DAS		 1.78	(2.68)	 ---	 	 ---	First	opioid	use	 ---	 18.53	(6.99)	 	 ---	First	regular	use	 ---	 21.91	(9.65)	 	 ---	Years	of	use	 ---	 22.76	(9.54)	 	 ---	Years	of	abuse	 ---	 19.40	(10.10)	 	 ---	Poly-drug	use	(%)	 ---	 15	(18.3%)	 	 ---	Extra-medical	use	(%)	 ---	 14	(17.1%)	 	 ---	*p	<	.05	
	
Statistical	analysis	of	probabilistic	health	gains	The	 group	median	 and	 individual	 IPs	were	 entered	 into	 the	 hyperbolic	equation	 using	 Microsoft	 Excel	 SOLVER	 Add-in	 (Brown,	 2001)	 to	 calculate	 a	discounting	factor	(h)	and	the	measure	of	fit	to	the	model	(R2).	The	control	group	had	 a	 discounting	 factor	 of	 h	 =	 2.011	 and	 a	 R2	 =	 .435.	 The	 patient	 group	demonstrated	a	discounting	value	of	h	=	2.278	and	a	R2	=	.480.	Figure	5.2	depicts	the	best-fitting	hyperbolic	model	for	control	and	patient	groups.	As	was	the	case	in	 Chapter	 4,	 neither	 group’s	 data	 fit	 the	 hyperbolic	 function	 well.	 When	individual	 data	was	 entered	 into	 the	 equation,	 47.3%	 of	 participants	 had	 a	R2	value	 that	was	 less	 than	 zero	 and	 the	 remaining	participant’s	R2	values	 ranged	between	 .194	 and	 .990.	 Subsequently,	 AUC	 analysis	 was	 used	 as	 a	 validated	
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measure	to	compare	discounting	between	groups.	As	the	AUC	method	does	not	rely	 upon	 participant	 responses	 to	 conform	 to	 a	 hyperbolic	model,	 it	 was	 not	necessary	to	exclude	participant	data	(control	n	=	32;	patient	n	=	42).			
	
	Figure	5.2.	Best	 fitting	hyperbolic	discounting	 functions	 for	probabilistic	health	gains	and	losses	between	groups	
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The	 proportional	 subjective	 values	 of	 10	 years	 improved	 health	 were	plotted	as	a	function	of	the	odds	against	its	receipt,	and	the	area	of	the	trapezoids	under	 the	 curve	 were	 summed	 to	 obtain	 the	 AUC	 for	 each	 participant.	 Initial	examination	 of	 mean	 AUC	 data	 showed	 that	 data	 was	 positively	 skewed	 and	could	 not	 be	 normalised	 through	 log	 transformation,	 necessitating	 a	 non-parametrical	 analysis.	 An	 independent-samples	 Mann-Whitney	 U	 test	 was	conducted,	which	 found	 that	median	AUC	 for	patients	 (Mdn	 =	 .34125)	was	not	statistically	significantly	lower	than	the	median	AUC	for	the	control	group	(Mdn	=	.37125;	U	=	597,	z	=	-.819,	p	=	.413).	It	appears	that	opioid-dependent	patients	and	control	participants	discounted	probabilistic	health	gains	to	similar	extents.		
Statistical	analysis	of	probabilistic	health	losses	The	 hyperbolic	 discounting	 equation	 was	 fitted	 to	 group	 medians	 and	individual	 IPs	for	the	PD	losses	task	 in	the	same	way	as	the	PD	gains	data.	The	control	 group	 showed	 a	 discounting	 value	 of	 h	 =	 1.780	 and	 a	 R2	 =	 .270.	 The	patient	 group	 demonstrated	 a	 discounting	 parameter	 of	 h	 =	 1.875,	 and	 a	R2	=	.623.	 When	 individual	 R2	 data	 was	 calculated	 for	 participants,	 41.9%	 of	participants	had	a	R2	of	less	than	zero.	As	the	participant	data	did	not	adequately	conform	to	the	hyperbolic	model,	particularly	the	controls	group’s	data,	AUC	was	used	to	compare	discounting	between	groups	(control	n	=	36;	patient	n	=	38).		 The	AUC	 for	 the	PD	 losses	 task	was	not	normally	distributed	 and	 could	not	be	corrected	for	by	transformation.	An	independent-samples	Mann-Whitney	U	 test	was	 conducted	which	 found	 that	while	 the	median	 AUC	 for	 the	 patient	group	 (Mdn	 =	 .38750)	was	 higher	 than	 the	median	 AUC	 for	 the	 control	 group	(Mdn	=	.38625),	this	difference	was	not	statistically	significant	(U	=	598,	z	=	-.93,	
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p	 =	 .352).	 It	 appears	 that	 groups	 discounted	 both	 probabilistic	 health	 losses	similarly.	
Group	comparisons	on	self-report	measures	A	 series	 of	ANCOVAs	were	 conducted	 to	 assess	differences	 in	 scores	on	the	IUS	and	BIS-11	between	groups	and	used	years	of	education	as	a	covariate.	Patients	scored	significantly	higher	on	all	measures	except	for	motor	impulsivity,	for	which	patients	and	controls	had	almost	identical	scores.	Means	and	results	of	ANCOVAs	are	found	in	Table	5.2.		Analyses	were	also	conducted	on	patient	clinical	variables.	Independent	t-tests	were	conducted	to	obtain	gender	and	patient	differences	in	discounting	and	self-report	measures.	Males	and	females	scored	similarly	on	all	measures	(all	p	>	.005),	and	poly-drug	and	non-poly-drug	using	patients	also	scored	similarly	on	all	of	 the	dependent	variables	 (all	p	>	 .200).	Extra-medical	opioid	users	 scored	higher	 on	 attentional	 impulsiveness	 (t(37)	 =	 -2.53,	 p	 =	 .016)	 and	 overall	 BIS	scores	(t(37)	=	-2.10,	p	=	.042)	compared	to	abstinent	patients.												
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Table	5.2		
Results	from	ANCOVA	comparing	mean	group	differences	in	scores	on	the	IUS	and	
BIS-11	
	Measure	 Mean	(SD)	 	 				F		 				Controls	 				Patients	 	 	IUSa	 64.35	(17.88)	 81.45	(25.45)	 	 8.34*						IUS-1	 33.46	(10.78)	 44.45	(14.88)	 	 9.59*						IUS-2	 30.89	(8.41)	 37.00	(11.32)	 	 5.61*	BIS-11	totalb	 64.46	(10.26)	 72.70	(13.04)	 	 4.86*						Attentional	 15.38	(3.35)	 18.35	(4.62)	 	 7.57*						Motor	 22.78	(4.05)	 22.95	(8.18)	 	 0.31						Non-planning	 26.30	(5.26)	 31.40	(6.26)	 	 9.39*	a	Control	n	=	37,	patient	n	=	37;	b	Control	n	=	37	,	patient	n	=	40.	*	p	<	.05		
Correlations	between	measures	Zero-order	 correlations	 were	 calculated	 between	 AUC,	 self-report	measures	 and	 opioid	 use	 variables.	 AUC	 for	 the	 gains	 task	 was	 significantly	negatively	 correlated	 with	 scores	 on	 the	 IUS	 and	 subscales,	 indicating	 that	greater	 IU	 predicted	 more	 risk-averse	 choices	 when	 making	 decisions	 about	probabilistic	health	gains.	AUC	 for	 the	 losses	 task	was	not	correlated	with	AUC	for	 the	 gains	 task,	 nor	 any	 of	 the	 self-report	measures.	 The	AUC	 for	 PD	 losses	task	did	not	correlate	meaningfully	with	any	other	measure	or	the	AUC	for	gains.	Between	 self-report	measures,	 positive	 correlations	were	 found	 between	 total	scores	on	the	IUS	and	IUS-1	with	scores	on	BIS-11,	with	the	exception	of	motor	impulsivity.	Aligning	with	previous	chapters,	the	IUS	and	IUS-1	were	significantly	positively	 correlated	 with	 overall	 BIS-11	 impulsivity	 score,	 attentional	impulsiveness	and	non-planning	impulsiveness.	Length	of	opioid	use	or	length	of	
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opioid	abuse	did	not	have	any	meaningful	correlations	with	discounting	nor	with	the	questionnaires.	The	 full	 results	 of	 the	 correlation	 analyses	 can	be	 found	 in	Table	5.3.		Table	5.3		
Zero-order	 correlations	 between	 discounting,	 self-report	 measures	 and	 clinical	
variables	
		 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8	 9	 10	 11	1.	AUCG	 ---	 -.111	 -.368**	 -.330**	 -.384**	 -.069	 -.153	 .010	 -.037	 .194	 .203	2.	AUCL	 	 ---	 -.024	 -.062	 .028	 .048	 -.001	 .091	 .012	 -.078	 .002	3.	IUS	 	 	 ---	 .968**	 .943**	 .227*	 .288*	 .030	 .225*	 .017	 .143	4.	IUS1	 	 	 	 ---	 .829**	 .312**	 .347**	 .083	 .299**	 -.038	 .069	5.	IUS2	 	 	 	 	 ---	 .093	 .181	 -.042	 .104	 .086	 .227	6.	BIS-T	 	 	 	 	 	 ---	 .769**	 .650**	 .801**	 .114	 .161	7.	ATT	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ---	 .182	 .656**	 .214	 .191	8.	MO	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ---	 .149	 .044	 .095	9.	NP	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ---	 .024	 .070	10.	LU	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ---	 .775**	11.	LA	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 ---	AUCG	=	Area	under	the	curve	gains	task,	AUCL	=	Area	under	the	curve	losses	task,	IUS	=	Intolerance	of	Uncertainty	Scale,	BIS-T	=	BIS-11	total	score,	ATT	=	Attentional	impulsiveness,	MO	=	Motor	impulsiveness,	NP	=	Non-planning	impulsiveness,	LU	=	Length	of	opioid	use,	LA	=	Length	of	opioid	abuse	*	p	<	.05,	**p	<	.001		
Moderation	analyses	Two	hierarchical	moderation	regression	analyses	were	conducted	to	test	for	 group	differences	 in	 the	 relationship	between	discounting	and	 IU.	The	 first	regression	model	 predicted	 IUS	 score	 from	 years	 of	 education,	 gains	 AUC	 and	opioid	dependency	status.	Education	was	used	as	a	variable	in	the	regression	as	
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preliminary	analyses	found	that	education	had	a	significant	negative	correlation	with	IUS	scores.		The	variables	contributed	significantly	to	the	regression	model	(F(3,63)	=	7.02,	p	<	 .001)	and	accounted	 for	21.5%	of	 the	variation	 in	 IU.	Both	opioid-dependency	 and	 AUC	 significantly	 predicted	 IU.	 The	 addition	 of	 an	addiction	 by	 AUC	 interaction	 variable	 in	 step	 2	 explained	 an	 additional	 7.6%	variation	 in	IU,	and	this	 increase	was	significant	(F(1,62)	=	7.04,	p	=	 .010).	The	complete	results	of	the	regression	analysis	can	be	found	in	Table	5.4.	Addiction	status	moderated	 the	 relationship	 between	 IU	 and	 discounting	 of	 probabilistic	health	gains.	Simple	slopes	analysis	revealed	a	significant	negative	relationship	between	IU	and	AUC	for	gains	in	the	patient	group	(b	=	-79.160,	SE	=	20.87,	p	<	.001),	but	there	was	no	meaningful	correlation	between	variables	in	the	control	group	(p	=	.801).	Figure	5.3	depicts	these	findings.			Table	5.4	
Results	from	the	hierarchical	moderation	regression	analyses	predicting	IUS	scores	
from	addiction	and	the	AUC	of	the	PD	gains	task	
	Predictor	 β	 R2	 ΔR2	 F	 ΔF	Step	1	 	 .251	 	 	7.02**	 							Education	 -.117	 	 	 	 							Group	 .314*	 	 	 	 							AUC	gain	 -.289*	 	 	 	 	Step	2	 	 .327	 .076	 	 7.04*							Education	 -.130	 	 	 	 							Group	 .906**	 	 	 	 							AUC	gain	 .041	 	 	 	 							Group	x	AUC	gain	 -.702*	 	 	 	 	*	p	<	.05,	**	p	<.001		
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The	 first	 step	 of	 the	 second	 hierarchical	 moderation	 regression	 model	was	comprised	of	education,	AUC	for	the	PD	losses	task	and	opioid-dependency	as	predictors	of	scores	on	the	IUS.	The	overall	model	was	significant	(F(3,65)	=	3.90,	p	=	.013)	and	accounted	for	15.3%	of	variance.	Opioid-dependency	was	the	only	significant	predictor	of	 IU.	The	 introduction	of	a	group	by	AUC	interaction	variable	into	step	two	failed	to	improve	the	overall	model	(p	=	 .198),	indicating	that	PD	of	health	losses	was	related	to	IU	similarly	between	groups,	and	that	this	relationship	was	non-significant	in	both	groups.		
	Figure	 5.3.	 AUC	 for	 the	 health	 gains	 task	 as	 a	 function	 of	 IUS	 scores	 between	groups.					
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5.4	Discussion	This	 is	 the	 first	 study	 to	 investigate	 the	 way	 in	 which	 uncertainty	influences	 risky	 health-related	 behaviour	 in	 opioid-dependent	 individuals	compared	 to	 healthy	 controls,	 and	 whether	 risk-taking	 may	 be	 influenced	 by	attitudes	 about	 uncertainty.	 Opioid	 patients	 tended	 to	 make	 more	 risk-averse	decisions	 when	 deciding	 between	 probabilistic	 health	 gains	 than	 controls,	however	the	difference	in	the	AUC	between	the	groups	did	not	reach	statistical	significance.	It	appears	that	opioid-dependent	participants	and	non-drug	abusing	individuals	may	discount	probabilistic	health	improvements	similarly.	Likewise,	patients	discounted	health	losses	more	than	controls,	but	this	difference	also	did	not	pass	the	threshold	of	statistical	significance.	The	similar	discounting	rates	of	health	outcomes	supports	the	only	other	existing	study	of	PD	of	health	losses	in	the	 context	 of	 addiction,	 which	 found	 that	 the	 probability	 of	 contracting	 an	sexually	 transmitted	 infection	 was	 not	 discounted	 differently	 between	 those	with	a	cocaine	use	disorder	and	non-users	(Johnson	et	al.,	2015).	While	it	would	reasonable	 to	expect	 that	patients	would	have	a	different	risk	attitude	towards	health	 outcomes	 compared	 to	 controls,	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 the	 health	 scenarios	employed	by	the	current	study	are	not	generalisable	to	health	related	behaviour	outside	of	 the	 laboratory.	Alternatively,	 these	 results	provide	 indirect	evidence	for	a	domain	effect,	as	has	been	witnessed	in	a	number	of	DD	studies	(Baker	et	al.,	 2003;	 Chapman	 &	 Elstein,	 1995;	 Lazaro	 et	 al.,	 2002;	 Petry,	 2003).	Furthermore,	PD	may	not	reflect	risky	decision	making	in	the	health	domain.		Because	inquiry	of	PD	of	health	outcomes	is	very	limited,	we	need	to	turn	to	the	DD	paradigm	to	interpret	the	lack	of	significant	differences	in	the	current	study.	 Research	 using	 DD	 tasks	 offer	 evidence	 that	 discounting	 hypothetical	
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health	 scenarios	 in	 a	 research	 environment	does	not	 necessarily	 translate	 into	real-life	 health	 behaviours.	 For	 example,	 only	 a	 weak	 relationship	 has	 been	observed	between	DD	of	hypothetical	health	outcomes	and	opting	for	a	free	flu	vaccination	(Chapman	et	al.,	2001;	Chapman	&	Coups,	1999).	However,	receiving	the	 vaccination	 was	 associated	with	 a	 greater	 willingness	 to	 wait	 for	 a	 better	health	 outcome).	 Research	 has	 shown	 that	 discounting	 of	 delayed	 health	outcomes	 are	 not	 predictive	 of	 daily	 exercise	 habits	 or	medication	 compliance	(Chapman,	 1998;	 Chapman	 et	 al.,	 2001).	 As	 the	 present	 chapter	 is	 the	 first	 to	investigate	PD	of	general	health	outcomes	in	the	context	of	addiction,	much	more	enquiry	is	needed	on	the	topic	in	order	to	make	more	definitive	conclusions.	The	 current	 study	 also	 observed	 a	 negative	 correlation	 between	 PD	 of	health	gains	and	scores	on	the	IUS,	in	that	greater	IU	predicted	a	preference	for	more	 certain	 health	 improvements.	 This	 is	 interesting	 given	 the	 lack	 of	correlations	 between	 IU	 and	 PD	 of	 monetary	 gains	 in	 Chapter	 4.	 IU	 is	characterised	 by	 tendencies	 to	 view	 uncertainty	 as	 aversive,	 and	 perhaps	 a	health	 scenario	 conveys	 more	 emotional	 weight	 than	 a	 situation	 involving	hypothetical	money.	 A	 significant	 relationship	 between	 IU	 and	 health	was	 not	observed	 in	 PD	 for	 losses,	 which	 limits	 our	 interpretations	 because	 illness	 is	arguably	 more	 threatening	 than	 the	 lack	 of	 a	 health	 improvement	 (i.e.	 a	punishment	 versus	 a	 non-reward).	 The	 results	 may	 also	 be	 an	 artefact	 of	 the	health	 scenarios	 used,	 in	 that	 health	 detriments	 occurred	 in	 the	 course	 of	 a	medical	 treatment.	 Perhaps	 the	 certainty	 of	 alleviating	 aversive	 symptoms	 are	more	valuable	than	the	certainty	of	avoiding	side-effects	during	a	treatment	that	will	ultimately	make	a	person	healthy	again.	An	alternative	explanation	may	be	that	the	health	scenarios	involved	“cold”	health	behaviours,	which	are	deliberate	
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and	made	in	a	relatively	unemotional	state,	as	compared	to	health	decisions	that	occur	 in	 a	 “hot”,	 goal-driven	 state	 (Chapman,	 2005).	 There	 is	 evidence	 that	discounting	applies	primarily	 to	hot	health	behaviours,	which	 tend	 to	be	made	impulsively	(i.e.	drug-taking),	and	not	to	cold	health	behaviours	(i.e.	preventative	health	 measures),	 which	 are	 more	 carefully	 considered	 (Chapman,	 2005).	 In	regards	 to	 the	 PD	 paradigm	 utilised	 in	 the	 current	 chapter,	 it	 may	 be	 that	decisions	 about	 cold	 health	 behaviours	 are	 not	 particularly	 indicative	 of	 risk	taking,	which	may	account	 for	 the	absence	of	correlations	between	PD	and	 the	BIS-11,	or	the	similarities	of	PD	between	participant	groups.			When	 group	 differences	 were	 analysed,	 this	 correlation	 was	 only	significant	 in	 the	patient	group	and	 indicated	 that	 IU	may	have	biased	patients	towards	 assured	 health	 gains.	 IU	was	 not	 related	 to	 control	 participants’	 risk-taking.	Aligning	with	the	results	of	the	previous	chapters	in	the	thesis,	the	results	of	 the	 current	 study	 support	 a	 relationship	between	 IU	 and	 impulsivity	 that	 is	limited	 to	 opioid-dependent	 patients.	 However,	 the	 correlation	 for	 health	outcomes	is	 in	the	opposite	direction	as	would	be	expected	given	the	results	of	the	previous	chapters.	It	appears	that	as	IU	increases	in	patients,	the	more	risk-averse	they	are	when	making	decisions	about	health	gains.	IU	may	promote	risk-averse	 choices	 in	 patients	 for	 the	 health	 scenario	 used	 in	 the	 current	 study	because	of	past	experiences	of	withdrawal.	Negative	attitudes	about	uncertainty	may	compound	the	effect	that	uncertainty	has	on	health	choices	in	patients	and	increase	 the	 tendency	 to	 rely	on	 the	 certainty	of	 the	 “health	 improvements”	of	drugs	 rather	 than	 risk	 withdrawal	 and	 negative	 affect	 for	 the	 benefits	 of	abstinence.	 Interestingly,	 there	 were	 no	 relationships	 found	 in	 either	 group	between	IU	and	PD	of	health	losses.	One	explanation	may	be	that	the	health	loss	
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scenario	was	 framed	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 treatment	 that	would	 ultimately	 result	 in	 a	positive	 outcome,	 which	 may	 not	 be	 a	 strong	 analogue	 to	 the	 health	 losses	incurred	by	drug	use,	as	there	is	no	long-term	health	benefit	from	chronic	drug	use.		 Almost	half	of	the	participants	did	not	fit	the	discounting	equation,	which	hints	at	the	motivational	factors	driving	health	choices	that	are	not	accounted	for	by	the	hyperbolic	model.	Story,	Vlaev,	Seymour,	Darzi,	and	Dolan	(2014)	propose	a	 theoretical	model	of	unhealthy	behaviour	 that	posits	 that	DD	can	account	 for	the	 initiation	of	goal-directed	behaviours,	but	ultimately	associative	 learning	 is	responsible	 for	cementing	health	behaviours	 into	habits.	Unhealthy	behaviours	tend	 to	 be	 stable	 even	 if	 one	 changes	 the	 health	 goal.	 For	 example,	 a	 habit	 of	eating	 unhealthy	 food	 will	 persist	 beyond	 the	 immediate	 goal-change	 to	 lose	weight,	and	this	behaviour	does	not	fit	the	hyperbolic	discounting	model	(Story	et	 al.,	 2014).	 Furthermore,	 environmental	 factors	 influence	 unhealthy	 choices,	such	as	stress	or	drug-related	cues	(Fields,	Ramos,	&	Reynolds,	2015;	Story	et	al.,	2014),	 which	 also	 cannot	 be	 accounted	 for	 by	 a	 discounting	 equation.	 The	influence	of	cues	on	behaviour	is	particularly	applicable	to	laboratory	research,	which	is	purposely	conducted	without	extraneous	environmental	variables.	The	poor	fit	of	the	current	study’s	data	to	the	hyperbolic	model	adds	support	to	the	notion	 that	 the	discounting	paradigm	may	not	be	an	accurate	measure	of	 risky	health	choices.		The	 relationship	 between	 IU	 and	 PD	 of	 health	 outcomes	 in	 the	 patient	group	 contrasts	 with	 the	 findings	 of	 the	 previous	 study	 in	 which	 correlations	were	found	with	monetary	losses	but	not	monetary	gains.	It	is	apparent	that	IU	relates	uniquely	to	PD	in	the	health	domain	compared	to	the	monetary	domain.	
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This	 is	 important	because	greater	 levels	of	 IU	have	shown	to	be	related	 to	 low	levels	of	perceived	self-control	and	less	use	of	adaptive	coping	strategies	in	the	face	 of	 a	 serious	 health	 concern	 (Taha	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Taking	 into	 consideration	negative	 attitudes	 about	 uncertainty	 could	 be	 important	 when	 assisting	 drug	addicted	 individuals	 to	 make	 positive	 health	 changes,	 such	 as	 using	 sterile	needles	or	initiating	rehabilitation.		The	different	relationships	between	PD	of	monetary	outcomes	in	Chapter	4	 and	 PD	 of	 health	 outcomes	 observed	 in	 Chapter	 5	 imply	 that	 the	 results	 of	Chapter	 4	 are	 not	 generalisable	 to	 real-world	 drug	 taking	 behaviour.	 It	 is	 also	possible	 that	 there	 are	 other	 unaccounted	 for	 variables	 impacting	 decision-making	such	as	one’s	financial	situation	in	Chapter	4	and	current	illness	for	the	present	 chapter.	While	 the	 study	did	not	 assess	health	 status	 in	participants,	 a	report	 of	 drug	 injecting	 residents	 in	 the	 wider	 Sydney	 community	 found	 that	70%	tested	positive	for	hepatitis	C,	24%	for	hepatitis	B,	and	7%	for	HIV	(Rutter,	Dolan,	 &	 Wodak,	 1996).	 More	 recently,	 69%	 of	 intraveneous	 drug	 users	 in	Australian	 capital	 cities	 reported	 a	 diagnosis	 of	 Hepatitis	 C	 (Butler	 &	 Burns,	2015).	While	 these	 illnesses	were	not	 accounted	 for	 in	 the	 current	 study,	 they	could	have	impacted	the	responding	of	patients,	although	we	would	expect	that	poorer	health	status	in	patients	would	influence	their	decisions	in	a	way	that	was	notably	 different	 than	 healthier	 controls.	 IU	 seemed	 to	 impact	 decisions	 about	health	 gains	 in	 the	 patient	 group,	 suggesting	 that	 current	 ill	 health	may	make	assured	health	improvements	more	appealing,	particularly	improvements	from	a	current	 illness.	Anecdotally,	a	number	of	patients	remarked	during	 testing	 that	they	could	relate	to	the	symptoms	described	in	the	health	scenarios	in	the	past	and/or	 present	 time.	 It	 may	 be	 that	 the	 poorer	 overall	 health	 of	 patient	
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participants	 who	 also	 had	 high	 IU	 influenced	 their	 desire	 for	 certain	 health	improvements	 because	 of	 a	 greater	 subjective	 value	 of	 even	modest	 symptom	relief.		 				
Limitations	The	 motivations	 underlying	 drug	 taking	 and	 drug	 addiction	 are	exceptionally	complex	and	there	are	a	myriad	of	variables	that	influence	whether	to	 abstain	 or	 continue	 using	 harmful	 substances.	 Therefore,	 the	 results	 of	 the	current	 study	 need	 to	 be	 interpreted	 taking	 into	 account	 a	 number	 of	considerations.	 	 While	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 current	 study	 was	 to	 assess	 PD	 of	general	health	outcomes	which	are	relevant	to	drug	taking,	the	scenarios	utilised	may	 not	 have	 been	 adequately	 applicable	 to	 everyday	 life.	 For	 example,	Herrmann	 et	 al.	 (2014)	 found	 that	 opioid-dependent	 women	 show	 increased	discounting	of	delayed	condom	use,	which	is	a	situation	that	is	more	likely	to	be	encountered	 in	 real	 life	 than	 the	 hypothetical	 medical	 scenarios	 used	 in	 the	current	 study.	 The	 tasks	 also	 involved	 a	 temporal	 element	 that	 could	 have	impacted	 the	 results.	 The	 number	 of	 years	 of	 feeling	 better	 (or	 feeling	worse)	involves	a	delay	of	the	recurrence	of	a	better	or	poorer	state	of	health.			 			 	
		
	 141	
Chapter	6:	General	discussion	
	The	 subject	 of	 addiction	 is	 highly	 complex	 and	 encompasses	 an	 array	 of	interconnected	 attributes	 and	processes.	 The	present	 thesis	 contributes	 to	 our	understanding	 of	 opioid-dependency	 from	 a	 cognitive	 and	 behavioural	perspective.	 The	 particular	 focus	 was	 the	 relationship	 between	 intolerance	 of	uncertainty	 and	 different	 facets	 of	 impulsivity	 that	 contribute	 heavily	 to	 the	maladaptive	decisions	 that	 are	hallmark	of	drug	abuse.	The	 thesis	 investigated	impulsive	 decisions	 made	 primarily	 under	 uncertainty,	 as	 IU	 was	 expected	 to	have	a	particular	impact	on	these	types	of	choices.		The	primary	research	questions	were	as	follows:		1.	 Do	 opioid-dependent	 individuals	 have	 different	 reactions	 to	 uncertainty	compared	to	non-drug	abusing	individuals?		2.	How	do	impulsive	personality	traits	and	behaviours	correlate	with	intolerance	of	uncertainty?				3.	 Does	 intolerance	 of	 uncertainty	 relate	 to	 impulsive	 traits	 and	 behaviours	differently	in	opioid-dependent	individuals	compared	to	the	general	population?					
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6.1	Synthesis	of	research	results	Some	of	the	research	questions	asked	in	the	thesis	can	be	answered	more	definitively	 than	 others.	 Opioid-dependent	 individuals	 undergoing	 medication	maintenance	therapy	consistently	reported	strong	negative	beliefs	and	reactions	towards	 uncertainty	 across	 all	 the	 studies	 presented	 here,	 which	 provide	 the	evidence	required	to	answer	the	first	research	question	affirmatively.	While	the	exact	causes	of	this	finding	are	unclear,	there	are	many	possibilities	that	warrant	further	investigation.	Those	with	high	IU	express	a	great	desire	for	predictability	and	report	an	impaired	ability	to	effectively	resolve	uncertainty	(Carleton	et	al.,	2007).	The	“paralysis”	experienced	 in	 the	 face	of	uncertainty	may	motivate	 the	individual	 to	 resort	 to	other	 coping	 strategies,	 such	as	drug	use,	 to	 resolve	 the	anxiety	 and	 distress	 that	 inevitably	 arises	 from	 uncertainty	 in	 the	 daily	environment.	Uncertainty	about	one’s	ability	to	cope	with	distress	is	an	inherent	factor	 in	 IU	 (Buhr	 &	 Dugas,	 2002),	 which	 can	 further	 contribute	 to	 using	maladaptive	methods	to	manage	stress.		Cognitive	processing	of	uncertainty	shares	a	number	of	neural	correlates	with	 addiction,	 such	 as	 the	 dopaminergic	 reward	 system,	 which	 is	 activated	when	 faced	 with	 unexpected	 rewards	 (Fiorillo	 et	 al.,	 2003).	 Additionally,	 the	striatum	 is	 a	 dopaminergic	 structure	 partly	 responsible	 for	 coding	 stimulus	salience,	 which	 is	 activated	 in	 response	 to	 uncertainty	 (Aron	 et	 al.,	 2004).	Accordingly,	 uncertainty	 may	 be	 more	 aversive	 to	 those	 with	 drug-related	dysfunction	 in	 dopamine	 function.	 Abnormal	 striatal	 activity	may	 increase	 the	salience	 of	 uncertain	 stimuli	 (Leland	 et	 al.,	 2006),	 and	 given	 uncertainty’s	general	 undesirability,	 heighted	 salience	 in	 drug	 users	 may	 augment	 their	aversion	to	uncertainty.	
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IU	may	be	a	personality	factor	that	increases	one’s	risk	for	drug	addiction,	or	it	may	result	from	neurobiological	and/or	environmental	detriments	resulting	from	 chronic	 drug	 use.	 For	 example,	 drug	 addiction	 may	 increase	 the	unpredictability	of	one’s	situation	and	produce	associations	between	uncertainty	and	adversity.	For	example,	the	amount	of	time	allotted	to	achieving	drug	related	goals	 eventually	 overtakes	 the	 time	 necessary	 to	maintain	 steady	 employment	and	a	consistent	stream	of	income	to	buy	life’s	necessities	(American	Psychiatric	Association.,	2013;	Piazza	&	Deroche-Gamonet,	2013).	Alienation	from	non-drug	peer	groups	is	also	a	diagnosis	factor	for	severe	SUD,	and	damaged	relationships	with	 friends	and	family	erode	support	systems	on	which	one	can	rely	upon	for	stability.	 As	 a	 result,	 uncertainty	 may	 appear	 more	 threatening	 and	 be	 less	tolerable	 for	 substance	 abusers.	 IU	 is	 thought	 to	 be	 a	 stable	 dispositional	characteristic	(Carleton	et	al.,	2007;	Freeston	et	al.,	1994),	and	chronic	drug	use	may	 cause	 long	 lasting	 changes	 in	 brain	 circuitry	 responsible	 for	 processing	uncertainty	and	managing	reactions	to	threat.	Compounded	with	pre-existing	IU,	it	is	plausible	that	IU	is	both	a	risk	factor	for	addiction	as	well	as	a	contributor	to	a	 vicious	 drug-taking	 cycle.	 It	 is	 outside	 of	 the	 scope	 of	 the	 current	 thesis	 to	determine	 a	 causal	 role	 that	 IU	 may	 play	 in	 drug	 addiction,	 but	 future	longitudinal	studies	can	provide	more	definitive	answers.		The	study	presented	 in	Chapter	2	was	 the	very	 first	 to	address	 the	way	that	 impulsivity	 and	 IU	 interact	 in	 opioid-addicted	 individuals,	 and	 provided	preliminary	 evidence	 for	 an	 inverse	 relationship	 to	 non-drug	 abusers.	 As	discussed	 in	 Chapter	 1,	 research	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 IU	 is	 associated	 with	greater	 deliberation,	 need	 for	 more	 information	 before	 making	 decisions	(Ladouceur	et	al.,	1997;	Thibodeau	et	al.,	2013)	and	more	risk	averse	behaviours	
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(Carleton	et	al.,	2016).	 IU	 is	also	a	key	 factor	 in	 the	development	of	worry	and	GAD,	and	IU	is	connected	to	both	clinical	and	sub-clinical	anxiety	(Barlow	et	al.,	2014).	 Individuals	 with	 greater	 anxiety	 demonstrate	 risk-aversion	 and	behavioural	 inhibition	 (Pittig	 et	 al.,	 2018),	which	 supports	 an	 expectation	 that	high	 levels	 of	 IU	would	 create	 a	 bias	 against	 impulsive	decisions	 and	motivate	more	deliberation	in	uncertain	scenarios.		However,	Chapter	2	found	that	IU	was	predictive	 of	 multiple	 impulsive	 traits	 such	 as	 acting	 quickly	 without	forethought,	 attentional	 control	 and	 myopia	 for	 the	 future.	 Furthermore,	attentional	 impulsivity	 was	 the	 strongest	 predicting	 factor	 of	 IU	 after	 anxiety	was	accounted	for,	suggesting	that	difficulty	controlling	one’s	attention	or	focus	may	be	a	key	 feature	of	 IU.	Most	 importantly,	positive	correlations	between	 IU	and	impulsivity	were	only	observed	in	opioid-dependent	patients	when	analysed	separately	from	control	participants.		Similar	results	are	reported	in	subsequent	chapters	of	the	current	thesis,	in	 which	 unique	 correlations	 between	 IU	 and	 risk	 taking	 were	 observed	 in	opioid-dependent	 patients	 but	 were	 non-existent	 in	 controls.	 	 	 Perhaps	 the	combination	 of	 impulsiveness	 and	 low	 tolerance	 of	 uncertainty	 has	 a	multiplicative	effect	on	the	inclination	to	engage	in	addictive	behaviours.		It	may	be	 that	 individuals	 with	 poor	 impulse	 control	 who	 also	 experience	 regular	distress	 in	 response	 to	 uncertainty	may	 be	 prone	 to	 using	maladaptive	 coping	methods	 without	 fully	 considering	 their	 ultimate	 effectiveness	 or	 long-term	consequences.	Indeed,	IU	has	been	linked	to	using	alcohol	as	a	coping	method	to	deal	with	stress	and	negative	affect	(Kraemer	et	al.,	2015;	Oglesby	et	al.,	2015),	and	 opioid	 users	 tend	 to	 use	 the	 drug	 to	 disassociate	 from	worry	 and	 anxiety	(Spotts	 &	 Shontz,	 1980).	 There	 is	 also	 evidence	 supporting	 a	 link	 between	
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striatal	dopaminergic	activity	and	impulsivity	in	the	context	of	substance	abuse.	A	study	conducted	by	Leland	et	al.	 (2006)	found	that	stimulant	users	exhibited	heightened	 striatal	 activation	 while	 making	 decisions	 with	 high	 degrees	 of	uncertainty	 compared	 to	 drug	 naïve	 controls.	 Furthermore,	 greater	 striatal	responding	 was	 associated	 with	 self-reported	 impulsivity	 on	 the	 BIS-11.	 The	interchange	between	dopaminergic	circuits	and	uncertainty	may	acount	for	the	positive	correlation	between	self-reported	 impulsivity	and	 IU	demonstrated	by	opioid-dependent	participants.		Chapter	2	provides	preliminary	evidence	that	IU	may	 impact	 impulsivity	 (or	 vice	 versa)	 differently	 in	 opioid-dependent	individuals	compared	to	 the	general	population,	and	that	 this	relationship	 is	 in	the	opposite	direction	as	would	be	expected	from	non-drug	abusing	individuals.	The	subsequent	chapters	of	the	thesis	further	explored	the	relationship	between	impulsivity	and	IU	via	behavioural	measures.	Drug	abusers	appear	to	be	highly	sensitive	to	the	rewards	of	the	drug	and	relatively	impervious	to	the	possibility	of	immense	harm.	Chapter	3	is	the	first	to	examine	how	 IU	 relates	 to	 the	 ability	 to	 learn	 from	probabilistic	 feedback	 and	adaptive	 behaviour	 modification	 following	 uncertain	 feedback.	 Chapter	 3	expanded	 upon	 the	 study	 conducted	 by	 Myers	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 by	 correlating	reward	 and	 punishment	 sensitivity	with	 IU,	 as	well	 as	with	 feedback	 learning	performance.	Our	results	replicated	those	of	Myers	et	al.	(2016),	in	that	patients	did	not	 exhibit	differences	 in	 learning	performance	 compared	 to	 controls.	This	contrasts	with	other	research	supporting	impaired	reward	leaning	in	individuals	with	 dopamine	 dysfunction	 or	 cocaine	 dependency	 (Frank	 et	 al.,	 2007;	Strickland,	 Beckmann,	 Rush,	 &	 Stoops,	 2017;	 Vadhan	 et	 al.,	 2014;	Waltz	 et	 al.,	2007).	 Opioid-dependent	 patients	 exhibited	 more	 sensitivity	 to	 punishing	
		
	 146	
feedback,	 in	 that	 they	 tended	 to	 alter	 their	 responses	 after	 negative	 feedback.	Unlike	 previous	 work	 showing	 that	 drug	 using	 individuals	 have	 diminished	sensitivity	 to	punishments	(Balconi	et	al.,	2014;	Brevers	et	al.,	2014;	Yan	et	al.,	2014),	 our	 results	 also	 do	 not	 appear	 to	 align	with	 the	 persistence	 of	 harmful	drug	 taking	 behaviours.	 However,	 when	 our	 results	 are	 construed	 in	 another	way,	 increased	 lose-shift	 responses	may	 reflect	 impulsive	 decisions	 elicited	 by	punishing	 feedback.	 This	 interpretation	 does	 align	 with	 relapses	 triggered	 by	stress	and	may	also	explain	why	some	addicts	resume	drug	taking	on	a	regular	basis.		Our	results	also	support	those	of	Ersche	et	al.	(2005),	which	revealed	that	experiencing	 a	 loss	 generated	 risky	 decisions	 in	methadone-maintained	 opioid	users,	but	not	current	heroin	users,	amphetamine	users,	ex-drug	users	or	drug	naïve	 controls.	 It	 may	 be	 that	 opioid	 medication	 maintained	 patients	 are	uniquely	hypersensitive	 to	punishments	 compared	 to	other	drug	users,	or	 that	there	 is	 an	 effect	 of	 current	 opioid-medication	 that	 affects	 impulsive	 decision-making.	 Chapter	 3	 also	 found	 that	 the	 tendency	 to	modify	 response	 strategies	after	 receiving	 a	 punishment	 ultimately	 predicts	 sub-optimal	 decisions	 when	learning	from	negative	feedback.	In	other	words,	impulsive	reactions	to	negative	feedback	can	interfere	with	adaptive	decision	making	when	an	overall	rewarding	pattern	of	behaviour	is	deserted.		There	are	neural	correlates	between	the	medial	prefrontal	cortex	(mPFC)	and	the	patient	group’s	increased	punishment	sensitivity	observed	in	Chapter	3.	The	 mPFC	 is	 involved	 in	 reward	 processing,	 error	 monitoring,	 and	 decision	making	 under	 risk	 and	 uncertainty,	 and	 the	 mPFC	 can	 dynamically	 modify	behaviour	 in	 response	 to	 changes	 in	 the	 environment,	 motivations	 or	 goals	(Venkatraman	&	Huettel,	2012).	The	mPFC	also	has	shown	to	process	a	variety	of	
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drug	 and	 non-drug-related	 stimuli	 such	 as	 cocaine	 and	 money	 (Breiter	 et	 al.,	1997;	 Delgado,	 Nystrom,	 Fissell,	 Noll,	 &	 Fiez,	 2000;	 Elliott,	 Newman,	 Longe,	 &	Deakin,	 2003).	 Seeing	 as	 the	 mPFC	 is	 involved	 in	 changing	 behaviour	 in	accordance	with	success	and	failures	of	a	given	action	(Matsumoto	et	al.,	2007),	mPFC	 dysfunction	 may	 underpin	 the	 maladaptive	 choices	 made	 by	 opioid-dependent	patients	in	response	to	negative	feedback.	Dopamine	and	serotonin	in	the	 basal	 ganglia	 have	 also	 been	 correlated	 to	 heightened	 sensitivity	 to	punishment	in	Parkinson’s	patients	(Balasubramani,	Chakravarthy,	Ravindran,	&	Moustafa,	 2014).	 Dopamine	 in	 the	 basal	 ganglia	 signals	 a	 difference	 between	expected	 and	 actual	 rewards	 (i.e.	 prediction	 error),	 and	 the	 basal	 ganglia	computes	 the	 value	 of	 the	 expected	 future	 reward	 (Haber	 &	 Behrens,	 2014).	Impaired	ability	to	predict	expected	rewards	may	impede	sticking	with	optimal	response	strategies	after	receiving	inconsistent	feedback.			It	appears	that	opioid-dependent	individuals	are	more	likely	to	respond	impulsively	 following	 negative	 feedback,	 which	 may	 aid	 our	 understanding	 of	drug	 relapse	 after	 successful	 rehabilitation.	 During	 abstinence	 or	 opioid-maintenance	therapy,	the	avoidance	of	physiological	symptoms	of	withdrawal	is	no	longer	a	motivating	factor	for	drug,	yet	craving	and	drug-seeking	still	occurs	(Devos,	Vanwilgenburg,	Vandenbrink,	Kaplan,	&	Devries,	1996),	which	is	why	it	is	of	great	interest	to	understand	why	many	individuals	experience	a	relapse	or	why	a	proportion	resume	drug	abuse.	There	are	multiple	 lines	of	evidence	that	experiencing	a	negative	or	stressful	event	can	trigger	relapse	(Sinha,	2001),	 for	which	 opioid-dependent	 patients	 undergoing	 treatment	 may	 be	 particularly	sensitive	 to	 (Bentzley	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 Failure	 to	 use	 adaptive	 coping	methods	 to	maintain	 abstinence,	 such	 as	 using	 exercise	 as	 distraction	 or	 avoiding	 drug-
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related	 situations,	 has	 been	 associated	 with	 relapse	 after	 completing	rehabilitation	(Gossop	et	al.,	2002).	A	reactive	sensitivity	to	negative	events	may	increase	 the	 chances	 that	 opioid-dependent	 patients	 will	 abandon	 abstinence,	despite	the	long-term	benefits.		The	relationship	between	IU	and	feedback	sensitivity	was	also	explored	in	Chapter	 3.	 Those	 with	 high	 IU	 were	 more	 likely	 to	 repeat	 winning	 responses	rather	than	explore	other	options,	which	corroborates	the	findings	of	Radell	et	al.	(2016),	and	seems	to	support	the	desire	for	predictability	and	an	aversion	to	the	unknown	 characteristic	 of	 IU.	 However,	 our	 results	 diverge	 from	 those	 of	Chapter	2	in	that	IU	predicted	more	cautious,	win-stay	responses	associated	with	optimal	 choices	 and	 overall	 better	 learning	 performance.	 IU	 may	 bias	 one	towards	 exploiting	 previously	 rewarded	 actions,	 rather	 than	 encourage	exploration	of	uncertain	alternatives,	 and	 this	bias	may	 improve	 learning	 from	feedback.	 IU	was	also	 linked	 to	optimal	punishment	 choices,	 and	 it	 is	probable	that	IU	facilitates	learning	from	negative	feedback,	due	to	increased	attention	to	potential	threats.	The	findings	of	Chapter	3	compliment	the	findings	of	Chapter	2	in	 that	 opioid-dependent	 patients	 exhibited	 more	 impulsive	 reactions	 and	reported	higher	levels	of	IU	than	the	control	group.	However,	regression	analysis	found	 that	 IU	 did	 not	 significantly	 predict	 impulsive	 responses	 differently	 in	opioid-dependent	patients	compared	to	control	participants.		Chapter	 3	 adds	 to	 our	 knowledge	 of	 how	 opioid-dependent	 individuals	react	to	and	learn	from	feedback,	but	we	were	unable	to	confirm	that	impulsive	reactions	 to	 probabilistic	 punishments	 (i.e.	 uncertain	 negative	 feedback)	 are	associated	with	 IU.	Our	 results	 indicate	 that	while	 IU	 is	 linked	 to	 self-reported	attentional	 impulsivity	 in	 opioid-dependent	 individuals,	 there	 may	 be	 no	
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meaningful	 connection	 between	 IU	 and	 impulsivity	 as	 assessed	 by	 the	probabilistic	feedback	learning	task.		Chapter	 4	 reported	 the	 first	 study	 to	 assess	 risk	 taking	 in	 opioid-dependent	individuals	using	the	PD	paradigm,	and	the	first	study	to	compare	PD	of	gains	with	PD	of	 losses	 in	 the	context	of	 illicit	 substance	abuse.	Chapter	4	 is	also	 the	 first	 to	 examine	 a	 relationship	 between	 risk	 taking	 and	 IU	 in	 opioid-dependency.	 We	 found	 that	 when	 considering	 probabilistic	 rewards,	 patients	preferred	certain,	smaller	monetary	gains	more	so	than	control	participants,	and	that	 the	 discounting	 of	 uncertain,	 larger	 gains	 is	 a	 suboptimal	 strategy	 to	maximise	 monetary	 gains	 in	 the	 long	 run.	 While	 Chapter	 3	 and	 Chapter	 4	examined	 different	 facets	 of	 impulsive	 decision-making,	 it	 is	 interesting	 that	uncertain	 rewards	 appeared	 to	 differentially	 impact	 patients	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 but	not	 Chapter	 3	 in	 which	 patients	 and	 controls	 modified	 their	 behaviour	 in	response	 to	 rewards	 similarly.	Risk	 taking	and	 reward	 sensitivity	 are	 arguably	different	 constructs	 that	 reflect	 different	 cognitive	 processes,	 and	 the	 current	thesis	 illustrates	how	all	elements	of	 impulsive	decision	making	may	not	relate	to	addiction	analogously.		The	 higher	 level	 of	 discounting	 demonstrated	 by	 patients	 may	 explain	why	 the	objectively	positive	outcomes	of	abstinence	are	eschewed	 in	 favour	of	chronic	drug	use.	It	 is	possible	that	the	certainty	of	the	drug’s	desired	effects	is	more	 appealing	 compared	 to	 the	 relative	 uncertainty	 of	 other	 non-drug	alternatives.	 This	 explanation	 is	 fairly	 simplistic	 on	 its	 own,	 given	 the	neurobiological	 and	 conditioned	 learning	 factors	 that	 make	 addictive	 drugs	highly	 appetitive	 and	 subjectively	 more	 valuable	 than	 natural	 reinforcers	(Volkow	et	al.,	2003).	Furthermore,	 there	are	differences	 in	the	 immediacy	and	
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effort	involved	in	drug	taking	compared	to	initiating	and	maintaining	abstinence.	Reaping	 the	 long-term	 rewards	 of	 abstinence	 takes	 a	 great	 deal	 of	 effort	 and	time,	which	 are	 two	 factors	 that	 undoubtedly	 influence	 the	 decisions	 involved	addictive	 behaviours.	 It	 has	 been	 well	 established	 that	 the	 immediacy	 of	 a	reward	 is	 greatly	 desired	 by	 drug	 abusers	 (Mackillop	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 The	 highly	aversive	symptoms	of	opioid	withdrawal	must	also	be	taken	into	account,	as	the	desire	 to	avoid	withdrawal	may	become	the	primary	motivation	 for	continuing	opioid	use	(Koob	&	Le	Moal,	1997).	However,	the	role	of	the	individual	in	the	path	to	drug	addiction	cannot	be	overstated	and	certainly	has	bearing	on	drug	taking	in	all	stages	of	use,	addiction	and	 recovery.	 The	 striatum	 has	 shown	 activation	 during	 risky	 choices	 about	rewards	 (Paulus,	 Rogalsky,	 Simmons,	 Feinstein,	&	 Stein,	 2003)	 suggesting	 that	the	patient	participants	in	Chapter	4	may	have	viewed	uncertain	reward	as	more	salient,	 more	 distressing,	 and	 therefore	 opted	 for	 more	 certain	 rewards.	Dysfunction	in	the	OFC	may	account	for	the	differential	PD	rates	observed	in	the	present	 thesis	 between	 opioid-dependent	 patients	 and	 healthy	 controls.	Uncertainty	 about	 outcomes	 is	 encoded	 in	 the	 OFC	 in	 probabilistic	 task	paradigms	 (Huettel,	 Song,	 &	 McCarthy,	 2005;	 O’Neill	 &	 Schultz,	 2010;	 Stern,	Gonzalez,	 Welsh,	 &	 Taylor,	 2010),	 and	 abnormalities	 in	 the	 OFC	 may	 reduce	sensitivity	to	risk	and	ambiguity	(Hsu	et	al.,	2005).	Dampened	activity	in	the	OFC	has	 been	 linked	 to	 substance	 dependency	 (London,	 Ernst,	 Grant,	 Bonson,	 &	Weinstein,	2000),	and	reduction	 in	OFC	matter	has	been	observed	 in	abstinent	drug	users	(Tanabe	et	al.,	2009),	suggesting	either	lasting	damage	after	chronic	drug	 use	 or	 a	 pre-existing	 deficit	 in	 OFC	 functioning.	 Decision-making	 in	 risk	scenarios	 also	 involves	 the	 integration	 of	 emotional	 responses	 with	 rational	
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responses,	 which	 is	 regulated	 by	 the	 cognitive	 control	 exerted	 by	 mPFC	(Venkatraman	&	Huettel,	2012).		When	 considering	 probabilistic	 losses,	 patients	 tended	 to	 take	 chances	with	 more	 unfavourable	 odds	 than	 controls	 in	 order	 to	 avoid	 incurring	 a	relatively	small	 loss.	The	 level	of	PD	patients	demonstrated	for	potential	 losses	was	a	less	optimal	decision	pattern	compared	to	that	of	the	control	group,	as	it	was	 too	 risky	 of	 a	 response	 strategy	 to	 minimise	 losses	 over	 time.	 When	 the	findings	of	Chapter	4	are	considered	 in	 tandem	with	Chapter	3,	 it	appears	 that	opioid-dependent	individuals	may	be	more	sensitive	to	experiencing	a	loss	than	the	non-drug	users,	and	that	this	sensitivity	may	promote	risky	decision-making	in	order	to	avoid	 future	negative	outcomes.	For	example,	a	heroin	user	may	be	aware	of	the	risk	of	an	overdose,	given	the	unpredictability	of	heroin’s	potency,	but	 the	aversiveness	of	withdrawal	or	 continuing	emotional	distress	 appear	 to	be	powerful	motivating	factors	to	risk	a	potentially	fatal	outcome.		When	correlations	between	IU	and	PD	were	initially	assessed	in	Chapter	4,	IU	did	not	appear	to	relate	meaningfully	to	either	PD	of	gains	or	PD	of	losses.	However,	when	 regression	 analyses	were	 conducted,	 higher	 IU	was	 associated	with	risk-taking	for	losses	in	the	patient	group.	This	result	aligns	with	the	study	reported	in	Chapter	2,	which	found	that	greater	IU	was	positively	correlated	with	self-reported	 impulsivity	only	 in	opioid-dependent	patients.	 Chapter	4	delivers	further	support	for	an	inverse	relationship	between	impulsivity	and	IU	in	opioid-dependent	 individuals	 compared	 to	 the	 general	 population.	 Those	 with	 an	addiction	may	be	impacted	by	uncertainty	in	a	paradoxical	way,	which	results	in	risky	rather	than	cautious	decisions	when	a	potential	loss	is	at	stake.	We	did	not	observe	an	interaction	between	PD	of	gains	and	opioid-dependency	in	regards	to	
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IU,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 differential	 impact	 of	 IU	 on	 risk-taking	 in	 opioid-dependency	is	limited	to	risking	negative	outcomes.	Considering	the	great	risk	of	harm	 involved	 in	opioid	abuse,	 the	 findings	of	Chapter	4	provide	 some	 further	illumination	on	how	faulty	attitudes	towards	uncertainty	may	lead	to	destructive	choices	in	those	with	drug	addiction.	The	 studies	 reported	 in	 Chapters	 3	 and	 4	 utilised	 tasks	 that	operationalized	 rewards	 and	 punishments	 numerically	 (i.e.	 number	 of	 points	accrued)	 or	monetarily	 (i.e.	 hypothetical	money).	 Chapter	 5	 presented	 a	 novel	task	assessing	PD	of	health	outcomes,	which	is	a	PD	domain	that	has	not	yet	been	applied	to	 illicit	substance	abuse.	The	findings	of	Chapter	4	may	not	have	been	generalizable	 to	 behaviour	 outside	 the	 laboratory,	 and	 it	 was	 the	 purpose	 of	Chapter	5	to	construct	a	PD	task	that	would	be	more	relevant	to	drug	abuse	or	more	personally	meaningful	to	participants	than	intangible	sums	of	money.	The	health	 scenarios	 were	 derived	 from	 those	 created	 by	 Chapman	 and	 Elstein	(1995)	and	while	they	were	not	written	to	be	specifically	relevant	to	substance	abuse,	many	patients	remarked	over	the	course	of	testing	that	they	could	relate	to	 the	 symptoms	 described	 in	 the	 scenarios.	 However,	 we	 failed	 to	 find	 any	significant	 differences	 between	 patients	 and	 controls	 in	 discounting	 of	 either	gains	 or	 losses.	 This	 is	 surprising	 given	 the	 health	 decisions	 made	 by	 drug	abusers	on	a	daily	basis,	and	contrasts	with	a	study	conducted	by	Poltavski	and	Weatherly	 (2013)	 that	 found	 heavy	 smokers	 PD	 general	 heath	 outcomes	 less	than	non-smokers.	An	interaction	was	found	in	Chapter	5	between	IU	and	PD	of	health	 gains,	 in	 which	 patients	 showed	 a	 preference	 for	 small,	 certain	 health	gains	as	their	IU	increased.	There	was	no	meaningful	correlation	between	IU	and	
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PD	of	health	gains	in	the	control	group,	which	suggested	that	IU	may	be	related	to	risk-aversion	regarding	health	outcomes	in	opioid-dependent	individuals.		It	 is	noteworthy	 that	money	was	discounted	differently	between	groups	in	Chapter	4,	but	health	was	discounted	similarly	in	Chapter	5.	Past	research	has	evidenced	 that	 delayed	 health	 improvements	 are	 discounted	 at	 a	 greater	 rate	than	delayed	sums	of	money	(Chapman	&	Elstein,	1995;	Lazaro	et	al.,	2002),	and	delayed	 illness	 is	 discounted	 less	 compared	 to	 delayed	monetary	 gains	 (Petry,	2003).	 Due	 to	 difficulties	making	 direct	 comparisons	 between	 domains	 across	the	 separate	 studies,	 statistical	 analysis	 was	 not	 conducted	 to	 ascertain	statistical	 differences	 between	 PD	 of	 health	 and	 PD	 of	money.	 Regardless,	 the	differences	 in	 discounting	 domains	 between	 Chapters	 4	 and	 5	 are	 interesting	because	health	consequences	are	highly	relevant	for	opioid	addicts.	It	would	be	reasonable	 to	 expect	 differences	 in	 the	way	patients	discount	health	 outcomes	compared	 to	non-drug	abusers,	 given	 the	 risks	opioid	users	are	willing	 to	 take	with	 their	 health,	 and	 that	 patients	 and	 controls	 demonstrated	 different	 risk-taking	patterns	about	monetary	outcomes.		
Impulsivity	and	IU	in	opioid-dependency	IU	 reflects	 negative	 attitudes	 towards	 uncertainty	 and	 is	 the	 basis	 of	worry	and	highly	co-morbid	with	anxiety.	It	was	expected	that	IU	would	also	be	a	factor	in	drug	addiction,	given	the	similar	maladaptive	decision-making	apparent	in	 chronic	drug	use.	The	 four	 empirical	 studies	 reported	 in	 this	 thesis	 support	impulsivity	 as	 a	 multi-dimensional	 decision-making	 construct,	 and	 provide	evidence	that	the	relationships	between	certain	facets	of	impulsivity	and	IU	are	unique	 in	 opioid-dependent	 individuals.	 A	 visual	 summary	 of	 the	 meaningful	
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relationships	between	IU	and	impulsivity	across	chapters	can	be	found	in	Figure	6.1.			
	
IU	
	 Opioid-dependent	 Control		 	 Attentional	impulsivity	
		 		 		Overall	BIS*	impulsivity	 		 		 	Lose-shift	responding		 					 Risk-seeking	monetary	losses		 	
	 Risk-seeking	of	health	gains		
			
	Figure	 6.1.	 The	 relationship	 between	 IU	 and	 impulsivity	 dimensions	 between	participant	groups		*	p	=	.064			 There	 was	 a	 pattern	 of	 impulsive	 response	 to	 positive	 versus	 negative	outcomes	across	Chapter	3	and	Chapter	4.	Patients	reacted	more	impulsively	to	punishments	 than	 controls,	 and	 they	 appeared	 to	 be	 more	 risk-taking	 when	faced	 with	 a	 financial	 loss.	 Taken	 together,	 these	 results	 suggest	 that	 opioid-dependent	 are	 more	 sensitive	 to	 punishments	 (i.e.	 are	 more	 loss-averse)	 and	
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appear	 to	 contradict	 other	 research	 showing	 that	 drug	 addiction	 is	 associated	with	dampened	sensitivity	to	negative	outcomes	(Hester,	Bell,	Foxe,	&	Garavan,	2013;	 Potts	 et	 al.,	 2006).	 However,	 there	 is	 evidence	 for	 stress	 circuitry	impairments	 and	 dysfunctional	 stress	 regulation	 in	 drug	 addicts,	 which	 may	make	 these	 individuals	 more	 reactive	 to	 the	 negative	 affect	 associated	 with	punishments.	 Uncertain	 negative	 outcomes	 create	 stress,	 which	 is	 a	 possible	explanation	why	 patients	were	more	 impulsive	 on	 the	 uncertainty	 impulsivity	measures.	Our	results	also	have	implications	for	relapse.	It	is	well	documented	in	animal	research	that	stress	in	the	form	of	foot	shocks	elicit	the	reinstatement	of	drug	seeking	(Shaham,	Erb,	&	Stewart,	2000),	and	stress	imagery	can	elicit	drug	cravings	 in	 humans	 similar	 to	 drug	 cues	 (Sinha,	 Fuse,	 Aubin,	 &	Malley,	 2000).	Consequently,	 researchers	 have	 theorised	 that	 relapse	 is	 triggered	 by	 stress	because	 stress	 disrupts	 the	 behavioural	 inhibition	 system	 responsible	 for	supressing	drug	taking.		More	relevant	 to	 the	present	 thesis	 is	 the	 interaction	observed	between	IU	 and	 impulsivity	 in	 relation	 to	 negative	 outcomes	 in	 the	 patient	 group.	 The	uncertainty	inherent	in	the	feedback	tasks	of	Chapter	3	and	in	the	probabilistic	outcomes	in	Chapter	4	ostensibly	elicits	stress	and	anxiety	in	those	with	high	IU.	Stress	 created	 by	 uncertain	 threat	 in	 IU	 individuals	 therefore	 can	 lower	inhibition,	 and	 thus	 result	 in	 impulsive	 behaviours,	 particularly	 in	 people	who	have	pre-existing	dysfunction	in	stress	circuitry	and	stress	regulation.	In	relation	to	 relapse,	 rehabilitated	 drug	 addicts	 who	 have	 low	 tolerance	 for	 uncertainty	may	 be	 especially	 vulnerable	 to	 reinstating	 drug-taking	 behaviour	 following	stress.	
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These	conclusions	are	tempered	by	the	lack	of	discounting	differences	of	probabilistic	health	losses	between	participant	groups	in	Chapter	5,	and	that	the	relationship	between	IU	and	health	losses	were	similar	between	groups.	This	can	potentially	 be	 explained	 by	 the	 finding	 that	 the	 relationship	 between	 IU	 and	losses	in	Chapter	5	very	small	and	non-significant	in	both	groups,	indicating	that	something	 about	 the	 health	 losses	 scenario	 was	 not	 impacted	 by	 attitudes	towards	uncertainty.	This	may	be	attributable	to	the	health	scenario	itself,	in	that	it	involved	health	detriments	occurring	during	the	course	of	a	treatment	that	was	guaranteed	to	result	in	a	positive	outcome.	Similarly,	the	relationship	between	IU	and	health	gains	that	was	not	observed	in	previous	chapters	may	be	a	result	of	the	temporary	nature	of	the	health	improvements,	which	occurred	in	the	context	of	a	life-long	illness.		 Overall,	the	results	from	the	empirical	chapters	of	the	thesis	clearly	show	that	 IU	 and	 impulsivity	 interacted	 only	 in	 opioid-dependent	 patients,	 which	suggests	 that	 negative	 attitudes	 towards	 uncertainty	 need	 to	 be	 addressed	 in	drug	treatment	programs.	 	
6.2	Contributions	and	applications	The	 connection	 between	 IU	 and	 addiction-related	 impulsivity	 factors	clearly	illustrates	the	need	to	address	IU	in	all	stages	of	addiction	prevention	and	treatment.	 Promisingly,	 a	 number	of	 recent	 studies	have	demonstrated	 that	 IU	can	 be	 modulated	 through	 cognitive	 interventions	 in	 clinical	 and	 non-clinical	populations.	 Oglesby,	 Allan,	 and	 Schmidt	 (2017)	 developed	 a	 cognitive	 bias	modification	 method	 to	 improve	 negative	 perceptions	 of	 ambiguity	 that	 are	hallmark	of	 IU.	Participants	with	 elevated	 levels	 of	 IU	were	 “trained”	 to	 assign	
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neutral	 or	 positive	 interpretations	 to	 ambiguous	 phrases	 through	 positive	 and	negative	feedback.	For	example,	an	ambiguous	phrase	such	as	“the	doctor	called”	can	either	be	interpreted	neutrally	as	an	appointment	reminder	(rewarded	with	positive	feedback)	or	negatively	as	a	disease	diagnosis	(punished	with	negative	feedback).	 This	 IU-focused	 cognitive	 bias	 modification	 paradigm	 yielded	 a	significant	reduction	in	IU	at	post-intervention,	as	assessed	by	the	IUS	(Oglesby	et	 al.,	 2017).	 These	 improvements	were	maintained	 at	 a	 one-month	 follow	up,	suggesting	 that	 a	 relatively	 simple	 cognitive	 bias	 modification	 procedure	 can	have	a	lasting	impact	on	negative	interpretations	of	uncertainty.		 Cognitive	behavioural	 interventions	have	also	 found	success	 in	reducing	IU	 in	 clinical	 samples.	 A	 cognitive	 behavioural	 therapy	 (CBT)	 intervention	targeting	 IU	 has	 been	 developed	 by	 Hui	 and	 Zhihui	 (2017),	 and	 involves	psychoeducation	about	IU,	recognition	of	uncertainty,	uncertainty	exposure,	and	problem	re-orientation	when	dealing	with	uncertainty.	The	authors	found	that	in	a	sample	of	adults	with	GAD	diagnosis,	IU-focused	CBT	had	success	in	reducing	IU,	 depression,	 anxiety	 and	 GAD	 symptoms	 at	 post-intervention.	 Furthermore,	improvements	 were	 sustained	 at	 a	 six-month	 follow	 up.	 Decreases	 in	 IU	 have	also	been	accomplished	indirectly	through	therapies	for	anxiety	and	depression.	IU	 reductions	 have	 been	 observed	 after	 group	 CBT	 for	 anxiety	 (Talkovsky	 &	Norton,	 2016)	 and	 social	 phobia	 (Mahoney	 &	 McEvoy,	 2012a),	 as	 well	 as	mindfulness-based	cognitive	therapy	 for	panic	disorder	 (Kim,	Lee,	Kim,	Choi,	&	Lee,	 2016).	 IU	 was	 improved	 following	 transdiagnostic	 CBT	 for	 patients	diagnosed	 with	 anxiety	 and/or	 depression	 (Boswell,	 Thompson‐Hollands,	Farchione,	 &	 Barlow,	 2013).	McEvoy	 and	 Erceg-Hurn	 (2016)	 propose	 that	 not	only	is	IU	a	transdiagnostic	factor	for	a	variety	of	emotional	disorders,	but	is	also	
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a	 “trans-therapy”	 factor	 that	 can	 be	 both	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 modulated	 by	diverse	 types	 of	 therapies.	 There	 are	 no	 studies	 to	 date	 that	 assess	improvements	 in	 IU	 following	SUD	 treatment,	which	 is	unsurprising	given	 that	IU	 has	 not	 received	 attention	 in	 the	 addiction	 literature.	However,	 the	 current	thesis	 presents	 robust	 evidence	 that	 IU	 is	 a	 factor	 for	 consideration	 when	treating	maladaptive	decision-making	in	chronic	drug	users.		Early	 interventions	 targeting	 the	 association	 observed	 between	 IU	 and	coping	motives	 for	 alcohol	 use	may	 be	 successful	 in	 preventing	 alcohol	 abuse,	considering	that	using	alcohol	as	a	coping	strategy	is	risk	factor	for	alcohol	abuse	disorder	 (Carpenter	&	Hasin,	1999;	Kraemer	et	al.,	2015;	Oglesby	et	al.,	2015).	Similar	 interventions	 could	 also	 be	 effective	 for	 opioids,	 as	 it	 is	 commonly	accepted	that	opioids	are	also	used	to	manage	stress	and	relieve	emotional	pain	(Khantzian,	 1985).	 The	 role	 of	 individual	 differences	 can	 also	 be	 vital	 for	screening	 patients	 who	 may	 be	 vulnerable	 to	 developing	 an	 addiction	 from	prescribed	 opioid	 medication.	 Oxycodone	 (OxyContin),	 which	 has	 double	 the	potency	 as	 morphine,	 was	marketed	 to	 primary	 care	 physicians	 for	 moderate	pain,	 despite	 it	 being	 originally	 dispensed	 by	 oncologists	 and	 physicians	 with	pain	 management	 training	 to	 cancer	 patients	 (General	 Accounting	 Office,	2003)(General	Accounting	Office,	2003).	While	increased	media	and	government	attention	 in	 United	 States	 has	 brought	 more	 awareness	 to	 the	 dangers	 of	pharmaceutical	 opioids,	 opioids	 are	 still	 commonly	prescribed	with	99%	of	 all	OxyContin	 prescriptions	 made	 in	 the	 United	 States	 (Manchikanti,	 2007).	Unfortunately,	 those	 who	 have	 been	 opioid	 naïve	 prior	 to	 receiving	pharmaceutical	opioids	clearly	have	pre-existing	vulnerabilities	that	need	to	be	accounted	for	before	prescribing	highly	addictive	drugs.		
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Given	 that	 IU	 may	 be	 a	 trans-diagnostic,	 trans-therapy	 factor,	 the	inclusion	 of	 IU	 reduction	 efforts	 in	 substance	 abuse	 treatment	 could	 also	ostensibly	 improve	 rehabilitation	 outcomes.	 Correcting	 negative	 perceptions	about	 uncertainty	may	 improve	 self-appraisals	 of	 control	 and	 enable	 problem-focused	 coping	methods,	 rather	 than	 emotional-focused	 strategies	 (Taha	 et	 al.,	2014),	 which	 has	 also	 has	 implications	 for	 preventing	 relapse	 in	 response	 to	stress.	Furthermore,	reducing	stress	elicited	by	uncertainty	in	opioid-dependent	individuals	receiving	maintenance	therapy	 is	 important,	as	stress	has	shown	to	increase	 extra-medical	 opioid	 craving	 in	 this	 cohort	 (Hyman,	 Fox,	 Hong,	Doebrick,	 &	 Sinha,	 2007).	 Improving	 perceptions	 about	 uncertainty	 may	 also	increase	 confidence	 for	 methadone/buprenorphine	 patients	 to	 progress	 past	maintenance	 therapy	 and	 become	 fully	 independent	 of	 any	 opioids.	 Finally,	focusing	on	creating	a	stable	everyday	environment	for	a	recovering	addict	may	be	 crucial	 for	 attaining	 long-term	 success,	 as	 the	 literature	 has	 demonstrated	that	 supressing	 cognitions	 about	 uncertainty	 can	 deplete	 the	 willpower	necessary	to	resist	temptation	(Milkman,	2012).		
6.3	Limitations	and	future	directions	The	 limitations	 particular	 to	 individual	 studies	 have	 been	 discussed	 in	their	 relevant	 chapters,	however	 there	are	a	number	of	 general	 considerations	that	need	to	be	accounted	for	when	interpreting	the	results	of	the	current	thesis.		A	 key	 consideration	 is	 that	 the	 methodology	 used	 does	 not	 allow	 us	 to	differentiate	between	the	acute	effects	of	opioid	maintenance	treatment	and	the	long-term	effects	of	opioid-dependency.	However,	we	consistently	found	that	the	length	 of	 opioid	 use	 or	 abuse	 was	 not	 correlated	 with	 the	 behavioural	 or	
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personality	measures,	 a	 result	 that	 provides	 tenuous	 evidence	 that	 impulsivity	observed	in	patients	may	predate	addiction.	The	cognitive	side	effects	 involved	with	 methadone	 and	 buprenorphine	 maintenance	 therapy	 may	 have	 also	impacted	patients’	responses.	For	example,	Rass	et	al.	(2014)	found	that	working	memory	 was	 significantly	 worse	 in	 methadone	 patients	 at	 peak	 timing	 of	methadone	 administration	 (120	 minutes	 after	 dosage)	 compared	 to	 trough	timing	(26	hours	after	last	dosage).	Alternatively,	Gorzelaczyk,	Fareed,	Walecki,	Feit,	 and	Kunc	 (2014)	 found	 that	 risky	decision-making	and	response	 time	(on	the	 Iowa	 Gambling	 Task)	 were	 reduced	 in	 methadone-maintained	 patients	shortly	 following	 their	 daily	 methadone	 dose.	 In	 the	 present	 thesis,	 it	 was	necessary	 to	 conduct	 each	 study	 shortly	 after	 participants	 had	 been	administered	 their	 medication,	 as	 daily	 administration	 of	 medication	 is	mandatory	 and	 it	 would	 not	 be	 ethical	 to	 interfere	 with	 patients’	 treatment	programs.	 It	 is	 possible	 that	 the	 decision-making	 demonstrated	 by	 patient	participants	may	change	over	the	course	of	the	day	as	the	acute	effects	of	their	medication	 tapers	 off.	 The	 best	 attempt	 was	 made	 to	 exclude	 data	 from	participants	who	appeared	to	be	cognitively	impaired,	however	future	research	using	this	cohort	would	benefit	from	a	cognitive	acuity	screening	measure	before	testing.		Treatment-seeking	opioid	users	may	 also	demonstrate	 altered	 cognitive	factors	 related	 to	 impulsivity,	 such	 as	 in	 executive	 control.	 Severtson,	 Von	Thomsen,	 Hedden,	 and	 Latimer	 (2010)	 found	 that	 low	 scores	 on	 an	 executive	functioning	 task	 predicted	 less	 treatment	 seeking	 in	 active	 heroin	 and/or	cocaine	 users,	 and	 scores	 were	 negatively	 correlated	 with	 self-recognition	 of	problematic	 drug	 use.	 There	 also	 may	 be	 differences	 in	 cognitive	 functioning	
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between	 abstinent	 opioid-medication	 maintained	 patients	 and	 non-treatment	seeking	 active	 heroin	 users,	 as	 evidenced	 by	 Verdejo,	 Toribio,	 Orozco,	 Puente,	and	 Pérez-García	 (2005).	 The	 authors	 observed	 that	 compared	 to	 abstinent	heroin	 users	 about	 to	 commence	 rehabilitation,	 methadone-maintenance	patients	 demonstrated	 impairments	 in	working	memory,	 analogical	 reasoning,	cognitive	 flexibility,	processing	speed	and	visuo-spatial	attention.	Furthermore,	there	 is	 evidence	 that	 methadone-maintenance	 therapy	 may	 impact	 risky	decision-making	 in	 opioid	 users	 compared	 to	 heroin	 users	 who	 are	 not	 in	treatment,	 in	 ways	 that	 cannot	 be	 accounted	 for	 by	 individual	 differences	 in	impulsivity	(Ersche	et	al.,	2005).		A	 final	 question	 that	 the	 current	 thesis	 is	 unable	 to	 answer	 is	 whether	data	obtained	from	opioid-medication	maintained	individuals,	who	have	ceased	involvement	 with	 illicit	 drugs,	 can	 generalise	 to	 opioid	 abusers	 who	 have	 not	sought	treatment.	Psychological	dependence	is	delineated	from	physical	opioid-dependence	 in	that	the	former	 involves	a	craving	for	the	drug’s	hedonic	effects	(Inturrisi,	 2002).	While	 all	 the	 patient	 participants	 in	 the	 current	 thesis	 were	physically	 opioid-dependent,	 the	 patients	 widely	 differed	 in	 regards	 to	psychological	 dependence.	 On	 one	 extreme	were	 patients	 who	 were	 regularly	using	drugs	other	than	their	medication	to	“get	high”	and	who	were	still	involved	in	a	drug-taking	lifestyle.	On	the	other	extreme	were	patients	who	had	not	used	illicit	 substances	 in	 decades,	 and	who	were	 living	 healthy,	 pro-social	 lifestyles.	There	 may	 be	 inherent	 personality	 differences	 in	 psychologically	 dependent	drug	 users	 compared	 to	 those	 who	 are	 only	 physically	 dependent,	 and	 future	research	would	benefit	from	addressing	this	question.		
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6.4	Conclusion	Intolerance	 of	 uncertainty	 is	 higher	 in	 opioid-dependent	 individuals	 and	 may	uniquely	influence	impulsive	decision-making,	in	that	it	may	result	in	heightened	impulsivity	 that	 is	 not	 typically	 characteristic	 of	 IU.	 Impulsive	 individuals	who	are	prone	to	addiction	may	also	react	to	uncertainty	in	negative	ways	that	reflect	their	 lived	experience	with	uncertainty.	 IU	may	also	arise	due	to	shared	neural	connections	 with	 impulse	 control,	 reward	 valuation	 and	 addiction.	 The	 cause	and	effect	nature	of	these	associations	are	yet	to	be	determined	in	future	studies.	However,	 the	new	 information	provided	by	 this	 thesis	 significantly	 contributes	to	 our	 understanding	 of	 the	 individual	 vulnerabilities	 that	 contribute	 to	 the	current	 opioid	 epidemic,	 and	 provides	 initial	 insight	 to	 guide	 the	 creation	 of	future	studies	on	the	topic.				 		 	
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Appendix	A		 The	Barratt	Impulsivity	Scale	–	Version	11		
DIRECTIONS:  People differ in the ways they act and think in different situations.  
This is a test to measure some of the ways in which you act and think.  Read each 
statement and fill in the appropriate circle on the right side of the page.  Do not spend 
too much time on any statement.  Answer quickly and honestly. 		 									                 		 Rarely/Never		 	Occasionally	 	 			Often	 Almost	Always/Always			1.					I	plan	tasks	carefully.	 						2.					I	do	things	without	thinking.			 				3.					I	make	up	my	mind	quickly.	 				4.					I	am	happy-go-lucky.	 				5.					I	don’t	“pay	attention.”	 				6.					I	have	“racing”	thoughts.	 				7.					I	plan	trips	well	ahead	of	time.	 				8.					I	am	self-controlled.	 				9.					I	concentrate	easily.	 				10.			I	save	regularly.	 				11.			I	“squirm”	at	plays	or	lectures.	 				12.			I	am	a	careful	thinker.	 				13.			I	plan	for	job	security.	 				14.			I	say	things	without	thinking.	 				15.			I	like	to	think	about	complex	problems.	 				16.			I	change	jobs.	 				
2	
41	
3	 4	
3	2	1	
1	
43	2	1	
43	2	1	
41	3	2	1	 41	3	2	11	 41	3	2	11	 41	3	2	1	 41	3	2	1	 43	2	1	
41	3	2	1	 43	2	1	
41	3	2	1	 43	2	1	
41	3	2	1	 43	2	1	
41	3	2	1	
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17.		I	act	“on	impulse.”	 				18.		I	get	easily	bored	when	solving	thought	problems.	 				19.			I	act	on	the	spur	of	the	moment.	 				20.			I	am	a	steady	thinker.	 				21.			I	change	residences.	 				22.			I	buy	things	on	impulse.	 				23.			I	can	only	think	about	one	thing	at	a	time.	 				24.			I	change	hobbies.	 				25.			I	spend	or	charge	more	than	I	earn.	 				26.			I	often	have	extraneous	thoughts	when	thinking.	 				27.			I	am	more	interested	in	the	present	than	the	future.	 				28.			I	am	restless	at	the	theater	or	lectures.	 				29.			I	like	puzzles.	 				30.			I	am	future	oriented.	 						 	
43	2	1	
41	3	2	1	 43	2	1	
41	3	2	1	 43	2	1	
41	3	2	1	 43	2	1	
41	3	2	1	 41	3	2	1	 41	3	2	1	 41	3	2	1	
43	2	1	
41	3	2	1	 43	2	1	
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Appendix	B	
		The	Intolerance	of	Uncertainty	Scale	
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Appendix	C	
	The	State	Trait	Anxiety	Questionnaire	–	Form	Y-2	
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Appendix	D			 Schematic	of	probability	discounting	procedure	and	calculation	of	an	indifference	point			Item	 Receive	for	certain	 	Receive	at	25%	chance	 	1	 $1000	 $1000	 	2	 $950	 $1000	 	3	 $900	 $1000	 	4	 $850	 $1000	 	5	 $800	 $1000	 	
IP	=	Mean	of	values	at	the	switch	point	($550	&	$500)	=	$525	6	 $750	 $1000	7	 $700	 $1000	8	 $650	 $1000	 	9	 $600	 $1000	 	10	 $550	 $1000	  
ç Switch	point	from	certain	to	probabilistic	reward	11	 $500	 $1000	12	 $450	 $1000	13	 $400	 $1000	 	14	 $350	 $1000	15	 $300	 $1000	16	 $250	 $1000	 	17	 $200	 $1000	18	 $150	 $1000	 	19	 $100	 $1000	 	20	 $50	 $1000	 			Figure	C.1.	Choices	between	monetary	rewards	for	the	25%	probability	block	of	questions,	with	example	answers	from	participant	#101	in	bold	font.		 	
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Appendix	E			Probability	discounting	functions	as	indices	of	risky	decision-making		
			
	Figure	D.1.	Example	probability	discounting	functions	for	gains	and	losses	interpreted	in	regards	to	risk	attitudes		The	graphs	show	that	risk	is	assessed	inversely	for	loss	discounting.		
		
	 212	
Appendix	F		 Participant	information	sheet		
 
 
Studying Cognitive Function in Patients with Addiction 
 
INFORMATION FOR PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study that is looking at cognitive 
function in adults. The objective is to investigate cognitive function in 
individuals who are receiving treatment for addiction, and healthy people who 
have no addiction problems. The study involves the completion of 
questionnaires and a computer task that measure different aspects of 
cognitive functioning. Participation in the study will take up to a maximum of 1 
hour to complete.  
 
The study is being conducted within this institution by Professor Paul Haber 
from the Drug Addiction Unit, and  Dr Ahmed Moustafa from Western Sydney 
University.  
 
The study is being supported by a research grant from the University of 
Western Sydney. 
 
Study Procedures 
 
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to sign the 
Participant Consent Form.  You will then be asked to complete a 
computerised cognitive test, and few general questionnaires. These will seek 
information on your cognitive functioning and will take about 50 to 60 minutes 
to do. In addition, the researchers would like to have access to your medical 
record to obtain information relevant to this study. 
 
Risks 
 
The risks of participating in this study are: 
 
The study requires you conducting some questionnaires and doing a 
computerised task, which will take approximately 50 minutes. Participants will 
be compensated financially for their participation in the study and there will 
not be any kind of risk or harm for their participation. 
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Benefits 
 
While we intend that this research study furthers medical knowledge and may 
improve the treatment of addiction problems in the future, it will not be of 
direct benefit to you. 
 
Costs 
 
Participation in this study will not cost you anything.  You will be reimbursed 
$20 for your travel expenses and participation in our study. 
 
Voluntary Participation 
 
Participation in this study is entirely voluntary.  You do not have to take part in 
it.  If you do take part, you can withdraw at any time without having to give a 
reason.  Whatever your decision, please be assured that it will not affect your 
medical treatment or your relationship with the staff who are caring for you. 
 
Confidentiality 
 
All the information collected from you for the study will be treated 
confidentially, and only the researchers named above (or other authorised 
personal as appropriate) will have access to it. The study results may be 
presented at a conference or in a scientific publication, but individual 
participants will not be identifiable in such a presentation. 
 
It is also possible that the results of this study may be used in other like 
projects conducted by Dr Ahmed Moustafa and colleagues, but will not be 
used in any way that reveals my identity. 
 
Further Information 
 
When you have read this information, Professor Haber will discuss it with you 
further and answer any questions you may have.  If you would like to know 
more at any stage, please feel free to contact Dr Ahmed Moustafa (Phone: 
9772 6847; email: a.moustafa@uws.edu.au) 
 
This information sheet is for you to keep. 
 
Ethics Approval and Complaints 
 
This study has been approved by the Ethics Review Committee (RPAH Zone) 
of the Sydney Local Health District.  Any person with concerns or complaints 
about the conduct of this study should contact the Executive Officer on 02 9515 
6766 and quote protocol number X16-0356. 
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Appendix	G		Participant	consent	form	
 
 
 
I, 
...................................................................................................................................... 
[name]  
 
of 
 
..............................................................................................................................…….[
address]  
 
have read and understood the Information for Participants on the above named 
research study and have discussed the study with  
.............................................................................................. 
 
I have been made aware of the procedures involved in the study, including any 
known or expected inconvenience, risk, discomfort or potential side effect and of their 
implications as far as they are currently known by the researchers. 
 
I understand that my participation in this study will allow the researchers and others, 
as described in the Information for Participants, to have access to my medical record, 
and I agree to this. 
 
I understand that the results of this study may be used in other like projects 
conducted by Dr Ahmed Moustafa and colleagues but will not be used in any way 
that reveals my identity 
 
I freely choose to participate in this study and understand that I can withdraw at any 
time. 
 
I also understand that the research study is strictly confidential. 
 
I hereby agree to participate in this research study. 
 
 
NAME:   
 ........................................................................................................... 
 
SIGNATURE:  
 ........................................................................................................... 
 
DATE:   
 ........................................................................................................... 
 
NAME OF WITNESS: 
 .................................................................................................. 
 
 
SIGNATURE OF WITNESS:
 .................................................................................................. 
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Appendix	H	
	Ethics	application		
ETHICS APPLICATION FORM FOR HUMAN RESEARCH 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 1: ADMINISTRATION AND SUBMISSION TO OTHER HUMAN RESEARCH 
ETHICS COMMITTEES (HRECs) 
 
 
1.1 (a) Full study title 
 
Decision Making, Learning, and Memory: Studying Cognitive Function in Healthy Patients 
with Addiction 
 
 (b) Short name by which the study will be known (if appropriate) 
 
Decision Making, Learning, and Memory  
 
1.2 (a) Name of Chief Investigator 
 
Dr Ahmed Moustafa 
 
 (b) Name(s) of Co-, Associate- and/or Student-Investigator(s) 
 
Co-investigator 2: Professor Paul Haber 
Study co-ordinator: Dr Christa Lam-Cassettari 
 
 
1.3 Indicate the exact SLHD (RPAH Zone) location at which the study procedures / 
data collection will be undertaken, ie department, building, level, etc. 
 
Drug Health Services, Royal Prince Alfred Hospital, Camperdown, NSW, 2050 
(directed by Dr. Paul Haber) 
. 
 
1. Project details 
 
HREC Application Reference Number: 
 
Name/ID of HREC reviewing the research project: 
 
Project Title (in full): Decision Making, Learning, and Memory: Studying Cognitive Function in 
Healthy Patients with Addiction 
 
2. Project summary  
Provide a brief description (half page) of the project details to enable the research 
governance officer to understand the nature and impact of the research project at the 
research site. 
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One limitation of prior research in the field of addiction is the largely exclusive focus 
on decision making and impulsivity measures. Here, we aim to extend current 
knowledge by departing from this route and focusing more on learning from gains or 
losses, in addition to systematically assessing a wider range of measures that 
comprehensively evaluate other cognitive functions that have been posited to 
influence addictive behaviours. 
 
In collaboration with Dr Paul Haber (Addiction Unit, RPAH), in this project, we will 
test cognitive function in individuals with diagnosed addiction problems compared to 
healthy controls. Although prior studies have reported cognitive changes in 
individuals with addiction, it is not clear how these changes (including executive 
function) correlate with psychiatric symptoms, including behavioural inhibition and 
impulsivity. In addition, there are various theories explaining why some individuals 
show addictive problems, including abnormal valuation of wins vs. losses or 
executive dysfunction.  In this project, we will test both healthy control subjects and 
individuals with addiction on both (a) computerized cognitive tasks (which test 
learning from wins vs. losses) and (b) clinical measures (Barratt Impulsiveness 
Scale). We will test the plausibility of existing cognitive theories of addiction. In 
addition, we predict that cognitive changes might explain some of the symptoms in 
individuals with addiction. 
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